$3.75
(Canada $4.75)

November 1998
Number 87

FIRST THINGS

ORIGINAL SIN
A DISPUTATION
Edward T. Oakes

WHAT WOULD NEWTON DO?
Phillip E. Johnson

PRO-LIFE THEN & NOW
Dave Andrusko

Michael W. McConnell on THE SUPREME COURT 1998
Daniel P. Moloney on QUESTIONING EVERYTHING
Michael R. Linton on MUSIC FOR THE END OF TIME
Luke Timothy Johnson on RAYMOND E. BROWN

ALSO: A World of Our Own Making • James Nuechterlein on Sin, Theodicy & Politics • Michael Nolan on What Aquinas Never Said About Women • Dennis Prager • Avery Dulles • Jean Bethke Elshtain David B. Hart • Allen G. Weakland • J. Budziszewski

0 73361 64655 2 11

Richard John Neuhaus
The Public Square
A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$3.75
Canada $4.75)

November 1998
Number 87

FIRST THINGS

ORIGINAL SIN
A DISPUTATION
Edward T. Oakes

WHAT WOULD NEWTON DO?
Phillip E. Johnson

PRO-LIFE THEN & NOW
Dave Andrusko

Michael W. McConnell on THE SUPREME COURT 1998
Daniel P. Moloney on QUESTIONING EVERYTHING
Michael R. Linton on MUSIC FOR THE END OF TIME
Luke Timothy Johnson on RAYMOND E. BROWN

ALSO: A World of Our Own Making • James Nuechterlein on Sin, Theodicy & Politics • Michael Nolan on What Aquinas Never Said About Women • Dennis Prager • Avery Dulles • Jean Bethke Elshtain David B. Hart • Allen G. Weakland • J. Budziszewski

0 73361 64655 2

Richard John Neuhaus
The Public Square
A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Interested in teaching in a unique Catholic school?

SPIRITUS
SANCTUS
academy

Spiritus Sanctus Academies

- Small, private Catholic schools
- Grades K-8
- Rich sacramental life
- Challenging curriculum
- Multi-age learning environment

Send a resume:

Spiritus Sanctus Academy
2600 Via Sacra
Ann Arbor, MI 48105
(734) 995-4770

The Schools are administered by the Sisters of Mary, Mother of the Eucharist.

For more information about the community contact:

Mother Assumpta Long
4399 Ford Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48105
(734) 994-7437 smme@rc.net



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIRST THINGS

NOVEMBER 1998 • Number 87

CORRESPONDENCE 2 The nature of conscience; over-affirming ourselves; (Dis)United Methodists; the evangelical mind; revelation and truth; ecumenical anxieties; friends of Luther; sports "monomania" and the New York Yankees

THIS TIME 7 *James Nuechterlein* Sin, Theodicy & Politics

OPINION 9 *Daniel P. Moloney* Questioning Everything?
Michael Nolan What Aquinas Never Said About Women
Michael R. Linton Music for the End of Time

ARTICLES

16 *Edward T. Oakes* Original Sin: A Disputation

25 *Phillip E. Johnson* What Would Newton Do?

REVIEW ESSAY 32 *Dave Andrusko* The Pro-Life Movement Then and Now

REPORT 37 *Michael W. McConnell* The Supreme Court 1998

BOOKS 40

Luke Timothy Johnson An Introduction to the New Testament by Raymond E. Brown
Dennis Prager The Gifts of the Jews by Thomas Cahill
Avery Dulles After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity by Miroslav Volf
Jean Bethke Elshtain Raymond Aron: The Recovery of the Political by Brian C. Anderson
David B. Hart Religious Mystery and Rational Reflection by Louis Dupré
Allen G. Weakland Sacred Passion: The Art of William Schickel by Gregory Wolfe
J. Budziszewski For Fidelity by Catherine M. Wallace;
. . . *and* Briefly Noted

THE PUBLIC SQUARE 71 A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life
Richard John Neuhaus
This Month: A World of Our Own Making, *etc.*
Poetry by *Susan St. Martin* (8), *Marjorie Maddox* (15, 31), *J. Bottum* (24)

Editor-in-Chief: *Richard John Neuhaus*
Editor: *James Nuechterlein*
Managing Editor: *Matthew Berke*
Associate Editor: *Daniel P. Moloney*
Editorial Assistants: *Sarah E. Hinlicky, Alicia Mosier*
Publisher: *Institute on Religion and Public Life*
Publishing Service: *Publishing Management Associates*

FIRST THINGS: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life (ISSN #1047-5141) is published monthly (except for combined issues June/July and August/September) for $29 per year by the Institute on Religion and Public Life, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY and additional mailing office. POSTMASTER: send address changes to FIRST THINGS: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. FT, Denville, NJ 07834. **Editorial Offices:** The Institute on Religion and Public Life, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010. **Editorial Phone:** (212) 627-1985. **Advertising Offices:** 129 Phelps Avenue, Suite 312, Rockford, IL 61108. **Advertising Phone:** (815) 398-8569. **Subscription Department:** P.O. Box 3000, Dept. FT, Denville, NJ 07834. 1-800-783-4903. Unsolicited material cannot be returned unless accompanied by sufficient return postage. Newsstand distribution by Eastern News Distributors, Inc., One Media Way, 12406 Rt. 250, Milan, OH 44846. Copyright © 1998 by the Institute on Religion and Public Life. All rights reserved. Produced in the USA.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIRST THINGS

FIRST THINGS is published by Religion and Public Life, an interreligious, nonpartisan research and education institute whose purpose is to advance a religiously informed public philosophy for the ordering of society. RPL also sponsors scholars conferences, consultations, research projects, public educational events, and a fellows program.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Midge Decter
Mary Ann Glendon
Stanley Hauerwas
Gilbert Meilaender
David Novak
Michael Novak
George Weigel

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Hadley Arkes
James Burtchaell
David Dalin
Thomas Derr
Jean Bethke Elshtain
James Finn
Ernest Fortin
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese
Suzanne Garment
Robert George
Bruce Hafen
Carl F. H. Henry
Russell Hittinger
Leonid Kishkovsky
Glenn Loury
George Marsden
Max Stackhouse
Robert Louis Wilken

Correspondence

Written on the Heart

I liked J. Budziszewski's emphasis on conscience as an active, rather than passive, force ("The Revenge of Conscience," June/July). I want to take issue, though, with one point he makes early on concerning Paul's so-called reference to natural law in Romans 2:14-15.

Romans 2:14-15 is the only scriptural passage that Christians use to buttress the idea of natural law. If we eliminate it we are left with a Bible that is silent on this issue. If natural law exists, if every individual has some kind of innate ability to discern God's basic moral requirements, this is crucial for understanding mankind. But why is the Bible so empty of references? The Bible has so much to say about the nature of man; certainly it should speak to this. As it is, the ancient Hebrews are silent.

In the Bible, law has only two sources: It is either spoken by God to people such as Adam, Noah, or Moses, or it is written by God on the heart of the individual person. Professor Budziszewski refers to the commands given to Noah and a rabbinic tradition that sees this as some kind of law for all humanity. But there is no mention of this in the Genesis passage itself, and Prof. Budziszewski refrains from the next step of making these commands some kind of innate moral compass. Maybe he thinks innateness is implied simply because the commands are supposedly universal. But the crucial point is that in the Bible there is no law independent of God's voice or action. To separate law from God Himself and make it a part of nature, we have to go outside the Scriptures. It is significant that Prof. Budziszewski reaches for tradition when linking Noah with natural law—these syntheses of the philosophical and the scriptural usually occur under the banner of tradition.

Tom Odeski
Dallas, TX

While reading J. Budziszewski's remarkable essay "The Revenge of Conscience" I kept thinking of a remark of Aristotle to the effect that the moral person already knows what is moral. Meaning, the moral philosopher's task is not to *establish* what is moral or immoral but to illuminate judgments we are already capable of making without the ministrations of the professional philosopher. (This view, by the way, exactly parallels his epistemology, which does not seek to ground or *justify* our knowledge, as if what we know would remain pure opinion without the aid of the philosopher.)

Similarly for Professor Budziszewski, conscience seems to function somewhat the way grammar does: one need not have a theoretical grasp of grammar to speak coherently, nor need one have a theoretical grasp of ethics to hear the voice of conscience; indeed to follow the injunctions of contemporary ethics is often, as the author shrewdly points out, to fall prey to the nemesis of a mistaken conscience. Thus in our civilization of massive ethical confusion, what remains as the fixed point is the integrity of conscience, just as the cacophony of political and philosophical convictions still gets expressed in an identical grammar.

If this is an accurate statement of the gist of his article, my question for Prof. Budziszewski is this: can conscience change? Is it, in other words, more analogous (to use Noam Chomsky's terminology) to the surface grammars of the different languages of the world or is it better compared to the deep, universal grammar that all languages have in common?

This question occurred to me precisely because of the example of Aristotle: although his analysis of ethics is still far superior to most of his modern competitors, there can be no question that the conscience of mankind has changed since

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Aristotle's day, most notoriously on the question of slavery and the equality of women. Simply put, can this evolution in the conscience of the human race be accounted for under the rubric of Prof. Budziszewski's remarkably lucid essay?

Edward T. Oakes, S.J.
Regis University
Denver, CO

J. Budziszewski's analysis of our present moral degradation and how we got to our present situation is without doubt the finest analysis I have ever read. The results of our abandonment of the natural law are so clear that the only question is whether we can ever make our way back as a culture and as a civilization. We have gone from a civilization that was penetrated through and through with the values of Judeo-Christianity and natural law foundations (the killing of the innocent, the nature of perversion, the definition of marriage, etc.) to the very opposite of these elements of natural law as the foundation of this society (abortion as right, perversion as respect, divorce as freedom, killing of the innocent as obligation). My only question—is there any way back?

If Malraux was correct when he said that "the twenty-first century will be a religious century or it will be nothing at all," then our only hope is a Christian religious conversion which alone has the strength, discipline, and power to return us to virtue and the demands of natural law. The pragmatists, naturalists, relativists, and rationalists are doomed to disappear because they have no roots and reasons for existence. In the West, our only hope resides here.

Peter J. Riga
Houston, TX

J. Budziszewski replies:
I think I understand why Tom Odeski believes we disagree more than we really do. Because I speak of a "natural" law, he reads into my discussion the pagan view of nature as self-existent and independent of God. On the contrary, I affirm the biblical view of nature as completely dependent upon its Creator but partially expressive of His purposes. It is true that extra-biblical revelation is insufficient for salvation and can be adequately understood only in the light of biblical revelation, but the Bible itself contradicts Mr. Odeski's view that there is no revelation outside the Bible.

According to Scripture, extra-biblical moral revelation comes in at least four modes. There is the fact that we are made in the image of God, which not only gives us rational and moral capacities, but also tells us of an unknown Holy One who is different from our idols (Genesis 1:26-27, Acts 17:22-23). There are the facts of our physical and emotional design, in which a variety of God's purposes are plainly manifest (Romans 1:26-27). There is the principle of the harvest, which teaches us by linking every sin with consequences (Proverbs 1:31, Jeremiah 17:10). Finally there is the mode on which I focused—the law of conscience, known inwardly (Romans 2:14-15).

Mr. Odeski is silent about the first three modes, but takes me to task for the fourth. But conscience is presupposed throughout the Scriptures. How can Abraham know about justice before the Sinaitic code (Genesis 18:25)? How can Israel admire the Sinaitic code unless it already knows about justice (Deuteronomy 4:8)? And finally, how can God hold gentiles accountable for their sins if they have never received a moral law at all (Romans 2:1-16)? The answer in each case is the same: Because there is a law written on the heart.

Edward T. Oakes asks an intriguing question that already contains the germs of a reply. Like grammar, conscience has both an unchanging deep structure and a changing surface structure. The great Scholastic thinkers recognized this, speaking of both *synderesis*, which cannot err, and *conscientia*, which can. A phenomenon they knew about but did not analyze is that *conscientia* cannot only err but rationalize; we can either try to come to terms with first principles, or play tricks with them instead. Just as Father Oakes suggests, the *conscientia* of a society can either advance or regress, depending on which of these responses it chooses to make. The focus of my article is the perverse tribute that our rationalizations pay to the very principles they deny.

Peter J. Riga's question is fitting and his answer, I think, correct; I have only to thank him for giving them voice.

Deepest thanks to all three correspondents for their thoughtful remarks.

Compassion and Morality

Gilbert Meilaender ("Affirming Ourselves to Death," June/July) is quite right in his statement that "feeling it necessary to 'affirm' every person . . . we find it difficult to state and adhere to any standard of conduct." One might expect (but deplore) this in secular society, but the greatest tragedy is that it has so permeated our Christian churches.

I suggested that my Catholic parish put a decorated crib in the foyer on Mother's Day to collect donations of baby clothes for a local Catholic agency helping women with problem pregnancies. I was told that we shouldn't do that because it would make women in the parish who had had abortions feel bad.

I have heard from a number of Catholics that going to confession is not advisable because it is hard on self-esteem. They oppose the "Lord I am not worthy" prayer before communion for the same reason. As a pastoral minister said, "Who is the priest to tell us that we're not worthy!"

"Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all." Or, as Professor Meilaender says, "Compassion taken alone . . . kills morality."

Mary Theresa Anderson
South St. Cloud, MN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Keeping Methodists Together

As an elder and pastor in the United Methodist Church, I feel compelled to share some thoughts on William J. Abraham's "United Methodists at the End of the Mainline" (June/July).

I find it sad that "conservative or classical Methodists" like myself, as Professor Abraham calls us, are being accused of "splitting the church" over the theological and ethical crisis in which we find ourselves. May I remind everyone of what John Wesley said? "It is dangerous to depart from Scripture.... Most of the controversies which have disturbed the church have arisen from people wanting to be wise above what is written, not contented with what God has plainly revealed there."

Prof. Abraham's solution to the current crisis is "to stimulate conversation toward the emergence of a new theological consensus that might command the allegiance of a majority in the church at large." May I suggest a good place to start: Stand at the crossroads and look; ask for the ancient paths, ask where the good way is, and walk in it, and you will find rest for your souls (Jeremiah 6:16).

The Lord spoke these words through Jeremiah in the midst of a situation of theological and ethical compromise, much like the compromise we see in the United Methodist Church today. These words don't ask us to look at the crossroads for ways to accommodate ourselves to the world around us. They simply encourage us to ask for the ancient paths, the right way plainly revealed in Scripture, and to follow them. For it is here, and only here, that we as a church will find rest for our souls.

(The Rev.) Mark A. Rains
Hershey, PA

William J. Abraham missed one supremely important factor keeping the United Methodist Church together: denominational ownership of *all* church property.

If this were not the case, by now untold numbers of local churches would have been long gone. Long, long gone.

(The Rev.) Ron Steltzlani
Mondovi-Gilmanton Charge
Mondovi, WI

Praising or Damning?

One is hard pressed about what to make of Preston Jones' essay "More Scandals of the Evangelical Mind" (June/July).

The conclusion seems to argue for at least tolerance of fundamentalists. Their "young people have some familiarity with the Bible," "they give more (of their finances) away," without them "the pro-life cause would be in more desperate straits" and the "American family would be an even greater disaster." Consequently, he says, holding them in contempt "should be resist[ed]." However, holding them in "contempt" is precisely what the first 80 percent of his essay does through words of others, with himself concluding that fundamentalists don't have "all that much to give in the first place." Is he truly trying to temper criticism of fundamentalists, or to plead for tolerance while actually damning them with faint praise?

It is worth noting that while the intelligentsia pontificate on arcane matters, it is the "great unwashed" (Jones' term), of all religious persuasions, that are manning drug rehab centers, food kitchens, crisis pregnancy centers, homeless shelters, hospice organizations, jail ministries, and similar outreaches. Arcane matters may not be trivial, but throughout the Bible, as in Matthew 25:34-36, God's interest is in—and He blesses—those who go, give, provide, visit, and serve—not intellectuals who attain a superior education and pontificate.

Forrest H. Scott
Middletown, OH

Preston Jones replies:
Many thanks to Mr. Scott for his letter. He seems to have read my essay too literally, allowing no quarter for irony, humor, and (my wife requires me to add) sarcasm. For instance, he construes my poking fun at fundamentalists as "contempt." But a good bit of that poking was aimed at myself, my own family, and folks whose memories I cherish. Otherwise I don't see that he and I have any disagreements.

Christian Arrogance

Until I realized that Jerry L. Walls was a Southern Baptist, I wondered how a reasonably reflective Christian could write his portion of "Must Truth Offend? An Exchange" (June/July).

J. A. DiNoia undoubtedly sets the matter straight in a scholarly and gentle manner. Nonetheless, allow me to join the conversation where Walls affirms "that if a religious seeker of good will was properly informed of the teachings of Christianity, of the evidences for it, and likewise with respect to other religions, and was not influenced by cultural biases (assuming for the sake of argument this could be the case), then that seeker would believe Christianity. If he would not, he would not be a person of good will." That, I submit, reflects an arrogance that brings Christianity into disrepute. Consider the following.

First, salvation is God's business, not man's, including Christian man's.

Second, revelation requires faith for revelation to be revelation, as parent requires child in order to be parent. Faith is *total* gift. No one dare impute moral culpability of any degree to one who does not accept Jesus Christ for reasons known only to God.

Third, public history and cosmic success are assured in the real ontological order in the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. The private history and personal appropriation of this reality is known only to the living God. As Augustine said centuries ago, "Many whom God has the Church does not have; many whom the Church has God does not have."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our task as Christians, whether in pastoral work or missionary work, is to *witness* to Christ, not to convert others to Christ. Conversion is a highly personal matter between the human being and the unique mysterious figure of Jesus Christ. The act of faith that engages the whole person, mind and will and heart, is nevertheless impossible without the gift of grace, which enlightens the mind, strengthens the will, and delivers the heart to the beloved Father. No one dare enter the personal sanctuary of this holy secret intercourse between the Holy Trinity and each individual human being. As Bernanos' dying country priest uttered, "All is grace." We with the great gift of this faith have indeed the duty and hope and joy to pray that all the world believe, that all the world be one. But our task is not to convert others to Christ but to witness to Christ in our own daily lives. We cannot and should not seek to manipulate God's gift of the grace of faith. We must not judge others who cannot or do not accept Jesus Christ.

David Dehler
Ottawa, Ontario

Jerry L. Walls replies:
I want to thank Mr. Dehler for his response to my article. It is noteworthy, however, that his attributing arrogance to me confirms my central thesis, namely, that basic religious disagreement inevitably comes down at some point to judgments of moral culpability. He did not, I take it, intend the charge of arrogance as a moral compliment. Mr. Dehler is surely right that salvation is God's business and none of us are in a positon to judge with certainty the faith or salvation of another. But the notion that belief in Christ is essential for final salvation is hardly a negotiable matter for Christian theology. The passages in Pascal I cited which judge unbelief to be culpable reflect a long tradition in Christian teaching that goes all the way back to the Athanasian Creed and even to Christ himself.

In the same vein, Mr. Dehler is mistaken in his claim that revelation requires faith in order to be revelation, properly speaking. Surely revelation requires faith in order to be appropriated in a saving way. But revelation can also be met by willful unbelief and rejection. It is no less revelation for that. Indeed, it is precisely because it remains revelation even when rejected that makes such rejection culpable. Mr. Dehler is also correct that conversion is God's work and not ours. But Christian conversion is surely not a personal matter only between individuals and God. Christians are called to give public witness to their faith by way of confession, baptism, and regular participation in the means of grace. For the record, I am a United Methodist, not a Southern Baptist. But given the current doctrinal indifference of oldline Protestant denominations, the confusion is understandable. I do not mind being identified with the Baptists on these matters just as I am sure I would never be accused of being a Methodist for arguing that essential orthodox belief really is important.

Churches or Church?

In "Ecumenical Anxieties" (Public Square, June/July), Lutheran theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg, at Father Neuhaus' invitation, comments on the recent statement by 150 German theologians which asserts that the Lutheran-Catholic Joint Declaration on Justification does not represent the consensus that is claimed. Professor Pannenberg intuits that this statement "expresses Protestant anxieties that such an ecumenical agenda may end up in Lutheranism being swallowed completely into the 'hierarchical structure' of the Roman Catholic Church." "But," he rejoins, "the declared aim of the ecumenical process is rather communion among churches, or, as Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger has phrased it, 'remaining churches while becoming one Church.'"

To be sure, the restoration of full ecclesial communion does not require melding the separated churches into a megachurch. The Catholic Church is a communion of distinct churches—indeed, a communion of communions—having a diversity of liturgical rites, canonical disciplines, spiritual and theological traditions (within the Great Tradition of Christian orthodoxy), and even (to some degree) systems of outward organization. Theoretically, then, establishing full communion between Catholics and Lutherans need not entail "Lutheranism being swallowed completely into the 'hierarchical structure' of the Roman Catholic Church."

On this point it is crucial to clarify terms. Lutherans need not enter the *Roman* Catholic Church, if by "Roman" is meant, not the Catholic Church in general, but the particular church of Rome (as distinct from, say, the Maronite Church in union with Rome).

DORDT COLLEGE

FACULTY POSITIONS

Dordt College is seeking Christian academicians for openings beginning August 1999 in the following areas:

Art
Business Administration: two positions
Computer Science and Mathematics: potential two-year position
Director of Graduate Education
Economics
Education: potential two-year position
Health, Physical Education, and Recreation
Philosophy
Spanish
Theatre Arts: potential one-year position

Evaluation of applications will begin December 1 and continue until the positions are filled. To learn more about the position and receive application materials, qualified persons committed to a Reformed, biblical perspective and educational philosophy are encouraged to send a letter of interest that provides evidence of that commitment and a curriculum vitae to Dr. Rockne McCarthy, Dordt College, 498 4th Ave. NE, Sioux Center, IA 51250, facsimile: 712 722-4496; e-mail: vpaa@dordt.edu

Dordt College is an equal opportunity institution that encourages the nominations and candidacies of women, minorities, and persons with disabilities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lutherans *could* in theory remain a distinct entity within the family of sister churches that comprises the Catholic Church whose center is Rome. But, as Pope John Paul II reaffirmed in *Ut Unum Sint*, Catholic ecumenism cannot settle for any kind of reunion that does not entail hierarchical communion with the Roman See. For Catholics, the principle of "reunion without absorption" is acceptable, provided it includes visible unity with Peter's successor. In his book *Called to Communion*, Cardinal Ratzinger points out that "both neighborly solicitude and living relation with Rome pertain to the catholicity of a bishop [and, a fortiori, of his church] as ways of giving and receiving in the great communion of the one Church."

With that important qualifier, the question remains: Once full agreement in doctrine between Lutherans and Catholics has been reached and intercommunion becomes possible, should Lutherans (or any of the Reformation churches, for that matter) retain a corporate identity at all? Is the Lutheran communion, like the Eastern-rite Catholic churches, sufficiently distinct in its rites, its spirituality, its discipline, and its articulation of the gospel to warrant remaining a distinct body within the one Church? Incorporating Lutherans into the Roman church seems sensible to me, given our common (i,e., Western) cultural, theological, and liturgical patrimony, as well as the adaptability of the modern Roman rite to particular "usages" (e.g. Anglican and Zairean).

The name of the ecumenical game, so to speak, may indeed be "remaining churches while becoming one Church." I merely question the advisability of this approach in *every* instance, especially with regard to the separated Western bodies. Absorption ought not always be regarded as a dirty word.

(The Rev.) Thomas M. Kocik
St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church
Hyannis, MA

No Help at All

With a mixture of amusement and irritation I read the report in While We're At It (June/July) on Baptists and Seventh-day Adventists rushing to the defense of Luther's doctrine of justification, and in the process demolishing Luther's sacramental theology.

It does need clearly to be understood that there are orthodox Lutherans, both here and elsewhere, who believe that *Evangelicals and Catholics Together* (ECT) is an inadequate articulation of the doctrine upon which we firmly believe the church stands or falls: the doctrine of justification by grace alone, through faith alone, on account of Christ's work alone.

This is all well and good. Healthy, honest, sober-minded debate over the doctrine of justification can only prove helpful to the cause of true and genuine unity in the Faith. Who knows? Such honest dialogue may even catch on in ecumenical circles. But then the World Council of Churches might have to go out of business, and with it, its local franchise, the National Council of Churches USA.

But with the Southern Baptists and Seventh-day Adventists "helping" us Lutherans, as apparently they are attempting to do, one can't help but recall the old adage, "With friends like these . . ."

(The Rev.) Paul T. McCain
Assistant to the President
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod
St. Louis, MO

From a Hedgehog to a Fox

So, James Nuechterlein has outed me. In his essay "The Weird World of Sports" (This Time, June/July), he says, "My colleague Matt Berke . . . is a monomaniacal sports nut. He likes only one sport, baseball, and only one team, the New York Yankees. Which of these is the more unfathomable is hard to say." Well, I'm certainly honored, after all these years, to be described as the archetype of *something*; but when my friend characterizes this mania as "unfathomable," I need to explain.

First, true baseball fans are not narrow-minded sports fans; often they are not sports fans at all but simply baseball fans—who may or may not have a casual interest in other games. (I don't.) Baseball, however, is the only game deserving of serious attention or devotion: football, basketball, boxing, etc. may be symbolic reenactments of war but only baseball is a reenactment of life (including war). However, this is not the place for yet another hymn to "the national pastime," so I'll leave it at that.

As for the Yankees, this loyalty is not unfathomable at all. They were the only local team when I was six years old, the Dodgers and Giants having left for California and the Mets still on the drawing board. Had I grown up in the Boston area, I would have been a fierce Red Sox fan, and probably by now utterly broken in spirit. It was simply luck, I suppose, that the home team happened to be filled with certifiable heroes: Mickey, Whitey, Yogi, Moose, Elston, and a newcomer named Roger Maris whom a lot of people didn't like even though (really *because*) he broke Babe Ruth's home run record, and whether he was wearing his trademark insouciant grin or his sad, hang-dog look Maris always had a little curl at the lip that reminded me of Elvis Presley. And of course, the Yankees represented Tradition, with an apostolic succession that ran from Ruth to Gehrig to DiMaggio to Mantle. Rooting for them was *not*, as envious detractors frequently say, like rooting for U.S. Steel, much less (as Mr. Nuechterlein suggests) like being for Germany against Poland in 1939; I don't think I ever rooted for the Germans in any war, except maybe in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, and perhaps not even then.

Matthew Berke
FIRST THINGS
New York, NY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THIS TIME

Sin, Theodicy & Politics

James Nuechterlein

It is a pleasure to recommend to readers Father Edward Oakes' masterful essay on original sin elsewhere in this issue. My own pleasure in reading it was augmented by the reflections, both personal and political, it triggered in me.

It was the doctrine of original sin that made me, in my youth, an agnostic. I was a freshman at Valparaiso University taking a required course in basic Christian doctrine. (The main text for the course was C. S. Lewis' *Mere Christianity*.) I thought I knew Christian doctrine fairly well, but the instructor's discussion of Augustine and original sin early in the semester threw me for a loop. He wrote on the blackboard—I remember it vividly—the words "Sin" and "sin." Our lower-case sins, he told us, derive from our inherited upper-case condition of Sin, and it is that condition that is at the heart of the human problem of alienation from God.

The distinction between Sin and sin intrigued me—the vividness of the memory attests to that—but the more I pondered it the more it disturbed me. For if I was, quite literally, born in Sin, how could I be responsible for it? If the wrongs that I did proceeded inevitably from the nature of my fallen being, then what had previously seemed the ineffable grace of God in Christ in saving me from the deserved consequence of my deeds became the superfluous action of an arbitrary, indeed quite absurd, deity. I should be grateful for being rescued from a situation for which I had no moral responsibility in the first place? I should love a God who created me a sinner and then "saved" me from being what he had made me? I wrestled with all this as best I could but found no resolution. I finally concluded that, at its very heart, Christianity made no sense.

Well, not "finally," as it turned out. My journey back to Christian faith—including a full acceptance of the doctrine of original sin—was long and convoluted, too complicated to detail here, but it followed the intellectual arc Fr. Oakes' essay lays out. Pascal's conclusion was, in the end, my own: "Certainly nothing offends us more rudely than this doctrine, and yet without this mystery, the most incomprehensible of all, we are incomprehensible to ourselves." Mysteries of faith remained, but my true "finally" was that, at the deepest level of thought and experience, Christianity made more adequate sense of life than anything else on offer.

Fr. Oakes rightly cites Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) as the foremost American expositor of original sin and its consequences. Niebuhr was essential to my own intellectual development, but I first encountered his thought indirectly. I knew little about Niebuhr when, as a graduate student, I ran across a critique of his "Christian realism" in the postscript to the philosopher Morton White's *The Revolt Against Formalism*. It was a curious experience: I read the critique and promptly decided—without having first read Niebuhr—that, theological questions aside, White was wrong and Niebuhr right about the nature of politics. It took some years more for me to conclude—having read him in the meantime—that Niebuhr's account of the paradoxical truth of original sin held the answer to my late-adolescent objections to the doctrine. I came slower to his neoorthodox theology than to his politics. (You didn't have to be a Christian to buy into Christian realism: many secular intellectuals in the postwar period styled themselves "atheists for Niebuhr.")

Christian realism rested, in brief, on certain assumptions: that the imperfections of the world stem from fallen human nature; that the realities of self-interest, aggression, and the human will to power have to be reckoned with; that to improve the world it is necessary to work with those forces and not dream of obliterating them. Though the perversities of fallen humanity can, with considerable effort and ingenuity, be manipulated in the direction of the common good, they cannot entirely be overcome. Thus the anti-utopian imperative at the heart of Niebuhr's politics.

As the meeting place of power and morality, politics was inescapably for Niebuhr an arena of tension, ambiguity, and uncertainty. The central problem of politics is power, the inevitable temptation of people—most especially when acting collectively—to use whatever advantages are theirs to further their own interests over those of others.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Niebuhr's argument for democracy differed so radically from that of most on the religious left in his day. For them, democracy rested on the possibility of human perfectibility. Niebuhr, by contrast, famously insisted that while it is humanity's capacity for justice that makes democracy possible, it is humanity's inclination to injustice that makes democracy necessary.

Niebuhr's version of liberal democracy—whether directed to domestic or international concerns—rested on the concept of the balance of power. A serious politics requires at all times elements of deterrence, of checking power with counterpower. Realism, Niebuhr said, means that you achieve the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

common good not just by unselfishness but by the restraint of selfishness. Since power is never in stable equilibrium, so neither is politics: it is an ongoing process, not an achieved end. There can be no dream of perfect justice. Politics has to do with the relatively better, or even the lesser evil.

Liberals like to remind conservatives—and they do so quite properly—that Niebuhr remained throughout his life a man of the left, that his gradual journey away from the socialism of his youth never took him beyond the New Deal. He never gave any evidence of repudiating the regulatory or welfare state. If he was in the end a sober, tough-minded liberal, he remained nonetheless a liberal.

That's true enough, but it doesn't settle the question of Niebuhr's legacy. His theological perspectives can doubtless be made to comport with a number of political positions, but it seems clear that at whatever point on the political spectrum they are applied, their influence will inescapably tend in a conservative direction. It is no accident that neoconservatives are more likely to cite Niebuhr than are liberals. Liberals recall him in program, but not in spirit.

Niebuhr inspired a brilliant moment in liberal history—he was a leading intellectual and political force in the supersession of the 1930s Popular Front by the non-Communist left after 1945—but the post-1950s development of the left suggests that Niebuhr's was a moment that never formed itself into an enduring mood. Certainly the voices of contemporary liberal Protestantism, and of liberalism in general, recall more of the earlier Social Gospel he so sharply challenged than of Christian realism.

In fairness, it must be conceded that modern American conservatism has little of the Niebuhrian spirit itself. Ronald Reagan, the most successful conservative the country has ever known, was at heart a cockeyed optimist, and his untroubled confidence in the limitless possibilities of American civilization was untouched by Niebuhrian reservations. The fact that Niebuhrians fare badly at either end of the political spectrum suggests that, for most Americans, the politics of original sin is an alien notion.

Maybe that offers a useful lesson. Maybe all Augustinian Christians—which Niebuhr certainly was—need periodically to remind themselves that even in the (relatively) good earthly dwelling that America provides, we have here no abiding city. FT

the road to St. Catherine's

yoga is bogus
to DesCartes
father of the modern art
of keeping
body and soul apart

ask directions
from
Gracie
at Simmons Store
a racy
eighty year old maid
a high heels lipstick
and cigarette
coquette
on her rocker
with a cheap romance
book
gives the yoga teacher
a withering glance
a distracted look

"all the way up
and all the way down
steep snake hill
then left right left
you'll spy
the Congregational steeple
kept lighted at night
high over the fields
St. Catherine's is right by"

Father Maroney greets me
with a twisted smile
from a heart attack
only a short while back
i do mahayana meditation
in his basement
with my class
while he says
the All Saints' Day mass
upstairs
and i hear
the words of consecration
for the first time
in twenty years

the road to St. Catherine's
is a quaint old
labyrinth
within it
both Buddha and DesCartes
get trapped
by the Sacred Heart

—Susan St. Martin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Opinion

Questioning Everything?

Daniel P. Moloney

Ever since Galileo, the received wisdom has held that an "expert" is somebody who "thinks scientifically," as can be seen in the drive to label every discipline a "science." Many scientists, ignoring the last thirty years of philosophical work showing the limitations of the scientific method, have exploited this need for experts to promote themselves as experts not just about physics or microbiology or entomology, but experts on everything, even human nature as such. Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Dawkins, E. O. Wilson, Stephen Pinker, Daniel Dennett: all these have, in recent years, tried to leverage their credentials as scientists into positions as guardians of public rationality. And all of them want to set the record straight: Science is close to figuring out all the answers, and anyone who says otherwise is an irrational obscurantist.

Rarely, however, does one find this view put so straightforwardly as in the three public lectures given by the late Nobel laureate physicist Richard P. Feynman, collected by Addison-Wesley and modestly titled *The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen Scientist*. The lectures, given at the University of Washington in 1963, were delivered from hastily organized notes and communicate that honesty which often accompanies improvisation. We find Feynman at his swashbuckling best, a genius physicist explaining to a lay audience what science is and how we live in "an unscientific age." Based on his scientific achievements, it is clear Feynman could have been an expert in just about anything; a man whose rationality has been tested against computational physics and quark theory could surely treat less difficult areas with ease. The irony is that Feynman's attitude now seems quite anachronistic; his confidence in the wide applicability of his scientific expertise rests upon ideas about science and rationality that we now regard as mere propaganda. Nonetheless, old habits are hard to break; when a scientist speaks of the deepest truths of mankind, most still treat him as an authority.

Take Feynman's second lecture, which examines why scientists become atheists and agnostics:

> A young man of a religious family goes to the university, say, and studies science. As a consequence of his study of science, he begins, naturally, to doubt as it is necessary in his studies. So first he begins to doubt, and then he begins to disbelieve, perhaps, in his father's God. . . . He learns to doubt, that it is necessary to doubt, that it is valuable to doubt. So he questions everything. . . . The result of this self-study or thinking, or whatever it is, often ends with a conclusion that is very close to certainty that there is a God. [But] it often ends, on the other hand, with the claim that it is almost certainly wrong to believe in God.

Feynman sees atheism as developing out of a methodological skepticism. First the science student begins to question his physical environment—"Why does this turn pink when I add three drops of acid but not two?"—and then, finding that the scientific method is a good way of examining reality, he turns his scientific methods to questions about God—"Now why would a good God have allowed Hitler to kill all those people?" "If God is omnipotent, why would he have needed to suffer and die in order to save us?" "If God is loving and could hear me, why didn't he answer my prayers?" All believers ask questions, of course. But the scientist is confident in his powers of reason, so if he runs into a sticky problem he works on it until he develops an answer:

> Suppose, however, our student does come to the view that individual prayer is not heard. . . . Then what happens? Then the doubting machinery, his doubts, are turned on ethical problems. Because, as he was educated, his religious views had it that the ethical and moral values were the word of God. Now if God maybe isn't there, maybe the ethical and moral values are wrong. And what is very interesting is that they have survived almost intact. . . . It seems to me that there is a kind of independence between the ethical and moral views and the theory of the machinery of the universe . . . [i.e.,] what things are and where they came from and what man is and what God is and what properties God has and so on.

According to Feynman, the student thinks that because the ethical principles he follows are derived from his religion, it would count in favor of his religion if the ethical principles could not be supported without his faith. But, Feynman argues, since atheists and believers do not act all that differently, since they have the same moral feelings and understandings of other people and of human nature, our stu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dent will see that one can keep the morality he believes without the questionable theistic "machinery of the universe." Therefore, learning to doubt and question rationally leads one to atheism, but to an atheism often accompanied by traditional morality.

It is hard to imagine a more quaint position than Feynman's theory about the independence of morality and religion, and about the similar morals of atheists and believers. His lectures were delivered before our national debates over abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, no-fault divorce, the redefinition of marriage and the family, normalization of homosexuality, in vitro fertilization, cloning, and fetal tissue research. Reliable contraception was even new back then, and the sexual revolution was only just beginning. Nowadays, one's religious view about "the machinery of the universe" and its purpose is the single most important factor in determining the position one takes on these issues. Which is not to deny that most traditional ethical principles are derivable from reason—they are. It's just that few atheists today are actually deriving them. A poll taken among the popular scientists mentioned above would not, I would venture, find widespread assent to the moral teachings of the Catholic Church. On this side of the 1960s, religion and morality seem more closely linked than ever.

There's another anachronistic feature of this story of the budding atheist, the notion that the scientist "questions everything." This is not only false, but so manifestly false that virtually nobody believes it today. Beginning with Thomas Kuhn, whose book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was published just months before Feynman delivered his lectures, almost every noted philosopher in the world has produced a devastating critique of the model of scientific reasoning that Feynman proudly and accurately describes as being "of the seventeenth century." I even saw this view refuted by the ditzy blond on the NBC sitcom *Friends*! And yet, as seen by Addison-Wesley's decision to publish this book and the favorable reviews it received in the *New York Times* and the *New York Review of Books*, the view of science that those who write for a popular audience wish to promote remains that of the relentlessly rational inquirer, the exposer of false assumptions, the professional skeptic.

Descartes questioned and doubted everything, but scientists don't. If we define a conclusion to be rational only if it can withstand the sort of skepticism Descartes employed, i.e., only if there is no logically possible alternative, then there might not be a single meaningful scientific conclusion that we can call rational.

John Henry Newman made a distinction between questioning a doctrine and investigating it. We *question* a doctrine when we withhold our assent from it while we try to find out whether it is true or not. We *investigate* a doctrine when we assent to it but keep trying to understand it better. A theologian who tries to explain how God can be good and yet allow evil is investigating the matter; presumably if he cannot come up with a satisfactory explanation he will not claim that God cannot be good, but that his own powers were not adequate to the task. Likewise, if a physicist were to see one billiard ball strike another but bounce back, he would not immediately question everything he knows about elastic collisions; he would investigate to see if the second ball were nailed to the table. Scientists assent to the fundamental rules of their discipline without Cartesian-style doubting; that's the only way they can get any research done. This is not a sign of the scientist's irrationality, but an indication that logical certainty is not to be found in science. To think otherwise is anachronistic.

So this means that Feynman has to tell a different story about why the young religious man who studies science becomes an atheist. If the young man is genuinely practicing science, he learns how to investigate his surroundings, accept that there are many things he does not know, and in general learn how to reconcile his assent to the scientific laws he has been taught with his less-than-ideal approximation of them in his experiments. In short, he learns how to accept things on authority and deal with his human epistemological limitations.

So why does the young man become an atheist? There are probably as many stories as there are atheists, but Feynman's own attitudes provide a clue. Feynman thinks it characteristic of the scientist that he be an expert in rational thinking as such. Since metaphysics and theology make allegedly rational claims about how the universe is, they are encroaching on his turf, and as *homo sapientissimus*, he feels authorized to judge their claims. The rest of religion consists of ethics and lifestyle choices that are not factual matters and so are not susceptible to rational investigation; as a result, not even scientists can become experts in such areas.

Feynman thinks that what a religion says about ethics is not rationally determinable, and what a religion says about the nature of the universe is a matter subject to rational investigation and is problematic on those grounds. So the man who comes to value scientific rationality as Feynman understands it will come to see religion as a set of falsehoods useful to persuade people to behave ethically. As we have seen, though, Feynman misrepresents the nature of scientific rationality in his lectures. Assuming that he and other science professors misrepresent the nature of scientific rationality to their students as well, we can begin to see why the students become atheists. From the false information they receive from their elders, they cannot help but reason falsely about the nature of religious belief. Were the students to realize that their training as scientists was actually training in in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vestigation and not in questioning, that each of them must give his assent to thousands of unproven claims in order for the field to progress, they might see that scientific reasoning is of a piece with reasoning in metaphysics, theology, and ethics. The difference is that its subject matter, the physical universe, makes reasoning much easier.

At the end of his third lecture, Feynman complains about how journalists cover developments in physics—always listening carefully, but in the end deciding, "Well, I understand this, but most of our readers won't." They go on to write something so simple that it conveys no helpful information to, for instance, another scientist who reads the newspaper. The journalists "assume that the public is stupider" than it is. Feynman points out that, in fact, a reporter is probably "dumber" than every member of his audience in some respect. He doesn't know how to fix washing machines, or write a macro for a spreadsheet, or dry-clean his suits. There are many things he does not know that somebody else does. Feynman makes this point to argue that journalists should simply record what the scientific experts tell them, and not simplify the story for their allegedly ignorant readers. If Feynman is the authority and the journalist is not, the journalist should transmit Feynman's expertise and not get in the way.

Of course, the argument cuts both ways. Feynman was an expert in physics, not in the philosophy of rationality. He and other scientists are not expert philosophers, nor as atheists do they have any clue how to lead a religious life in a scientific age. To use Feynman's phrase, they are "dumber," at least in this respect, than most religious intellectuals. They think they are "smarter" than they are because, they claim, all their beliefs are the result of scientific reasoning and are thus beyond rational doubt. This seventeenth-century idea would be as quaint as belief in alchemy, were it not so corrosive.

Don't be intimidated by Dennett, Dawkins, et al. Scientists make as many assumptions as the rest of us. And sometimes, just like the rest of us, their assumptions turn out to be wrong, especially when, like Feynman, they assume they know more than they do.

DANIEL P. MOLONEY *is Associate Editor of* FIRST THINGS.

Coming in December:

Avery Dulles
on
SHOULD THE CHURCH REPENT?

What Aquinas Never Said About Women

Michael Nolan

If the first casualty of war is the unwelcome truth, the first tool of the discontented is the welcome lie. Such lies cluster freely around Thomas Aquinas. Here I want to engage two frequently encountered in feminist literature: that he claims women are defective males and that he claims that the male human embryo receives a rational soul earlier than does the female. Aquinas nowhere makes the second claim, and as for the first, not only does he not assert it, he denies it no fewer than six times.

One may wonder why he should find it necessary to deny that woman is defective. The answer lies in Aristotle, who, in his account of reproduction, writes that "the female is as it were a defective male." As a Catholic theologian, Aquinas believes that God personally produced the first woman. She cannot therefore be defective. Yet Aristotle's name in the Middle Ages evoked all the awe that Einstein's does in our own. What he said about the female—or anything else—would be taken very seriously in the medieval universities. Aquinas therefore diplomatically attempts to set Aristotle's dictum in its context and to show that it has a strictly limited application which does not imply that women are defective.

Aristotle's theory of reproduction correctly identifies semen as the male reproductive substance. But he does not know about the existence of the ovum—that had to await the researches of William Harvey, the seventeenth-century Englishman who also discovered the circulation of the blood. Aristotle thinks that the female reproductive substance is a very pure fraction of the menstrual blood. Both substances, he says, are produced by the body in a process of "concentration" that requires heat. The male substance, the semen, is more concentrated than the female substance. Aristotle concludes that the male possesses more heat than does the female. The female, accordingly, is relatively lacking in heat, and this is the meaning of the statement that the female is a defective male. It is, as can be seen, a very limited statement, and has no more general significance than the assertion that women lack the muscular power of men.

Aristotle, however, has more to say. He thinks that the male semen seeks to "master" the female reproductive substance and to cause it to develop into a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

male child. But sometimes—manifestly on some 50 percent of occasions—the semen itself is "mastered," either because it is weak or because the female substance resists its action, or for some other reason. Then a female child is born. In other words, the female child is not what the male semen "intends," and arises from some failure in the action of the semen.

To be fair to Aristotle one must add that for him this failure is built-in by nature, for both females and males are required if animals are to reproduce and continue the species. The female is not truly defective, but only *as it were* defective.

Aristotle's phrase "the female is as it were a defective male" came to the Scholastics in the translation *femina est mas occasionatus. Occasionatus* is a word not found in classical Latin. The Scholastics use it to mean something caused unintentionally or accidentally. Now accidents, by and large, are for the worse, so much so that when they are for the better, we talk of a "happy" accident. The phrase therefore implies that there is something deficient in the female.

Aquinas, as has been said, takes the matter so seriously that he deals with it no fewer than six times. The main treatment is in his *Summa Theologiae* (1, 92, 1). The problem comes up when he is dealing with the creation of the world. He asks whether God should have created woman at the beginning of the world. Although the manifest answer to this is Yes, Aquinas nevertheless states some objections to this answer. The first objection is that Aristotle has said that the female is an "unintended" (*occasionatus*) male, and what is "unintended" is defective. It follows that woman is defective. Now God should not have made anything defective at the beginning of the world, and consequently He should not have made woman.

Aquinas answers the objection as follows. The female may not be intended by the male semen, but it is most certainly intended by nature. And since God is the author of nature, the female is intended by God. Being intended, it is not defective. Hence God rightly made woman at the beginning of the world.

> With respect to the particular nature the female is something defective and *occasionatum*, for the active force in the male semen intends to produce a perfect likeness of itself in the male sex; but if a female should be generated, this is because of a weakness of the active force, or because of some indisposition of the material, or even because of a transmutation [brought about] by an outside influence. . . . But with respect to universal nature the female is not something *occasionatum*, but is by nature's intention ordained for the work of generation. Now the intention of universal nature depends on God, who is the universal author of nature. Therefore, in instituting nature, God produced not only the male but also the female.

The passage requires some comment. The phrase "with respect to the particular nature the female is something defective" may suggest to ears unused to scholastic language that the particular nature of the female is defective. But "particular nature" means the power or force in a particular thing, and here the particular nature is the power in the male semen. There can be no doubt on this point, for in his *Summa Contra Gentiles* (3, 94) Aquinas explicitly states that the particular nature is the power in the semen.

The phrase that the female "is by nature's intention ordained for the work of generation" must not be taken to mean that the male is not so ordained. Aquinas argues explicitly in the same article that both woman and man have more important things to do than to procreate. Their primary task is to know and understand the world in which they live. Indeed the reason the sexes are distinct is precisely so that individual people can explore the world in their own way.

One may note the meaning Aquinas gives to the Genesis statement that the first woman was formed from the side of the first man. Woman, he says, (*Summa* 1, 92, 3) was not formed from man's head, because she should not dominate him. Neither was she formed from his feet, for she should not be despised by man, as though she was subject to him as a servant. Rather she was made from his side so as to signify that man and woman should be conjoined as allies (*socialis coniunctio*).

The mistaken attribution to Aquinas of the view that the male embryo receives a rational soul earlier than the female also arises from a commentary on Aristotle. Aquinas cites (*In 3 Sent.*, 3, 5, 2, co et ad 3) a passage from Aristotle's *History of Animals* which says that if an embryo is aborted, the articulation of the male can be perceived at forty days, that of the female after ninety days. He cites the passage because he wishes to argue that the body of Christ was complete in every detail, even if tiny, from the moment of conception, whereas other embryos are only gradually articulated. Neither in Aristotle's original statement nor in Aquinas' comment on it is there any reference to the infusion of the soul. There are more than fifty passages elsewhere in Aquinas where he does refer to the infusion of the rational soul. In none of these passages does he make any distinction between men and women.

All in all, then, those searching for evidence that Christianity has viewed woman as defective to man will have to look elsewhere than to Thomas Aquinas.

MICHAEL NOLAN *is Professor Emeritus in the Maurice Kennedy Research Center at University College, Dublin.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Music for the End of Time

Michael R. Linton

What is this century's greatest piece of music? Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring*? Schoenberg's *Moses und Aron*? Britten's *Peter Grimes*? Bernstein's *West Side Story*? Carter's Piano Sonata? I don't know the answer to the question. "Great" is hard to define: do we mean the most influential, most original, most subtly crafted, most popular? It's hard to say. But I am pretty confident as to what the century's most *miraculous* work is. Composed and premiered in a German prisoner-of-war camp, Olivier Messiaen's 1941 quartet for piano, clarinet, cello, and violin is a piece of musical radiance, joy, and transcendence in the midst of squalor and misery. In other words, it's a miracle.

Olivier Messiaen (1908-1992) was something of a cause célèbre even in his teens. While he was still a student at the famous Paris Conservatoire, his teacher Paul Dukas insisted that his publisher Leduc issue the seventeen-year-old Messiaen's *Le Banquet céleste* for organ. By graduation, Messiaen had won twice as many "firsts" as had Debussy, and was quickly appointed principal organist at the Church of La Trinité, one of Paris' most important musical posts (a position he was to hold to the end of his life). Barely out of his teens, Messiaen became a fixture of musical life in Paris, which in the early 1930s was the most fashionable (and richest) capital in Europe. Captivated by the Harlem import Josephine Baker (famous for appearing on stage adorned by only a few bananas), stylish Parisians crowded music halls a-sizzle with *le jazz-hot*. They only slightly less eagerly awaited the latest creations of Stravinsky, Poulenc, and Milhaud, either in the public theaters or in the rival private salons of the Polignacs and Beaumonts. But from the start, Messiaen's music spoke of a world radically different from the sophisticated cynicism of his contemporaries. It wasn't that his music was more conservative than Stravinsky's neo-classicism or Milhaud's jazz-influenced pieces—because, if anything, his was more radical—but that Messiaen's music spoke of a different world than that of the swank Paris boulevards.

Messiaen was a deeply committed Catholic. Although not raised by particularly religious parents, he described himself as having been "born a believer," and remarked that the most important function of his music was "[to shed] light on the theological truths of the Catholic faith." *Le Banquet céleste*, the piece which so impressed Dukas, was typical of the religiosity of almost all of the works that followed. Messiaen replaced traditional major and minor scales by those of his own invention, which not only resonated differently than the traditional scales, but were not bound by the same relationships. His most important innovation, though, was rhythmic. Messiaen began to complete the dislocation of rhythm from meter, which Wagner had begun and which Debussy continued, both by making his piece extremely slow and by avoiding any suggestion of a regularly weighted beat. Although only twenty-five measures long, the *Banquet* lasts for over six minutes. By any standards of the day, this was a daring piece of music.

But Messiaen's purpose was neither to amuse nor to shock. It was devotional. The *Banquet* was a profound (and unnerving) musical meditation on the sacrament of the eucharist; the most time-conscious of arts celebrating that least temporal event. Messiaen disjointed meter because the sacrament exists outside of time. And he adopted bizarre harmonies because the colors of such a celestial banquet are too vivid for the familiar progressions of Wagner and even Debussy to convey. The *Banquet* was not so much a work of art as an act of private piety publicly expressed. It was prayer first, music second.

Messiaen was thirty-one when France entered the war against Nazi Germany. In the previous decade he had received academic appointments to the École Normale and the Schola Cantorum, saw the first public performances of his orchestral triptych *Les Offrandes oubliées*, published a set of piano preludes and songs, and completed several cycles for organ. Although a pacifist, married, and the father of a two-year-old son, Messiaen volunteered for the hospital corps. He was overtaken by the German advance near Nancy in June 1940. Herded into cattle cars, Messiaen and his fellow prisoners of war were shipped across Germany to Silesia where he was imprisoned in Stalag 8a. He had no food and little clothing, but somehow he had managed to take with him a knapsack stuffed with Bach's Brandenburg concertos and scores by Ravel, Beethoven, Berg, and Stravinsky.

The camp commander soon discovered this bespectacled prisoner with all the scores, and gave him manuscript paper and a quiet place to compose. Three other musicians had been caught in the German advance (a cellist, a violinist, and a clarinetist), and Messiaen began to write for them. He completed the quartet late in 1940 (incorporating in it two earlier works rewritten from memory), and performed it in January 1941 in the prison camp. Of that first audience of four thousand prisoners and their guards, Messiaen later said, "Never have I been heard with as much attention and understanding."

Taking his title from (a slight mistranslation of) Revelation 10:6, Messiaen called it, *Quatour pour la fin du temps*, the "Quartet for the End of Time." The title worked at several levels: the work was about the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

apocalypse, but it also was a pun—the quartet separates rhythm from meter, so it is for the end of "time."

This revolution in rhythm is best seen in the quartet's introductory movement, the "Liturgy of Crystal." For the piano Messiaen superimposed a progression of twenty-nine densely voiced chords (some of which have as many as nine notes) upon a pattern of seventeen rhythmic durations. He added to this a cello part constructed of five harmonics coupled to a pattern of fifteen rhythmic values, arranged in two palindromes: the first a three-note rhythm and the second a twelve-note grouping. Messiaen would later call this kind of thing a "non-retrogradable rhythm." Messiaen had rediscovered a medieval device called "isorhythm," in which unequal patterns of chords, pitches, and rhythms revolved around each other—except for medievalists, few musicians knew of the device until the 1950s. By avoiding metrically defined phrases and patterns of stressed and unstressed beats, these isorhythmic "wheels within wheels" destroyed any sense of meter, and thus created a piece of music outside of "time."

This could have been merely a clever innovation. But Messiaen's purpose was more than just to be "progressive." In performance, should those multiple patterns be allowed to cycle through all their possible combinations, the movement would take about two hours. But Messiaen cut it off after only two and a half minutes for a theological purpose. This music functions as does an icon in Orthodoxy. Just as the icon isn't primarily an aesthetic object to be enjoyed but rather a "window" through which the devout glimpse the holy reality of the saint portrayed, so too the "Liturgy of Crystal" gives the listener a glimpse into the reality of the heavenly Jerusalem, a place beyond "time." His cycles are metaphors for the life of heaven, and the forty-three bars are a peek into eternity.

Messiaen reinforced that heavenly vision by his violin and clarinet parts. For the first time in his own writing, Messiaen incorporated bird songs, perhaps inspired—as have been so many prisoners before him—by the sight of birds free to fly over the prison walls. He would later describe birds as "little prophets of immaterial joy"; here he wrote flourishes reminiscent of the blackbird and nightingale for the clarinet and violin.

In his note to this movement, Messiaen wrote that he was trying to describe the "harmonious silence of heaven." Whatever that metaphor may mean, his bird calls, the nontonal harmonies, the isorhythmic palindromes, all coalesce in a piece of unearthly tranquility. If this heaven is not quite silent, it is certainly hushed and attentive, awaiting the angel's annunciation of the apocalypse.

Messiaen cast that apocalypse in eight movements, one for each of the days of creation, the seventh day of the sabbath extending into the eighth day of eternity. The second movement, "Song for the Angel Who Announces the End of Time," is an extended aria for the violin and cello accompanied by shimmering nontonal piano chords (Messiaen called them "waterfalls of red-hot pitch") bracketed with fortissimo flourishes by the whole ensemble. The third movement for clarinet alone is perhaps the earliest piece of minimalist music. In the fourth movement (a trio where the piano is silent), Messiaen showed his debt to Debussy and Ravel. The quartet's fifth movement for cello and piano alone, "Praise to the Eternity of Jesus," was one of Messiaen's reconstructions. The sixth movement is the work's most dramatic ("Dance of Wrath for the Seven Trumpets"). Here Messiaen rejected all harmony, writing for the instruments in startling unions which he called "music of stone, formidable and resounding granite; irresistible movement of steel . . . purple rage, icy ecstasy." The seventh movement ("Frenzy of Rainbows, for the Angel Who Announces the End of Time") returns us to the world of the second movement. The eighth movement ("Praise to the Immortality of Jesus") echoes the texture of the fifth movement, but here the solo instrument is violin instead of cello. This movement, with its simple iambic accompaniment and ethereal violin line, may very well be the most radiant and transfixing piece of music written this century.

The scope of Messiaen's imagination is stunning. The great revolutionary works of the previous generation can be seen as logical developments of nineteenth-century traditions. (Stravinsky's 1914 *Rite of Spring*, for instance, for all its genius, is only Rimsky-Korsakov's *Scheherazade* at a fever pitch.) Messiaen's work, however, is without precedent. And the sheer sonic beauty of Messiaen's textures and melodies dazzle. The unisons of the sixth movement are startling, and elsewhere the textures created by Messiaen's four instrumentalists make those created by Stravinsky with 111 players seem pale by comparison.

I have called the work a miracle. Certainly, any masterpiece is a kind of miracle. And it can be called miraculous that Messiaen found himself imprisoned where his abilities would not only be recognized by the camp commander, but encouraged and even rewarded by a performance. But what is most miraculous about this quartet is its character. This is deeply irenic and joyous music, yet it is written in a prison camp, by a prisoner, in the middle of a war, about the end of the world. This is not the kind of work one would most likely expect under such circumstances.

In the midst of chaos, Messiaen wrote about the apocalypse in a completely "unapocalyptic" manner. In the previous century, the sequence from the Requiem Mass had given composers the opportunity to unleash all the thunder they could muster to depict the horrific details of God's day of accounting. Berlioz and Verdi had both written depictions that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chill—or more honestly perhaps, thrill—us to this day. And not too long after Messiaen's quartet was completed, Schoenberg, Shostakovich, Britten, and Penderecki would write pieces expressive of the horrors of the Nazis and their war, music full of screams, howls, and cries for righteous justice against the oppressor.

But Messiaen has no place for such neo-pagan hysterics. In the middle of a prison camp, a prisoner unsure if he would ever again see his family or home again, Messiaen composed a vision of heaven where anger, violence, vengeance, and despair are not so much repressed as irrelevant. This work has nothing to do with war, or prison, or "man's inhumanity to man." This piece is entirely about the work of God and the glory of Jesus. There is no darkness here. There is no bitterness. There is no rage. Instead there is power, light, transcendence, ecstasy, and joy eternal.

Fortunately, this miracle is well represented on CD. There are at least two hundred CDs featuring Messiaen's work now on the market, twenty of which are performances of the *Quatour*. Probably the one overseen by Messiaen's widow Yvonne Loriod at the piano is the most authoritative recording (EMI Classics CDC 54395). But RCA markets a wonderful performance on its Gold Seal label (7835-2-RG) that features Peter Serkin on piano and Richard Stolzman on clarinet. The clarinetist Eduard Brunner joins the Trio Fontenay in a fine performance on the Teldec label (9031-73239-2).

Messiaen was repatriated to occupied France in the spring of 1941. Back in Paris, he returned to his liturgical and academic positions, and his compositions continued to win enthusiasts and detractors. (Stravinsky once sneered that one of Messiaen's works could have been composed by anybody, "if he had had enough manuscript paper.") Yet his compositions received international attention, students flocked to his classes, and by the time of his death in 1992 his position as France's greatest twentieth-century composer was challenged only by his pupil, Pierre Boulez. On his last trip to New York to hear a performance of his *Turangalîla Symphony*, Messiaen told the *Times* that while the sole purpose of his music was to point people to Christ, somehow even his greatest enthusiasts usually seemed blind to his intent. They admired and even praised his work, but cared little—or purposefully ignored—its message. This failure, or refusal, of so many musicians to understand his music was the greatest sorrow of Messiaen's artistic life.

But the miracle of the *Quatour*—perhaps the greatest artistic miracle of our times—remains.

MICHAEL R. LINTON *is head of the Division of Music Theory and Composition at Middle Tennessee State University.*

All Saints' Day

Waiting behind burned-out jack-o'-lanterns for day to come,
the saints clap their stigmata hands.
They are the sun's halo, shimmering the November air
with celestial simplicity; the sky, their dried blood.

By the time we wake on All Hallows,
weary from our own werewolves and witches,
the narrow sidewalks are crowded, the Christian dead
hopscotching between the cracks
we've let creep parallel to where we live.

And soon, yes, they'll be marching triumphantly
past the graveyard, cymbals like offering plates at their hips,
the old spiritual clanging the neighborhood,
saxophones and trumpets blasting the last
doubts from our ears.

Of course, we will follow,
stiff in our nightshirts, too human for holiness
but hungry enough to shadow their sanctified sufferings,
genuflect with them in the cold gothic
arch of the cathedral where,
with the canonized, we will feast greedily
on the Body and Blood.

Marjorie Maddox

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Original Sin: A Disputation

Edward T. Oakes

No doctrine inside the precincts of the Christian Church is received with greater reserve and hesitation, even to the point of outright denial, than the doctrine of original sin. Of course in a secular culture like ours, any number of Christian doctrines will be disputed by outsiders, from the existence of God to the resurrection of Jesus. But even in those denominations that pride themselves on their adherence to the orthodox dogmas of the once-universal Church, the doctrine of original sin is met with either embarrassed silence, outright denial, or at a minimum a kind of halfhearted lip service that does not exactly deny the doctrine but has no idea how to place it inside the devout life. Even the *Universal Catechism of the Catholic Church,* surprisingly enough, calls original sin a "sin" only in an analogous sense (#404), because unlike other (presumably real?) sins it is only contracted and not committed—a concession that would certainly have surprised Augustine, who had a vivid and almost physical/biological understanding of the First Sin.

Clearly, Augustine's authority notwithstanding, the doctrine is in crisis, a crisis different in kind from the challenge that secular modernity hurls at the totality of the Christian message. Secular culture undeniably plays a part here as well, with its doctrine of evolution or its belief in progress (now a rather tattered and shopworn belief, though one that still lurks in certain editorials and books). But much more severe is the outright discomfort believers feel in the doctrine because of what seems to them its *internal* inconsistency: how can guilt, an ethical and spiritual category, be inheritable, a category drawn from nature? As with the doctrine of predestination, to which it is often married, there seems to be a kind of "damned if you do, damned if you don't" aura to the theology of original sin: Free will may be free, declares Augustine without apparent embarrassment, only it is not free to do good. "How then do miserable men dare to be proud of free will before, or of their own strength after, they are liberated?" But no sooner does Augustine fear that the concept of original sin might threaten the idea of human responsibility than he quickly turns around and becomes free will's best advocate, again without a trace of embarrassment: "Let no man dare to deny the freedom of the will as to excuse sin." In other words, if you do a good deed, that is God's doing; if you commit a wrong, it is your doing.

In this situation of widespread denial, perplexity, or negligence, I thought the best defense of the doctrine could be mounted if it were presented as a typical article in Thomas Aquinas' monumental *Summa Theologiae.* In this work Thomas would begin each treatment of a so-called "disputed question" with a fair-minded exposition of the position he wanted to refute in the latter half of the article. This is the famous *Videtur quod* section of the argument, which is usually translated as: "It would seem that [such-and-such a doctrine] is not the case."

What makes this opening portion of each article so remarkable is Thomas' generosity and fairness to his opponents. Aquinas is the ideal model here, for, as some commentators have noted, he at times seems to present a better argument for his opponents' positions than they themselves managed to do. Josef Pieper, for example, in his *Guide to Thomas Aquinas,* notes how Thomas' fairness to his opponents can sometimes catch the reader off guard:

> An unsuspecting reader, rather stunned and confused, may read whole pages containing nothing but opposing arguments formulated in a highly convincing manner. There will be nothing at all in the phraseology to indicate

EDWARD T. OAKES, S.J., *is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Regis University in Denver, Colorado. The second edition of his book* Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar *(Continuum) has just appeared in paperback.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> that Thomas rejects these arguments—not the trace of a hint at the weakness of the argument, not the slightest nuance of ironical exaggeration. The opponent himself speaks, and an opponent who is obviously in splendid form, calm, objective, moderate. . . . In this procedure there emerges an element profoundly characteristic of St. Thomas' intellectual style: the spirit of the *disputatio*, of disciplined opposition; the spirit of genuine discussion which remains a dialogue even while it is a dispute.

Only after such an exposition of the opponent's point of view would Aquinas venture to present his own case. First he would introduce a statement from an authority holding the position Thomas favored. This is the *Sed contra* ("on the contrary") section of the argument. Now because Thomas explicitly held that argument from authority is always the weakest form of argumentation, his citation of an authority was clearly meant only to give the reader pause: although the arguments previously set forth *sound* plausible, they cannot be the last word, for after all some authority—be it the Bible, Aristotle, a Church Father—holds the contrary opinion. So perhaps there is more to say on the issue (the reader is meant to think) than is first apparent.*

It is only at this point that Aquinas presented his own argument; this is the so-called *Respondeo* section ("I reply as follows"), which is the pith and substance of the article. Finally, after setting out his own position and the reasoning for it, he answered the objections raised in the first section of the article (*ad primum, ad secundum,* etc.: "as to the first, second objection," etc). And once more the reader notices Thomas' remarkable serenity in responding to contrary views.

And so, with the indulgence of the reader, I would like to follow the Thomistic format in addressing the "disputed question" of whether we need any longer to believe in original sin.

Should We Believe in Original Sin?

Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit credibile: It would seem that original sin is not believable, and for the following three reasons. First of all, not only is the doctrine intolerably paradoxical, it is never once mentioned, as such, in the Bible, not even where it is taken to be most evident: in chapter 3 of Genesis and chapter 5 of St. Paul's Letter to the Romans. Secondly, our understanding of both evolution and biblical science makes it even more obvious than before how far from the intent of the biblical authors was any doctrine of original sin (careful exegesis of Romans 5, for example, has led many scholars to hold that Augustine developed his view of original sin based on a mistranslation by the Vulgate of a verse in this chapter of Paul's Letter to the Romans). Thirdly and finally, the doctrine damages souls. Belief in original sin leads to pessimism: it results in a resigned fatalism about changing those sinful structures that actually can be changed but which go unchallenged because they are all too lazily attributed to the effects of original sin, which by definition is a given and cannot be changed. (Hannah Arendt was rightly annoyed when she returned to Germany after World War II and discovered Germans were blaming Hitler, as well as their own romance with Nazism, on Adam and Eve, a subterfuge scarcely less vulgar than the common criminal's pretext, "the devil made me do it.") Let us take each of these arguments in turn.

1) No one now disputes that the Bible does not teach a doctrine of original sin as such. Not only does the term never occur in the entire Bible, these Scriptures—both Old and New Testaments—are also innocent of any notion that Adam's sin has made proleptically guilty those who live so far from the source of that sin that they seem incapable of having taken part in it. But that is what the doctrine says. Moreover, it goes on to say that this sin can only be expiated by Christ's death and cleansed by baptism; that is, it is a sin which, if left unexpiated and uncleansed, "justifies" God in condemning that person, even an infant, to eternal banishment from God's presence—and all for a sin never actually committed!

What is remarkable about this doctrine is how even its most ardent defenders admit its blazing paradoxicality. Reinhold Niebuhr undoubtedly presented the best defense of the doctrine in modern times, and even convinced a number of secular critics of its truth. But his stirring apologetic began by openly admitting the strange logical status of the doctrine:

> The Christian doctrine of sin in its classical form offends both rationalists and moralists by maintaining the seemingly absurd position that man sins inevitably and by a fateful necessity but that he is nevertheless to be held responsible for actions which are prompted by an ineluctable fate. . . . Here is the absurdity in a nutshell. Original sin, which is by definition an inherited corruption, or at least an inevitable one, is nevertheless not to be regarded as belonging to his essential nature and therefore is not outside the realm of his responsibility. Sin is natural for man in the sense that it is universal but not in the sense that it is necessary.

* The Bible is somewhat of an exception to this rule. This is because, for Thomas, while merely human authority is a weak support for any argument, divine authority is the strongest possible ground of truth. However, the mere citation of the Bible in the *sed contra* section was not meant to be the clincher it might seem, for often the *videtur quod* section cited the Bible as well. It was obvious to everyone in the medieval schools that on the surface the Bible often seems to contradict itself; indeed it was out of a sense that these contradictions needed to be resolved that the scholastic method first arose.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As if that paradoxicality were not enough, one must also admit that the Bible never attributes to Adam the role of biologically tainting us with his guilt, as can perhaps best be seen in the history of Jewish interpretation of Genesis up to and just past the beginnings of the Christian era; for it was the much more common Jewish interpretation, even into the era of the rabbis during the Christian era, that the human proclivity to evil (insofar as it came from anywhere else than man's free will) was the product not of the sin of our first parents but of that strange episode narrated in Genesis 6 of the mating of "the daughters of men with the sons of God." This highly enigmatic passage, told with the usual laconic style characteristic of all the patriarchal narratives, was usually interpreted by later (and obviously intensely monotheistic) Judaism as referring not to "gods" but to the rebellious angels, whose mating with "the daughters of men" brought with it a kind of "genetic pollution" to the human race.

Such a view now strikes us as frankly mythological, and indeed it soon lost all hold on the Jewish imagination, perhaps under the influence of early Christianity. It is worth mentioning only because the very prevalence of this interpretation shows how little the story of the Fall in Genesis 3 *necessarily* leads to a doctrine of original sin when left on its own terms. Even in Romans 5, which does explicitly link Adam's sin to the entrance of death into the world (apparently under an incipient rabbinic trend of moving the origin of evil back from Genesis 6 to Genesis 3), there is no notion of original sin according to Augustine's scenario; for it is to Augustine, not Paul, that we owe the picture of an ideal Paradise of two human beings created immortal and whose sin brought an unspeakable catastrophe on the human race. When Genesis 3 is read strictly on its own terms and not through the lens of Augustine's theology of an ideal Paradise before the Fall, a much different picture emerges. As the Anglican theologian N. P. Williams puts it in his 1926 book *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin:*

> In fact, the scriptural text says nothing of the kind: it implies, on the contrary, that man was created mortal, formed of the dust and destined to return to it, though he might have made himself immortal by eating of the Tree of Life [that is, the second Tree, not yet touched by Adam and Eve after they ate from the first Tree, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil], even after his sin; and that it was precisely in order to *keep* him mortal that Yahweh expelled him from the Garden and posted a cherubic guard to prevent his return. The point of Yahweh's warning [in Genesis 2:17] as to the fatal consequences which would follow a breach of his command is, not that man would become mortal after being immortal, but that man, mortal by nature and fated sooner or later to return to dust, would suffer death *forthwith* as a punishment for sin (*"in the day* that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die") instead of living out his life to a ripe old age and being reabsorbed into his parent earth through a painless dissolution.

It might be objected that Augustine was basing his theology of original sin not just on Genesis 3 but also on Romans 5:12-21, where Paul explicitly assigns the universality of death to Adam's sin (especially in verse 12: "Therefore, just as through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, so then death spread to all men inasmuch as all sinned"). But the Greek word translated here by the phrase "inasmuch as" is *eph'hô*, which in Latin was translated, not quite literally, as *in quo*; Augustine then took it to mean "in whom," referring to Adam. In other words, Augustine would have read Paul to say that death spread throughout the whole human race because we always sin "in" Adam. But this is not Paul's meaning, for if it had been he would have chosen the Greek phrase *en hô*. In this passage death seems to be a *later* consequence of *personal* sin: in other words, according to this interpretation of the Greek, Paul here seems to imply that our individual deaths are the result of our own personal sinfulness, not of Adam's primordial sin.

But leaving aside technical questions of translation, there can be no doubt that Paul is *not* referring to Augustine's later doctrine whereby Adam was created perfect and through his own sin introduced into the world a death that would otherwise never have afflicted humanity. On the contrary, he could not be clearer in the rest of his writings that death is not just punishment for sin but is also (and perhaps primarily) a natural condition of fleshly existence.

> What is sown is perishable; what is raised is imperishable. The body is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is sown a physical [animal, worldly] body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a physical body, there is a spiritual body. Thus it is written, "the first man Adam became a living being" [Genesis 2:7], but the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. *But it is not the spiritual which is first but the physical, and then the spiritual.* The first man was from the earth, a man of dust; the second man is from heaven. As was the man of dust, so are those who are of the dust; and as is the man of heaven, so are those who are of heaven. Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven. I tell you this, brethren: *flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable.* (1 Corinthians 15:42-50, emphasis added)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not only is there no trace in Paul of any notion of an Adam and Eve created immortal, the passage cited here directly contradicts it.

2) But even if we could force Paul to fit Augustine's procrustean bed by having him assert a doctrine of an imperishable Adam and Eve before the Fall, and even if we could convince ourselves that the combination of Genesis 3 and Romans 5 leads to a doctrine of original sin, the massive discoveries of nineteenth- and twentieth-century geology, biology, and paleontology block our way. Under their combined and massive impact we no longer interpret Genesis 1-3 literally, understanding by "literal" what is meant in ordinary parlance: taking any vivid *historical-seeming* narrative to be genuinely historical. Now, at least in professional circles, "literal" means something else: interpreting a text according to the author's own intentions independent of later doctrinal overlays (a meaning of the term "literal" approved by Pope Pius XII in his encyclical *Divino Afflante Spiritu).*

Before his conversion, Augustine had always disliked the Old Testament because he found its history so crude, and it was a real liberation for him to discover St. Ambrose's figural interpretation; thus after his conversion he toyed with an allegorical interpretation of Genesis, as in the last three books of his *Confessions.* But the older he got, the more literal (in the first sense of the term) became his methods; indeed he wrote a book called *Genesis Literally Interpreted.* And out of such "literal" interpretations came his depiction of the Garden of Eden as, well, a Paradise: no death, no sin, no suffering. Indeed, so glowing was his portrayal of this putative historical "paradise" that, in his debates with the Pelagians, he was hard put to come up with a motivation for the sin of Adam and Eve: what would ever prompt such a fateful sin in such a pleasant environment and in beings created so free of evil tendencies? So he was finally forced to posit at least a smidgen of "concupiscence," a small but appreciable amount of an inclination toward evil in our first parents, to explain their enticement by the Serpent—a concession which might seem rather to undermine the whole point of the doctrine.

But however awkward it may be on its own terms, this literalizing scenario of Augustine's completely collapses under the impact of Darwinian biology and of the geology on which it rests. Now "literal," at least for those not schizophrenic about modern science, can only mean taking the biblical authors on their own terms by bracketing away later doctrinally inspired interpretations. This method highlights features of the text not previously noticed, such as how radically variant are the two accounts of creation in the first two chapters of Genesis and how much both are reliant on ancient Hebrew cosmology, which itself borrows heavily from Babylonian sources. And none of these sources recognizes a scenario whereby the first progenitors of the human race were created immortal. Indeed most mythological accounts of the origin of man see the human species as the *last* and *weakest* of prior, much stronger, races (as in Hesiod's notion of the Age of Gold declining to Silver and then to his own wretched Age of Iron, etc.).

3) Finally, even if some way could be found to give a plausible hermeneutical spin to these difficulties, even if theologians found a way of presenting the doctrine in a convincing way, we have the experience of Christian history to tell us of the effects of this doctrine on those churches that most emphasize the doctrine.

It is generally believed that theological schools such as Jansenism and denominations such as Calvinism bring in their wake legions of members with withered emotional lives, censorious views of their less austere neighbors, and a bleak, nearly blasphemous, view of God's love. At least that is the picture handed down to us from countless sources in the culture, from Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel *The Scarlet Letter* to more vulgar displays of the journalistic mind, such as H. L. Mencken's scorn for the Tennessee literalists of his day or, more recently, the soap-opera treatment to which the Reverend Jimmy Swaggart was subjected a few years back.

And there must be something to this perception, at least if we are to take the testimony of certain people raised in the Calvinist tradition seriously. For example, Woodrow Wilson, a Presbyterian, suffered from a bleak and relentless depression stemming, according to his biographers, from the combination of his herculean efforts to spread democracy coupled with his firm belief that the vast majority of the human race was going to hell in any event. And Henry James, Sr., the father of the famous novelist Henry and his equally renowned philosopher brother William, suffered under a similar theology-induced depression until he had what he described as a "vastation" (clean sweep) and became a Swedenborgian.

To the extent this cultural perception is accurate, it must rest on what is the most illogical and contradictory aspect of the doctrine of original sin, at least as it is normally heard in the pew: that we are morally culpable for possessing instincts which we cannot help possessing. One is reminded in this context of Calvin's weird, though logical, inference in his *Institutes* (II, i, 8) that "infants bring their own damnation with them from their mothers' wombs; the moment they are born their natures are odious and abominable to God." To build a pedagogy on this premise is, needless to say, to invite disaster, as we learn in the poem "Holy Willie's Prayer" by the Scotsman Robert Burns; one of the grimmest poems in the language, it depicts the vision of babies dropping right from their mothers' wombs into hellfire. The Rev. Williams, whose book we have already cited, generally offers a sober, impartial history of this doctrine, but when he comes to its moral and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

psychological effects he can be positively withering, and on no one is he harsher than on Augustine:

> The downright brutality which led him to discard his mistress of fifteen years' standing, the mother of Adeodatus, without, apparently, so much as a thought of making reparation for his fault by marrying her, appears in his theology as the heartlessness which leaves the great bulk of mankind, even helpless infants, in the *massa perditionis,* doomed to everlasting flames for a sin which is not their own. The terrible strength of the sexual passions which devastated his youth and early manhood accounts for the prominence which the idea of "concupiscence" assumes in his writings; and the apparently instantaneous sublimation of these emotions through his conversion explains the feeling of irresistible grace upon which his theology of predestination and election was founded, as well as the ultra-puritan fanaticism which colored his opinions with regard to wedlock and procreation. . . . The fact that Augustine nevertheless maintained this inhuman theory [of the damnation of unbaptized infants] down to the last days of his life is a melancholy illustration of the way in which the best of men may allow the kindly instincts of human nature to be overridden by the demands of a fanatical logic.

And so, it would seem that original sin ought not be believed.

Sed contra: on the contrary, the Psalmist says: "Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me" (Psalm 51:5). Or, for those who would deny the authority of the Bible but need to be brought up short so as to question the seeming plausibility of all of the above, I cite Reinhold Niebuhr: "The truth is that, absurd as the classical Pauline doctrine of original sin may seem to be at first blush, its prestige as a part of the Christian truth is preserved, and perennially reestablished, against the attacks of rationalists and simple moralists by its ability to throw light upon complex factors in human behavior which constantly escape the moralists."

Respondeo: And therefore, to all of the above, I respond as follows:

First of all, the doctrine of original sin is not, despite what some historians of dogma aver, St. Augustine's invention sprung full-blown from his overheated sex life. It is really, when soberly examined, an inference that arises from reflection on the reality of evil when considered in the light of ethical monotheism. John Henry Newman, for one, always insisted that original sin is the only way believers can make sense of the world when they contrast that world to their faith in God. So powerful is his description of the meaning of this doctrine (it is probably the most famous passage in his *Apologia pro vita sua)* that it bears quoting in full:

> If I looked into a mirror, and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me, when I look into this living busy world, and see no reflection of its Creator. . . . [To consider] the tokens so faint and broken of a superintending design, the blind evolution of what turns out to be great powers or truths, the progress of things, as if from unreasoning elements, not towards final causes, the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration, the curtain hung over his futurity, the disappointments of life, the defeat of good, the success of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevalence and intensity of sin, the pervading idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion, that condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apostle's words, "having no hope and without God in the world"—all this is a vision to dizzy and appall; and inflicts upon the mind the sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond human solution. What shall be said to this heart-piercing, reason-bewildering fact? I can only answer, that either there is no Creator, or this living society of men is in a true sense discarded from His presence.

This remarkably modern passage does not, admittedly, present a full-throated defense of the doctrine of original sin, for it still allows a choice between atheism *or* a subscription to a belief in the Fall to account for the presence of evil in the world. But that is how the doctrine of original sin has in fact functioned in the history of the Church's thought: it is a secondary implication arising from a prior belief in God's goodness and omnipotence. Thus the waning of belief in God was bound to make the doctrine of original sin seem irrational. But that hardly makes it less indispensable, as Steven Duffy argued in an important 1988 article in *Theological Studies:*

> In the twentieth century, when human beings have already killed well over one hundred million of their kind, disenchantment [with an optimistic view of human nature] has set in. Two world wars, the Gulags, the Holocaust, Korea, Vietnam, the nuclear and ecological threats form a somber litany that makes the optimism of the liberals ring hollow and naïve. Despite technological progress, evil, far from vanishing, has only become more powerful and more fiendish. . . . And artists like Conrad, Camus, Beckett, Golding, and Murdoch contend that because of our hearts of darkness there may be countless nice men and women but few if any genuinely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> good ones. In all these perspectives evil is held to be inherent, somehow structural, ingrained. And its terrible power defies explanation and solution. Paradoxically, the silver wings of science and technology, on which soared the hopes of the industrialized societies, carry the ultimate menace to the human prospect.

Nor is the doctrine, in its essence, tied to a "literal" interpretation of the narrative of the Garden of Eden in Genesis 2-3, despite what so many people think. In fact, the ubiquitous evil of the world, when honestly considered, is not a reality that an honest person should see first and primarily as an abstract issue of speculative theodicy ("How can there be evil *out there* when God is good?"); rather it is one that should first arise from within the human heart itself ("Why do I do the evil I abhor?").

What is more, the consequences of abandoning the doctrine are nothing short of disastrous. Indeed, perhaps the best way of defending the doctrine is to follow the career of modernity and see the consequences of not holding to the doctrine. I am reminded in this context of a shrewd observation by Anatole France to the effect that never have so many been murdered in the name of a doctrine as in the name of the principle that human beings are naturally good. When one glances over the catalogue of evils that have so pockmarked this century, it is extraordinary how many have come from doctrines founded on the notion of the perfectibility of man. As Niebuhr puts it so well:

> The utopian illusions and sentimental aberrations of modern liberal culture are really all derived from the basic error of negating the fact of original sin. This error . . . continually betrays modern men to equate the goodness of men with the virtue of their various schemes for social justice and international peace. When these schemes fail of realization or are realized only after tragic conflicts, modern men either turn from utopianism to disillusionment and despair, or they seek to place the onus of their failure upon some particular social group, . . . [which is why] both modern liberalism and modern Marxism are always facing the alternatives of moral futility or moral fanaticism. Liberalism in its pure form [that is, pacifism] usually succumbs to the peril of futility. It will not act against evil until it is able to find a vantage point of guiltlessness from which to operate. This means that it cannot act at all. Sometimes it imagines that this inaction is the guiltlessness for which it has been seeking. A minority of liberals and most of the Marxists solve the problem by assuming that they have found a position of guiltlessness in action. Thereby they are betrayed into the error of fanaticism.

This too, like Cardinal Newman's defense of the doctrine, is not a positive "proof" in the technical sense but merely points to the consequences of abandoning the doctrine. But such a modest opening gambit at least blocks the way to an outright denial of the doctrine. For it is, after all, mostly because of Augustine's own formulations of a perfect Paradise spoiled by a nearly unmotivated sin that make Christians feel stranded in their sense of the doctrine, especially in the light of evolution. On its own terms, the doctrine stands as a cipher pointing to what everyone senses in his or her own heart: that sin after Adam always takes the form of *acquiescence* and not of origination. We are born, that is, into a world where rebellion against God has already taken place, and the drift of it sweeps us along.

Nor, properly understood, is Augustine's rosy scenario of Paradise (which John Milton used so effectively in *Paradise Lost)* all that absurd: the *Catechism* speaks of the "figurative language" of Genesis 3 (#390), and the same must therefore apply, a fortiori, to Augustine's portrait of Adam and Eve before the Fall. The reason we are drawn, despite the theory of evolution, to Augustine's and Milton's portrait of Paradise before the Fall is the memory of that original justice we once had with God but lost through sin, as Pascal explains so well:

> The greatness of man is so evident that it is even proved by his wretchedness. For what in animals is called nature we call wretchedness in man; by which we recognize that, his nature now being like that of animals, he has fallen from a better nature which once was his. For who is unhappy at not being a king except a deposed king? Who is unhappy at having only one mouth? And who is not unhappy at having only one eye? Probably no one ever ventured to mourn at not having three eyes; but anyone would be inconsolable at having none.

In other words, when Augustine and Milton paint their version of "paradise lost" with the genius of their theological imagination, they are putting into figurative language this elementary insight of Pascal's, one that every human being can recognize. The Genesis story of the Fall even retains its validity when we admit into our purview the folkloric motif of the serpent. As Paul Ricoeur notes in his book *The Symbolism of Evil,* which along with Niebuhr's *The Nature and Destiny of Man* is perhaps the best book on this topic written in the twentieth century, the figure of the serpent symbolizes a seldom-stressed aspect of the doctrine of the Fall: that rebellion against God also pre-existed the human species: "It is noteworthy that the Adamic myth does not succeed," says Ricoeur, "in concentrating and absorbing the origin of evil in the figure of a primordial man alone; it speaks also of the adversary, the Serpent, later [understood as] the devil." In a way, the term "original sin," at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least when taken, as it usually is, to refer to what happened to humanity in Adam and Eve, is a misnomer, for it is crucial to the narrative that they were *tempted,* and indeed by an *outside* force or reality. Niebuhr also emphasizes this point:

> The importance of biblical satanology lies in the two facts that: (1) the devil is not thought of as having been created evil. Rather his evil arises from his effort to transgress the bounds set for his life, an effort which places him in rebellion against God. (2) The devil fell before man fell, which is to say that man's rebellion against God is not an act of sheer perversity, nor does it follow inevitably from the situation in which he stands.

The term "original" sin still retains its validity, though, even when applied to Adam and Eve, for the narrative definitely holds that, in St. Paul's terms, sin *entered* the world through the sin of our first parents and henceforth takes on the specifically human form of "giving in," of yielding to a force already heavily at work in the world of creation. This is why for the saints an asceticism of *agere contra,* literally "striving against," was so crucial. For without a conscious effort to "stem the tide" of sin, acquiescence will sweep us along in its path.

With these arguments in hand we are now ready to answer the various arguments raised in the first part of this essay:

Ad primum: as for the first objection, it is not necessary for the Bible to mention the name of a doctrine for it either to be true or for it to be located there in so many other words. The notion of original sin arose in the Christian Church well before Augustine when Christians accepted a canon of Old and New Testaments and began to interpret one book in terms of all the others. And so it became inevitable to interpret Genesis 3 in terms of Romans 5. But even more crucially, the canon of the New Testament arose under pressure from Gnosticism, which held that evil was a necessary concomitant of the material, created world. To counteract this heresy, which contradicts the Christian gospel of the goodness of God and of his creation, the Church insisted on the *contingency* of evil. And yet, as Paul says, once evil "entered" the world, it worked its way into the very roots both of creation (Romans 8) and of the human heart (Romans 7). And out of this process, at first adventitious and then deeply embedded, there arises the experience of the servility of the will to temptation, which all human beings who are honest with themselves will see as true in their own case. This reality of the crippled will, when coupled to a confession of the essential goodness of nature, can only be illumined by a doctrine of original sin.

Ad secundum: as to the second objection, as we have seen, the doctrine in its essence does not depend on the historicity of Genesis 1-3 (very few Christians in the world now refuse to admit the figural language of the first three chapters of the Bible). In fact, to historicize it, to read it "literally" (and it is doubtful that even fundamentalists think God takes afternoon strolls in His garden), distorts the point of the doctrine and forces Paul to contradict himself about the physical body being naturally mortal.

As we have seen, the Jews of the Hellenistic world also came gradually to abandon the notion that evil entered the world because of the mating of "the daughters of men with the sons of God" and finally attributed the evil inclination of the human heart to Adam's sin. But because of the similarity between the name *Adam* (Hebrew for "man" in the generic sense) and *adamah* ("ground" or "earth"), some rabbis wove a charming story of embellishment—technically known as a midrash—which said that God made Adam out of dust gathered from all over the earth, with his head formed from the earth of the Holy Land, the trunk of his body from Babylonian soil, etc. How much Paul was influenced by these speculations remains a matter of dispute (the story, at least as it comes down to us, stems from a tradition that postdates Paul), but he certainly seems to hold a corporate view of Adam in Romans 5 as a contrasting concept to his corporate view of Christ (that is, as sinners we belong to the "body of Adam" as we belong to the Body of Christ by virtue of our redemption through baptism). But that must mean that Paul *does* propose a theory of original sin after all, precisely by subscribing to a corporate notion of Adam: we sin because we sin "in" Adam. (This is, by the way, a view also held by, among others, St. Ambrose, an elder contemporary of St. Augustine's, who said, "So then Adam is in each one of us, for in him human nature itself sinned.")*

Now if Paul does hold to a corporate view of Adam, then this must mean that Romans 5:12b should not be translated "death spread to all men *inasmuch as* all men sinned" (implying that personal sin causes death) but rather "*with the result* that all

* The reason this issue of the corporate Adam is so important stems from this dilemma: how do we connect the first sin with all subsequent sins but not so that there is a cause-effect relationship between the first sin and later sins? For in that case Adam's sin would be a freely chosen sin while all other sins would be the inevitable result of his sin (effects have no choice in being the effect of a cause). But if Adam is free and we are not, then he is not really the first of a series. So how do we link Adam to the rest of the human race so that he still remains *within* the series of humans (though the first) but *also* so that we can still posit a definitive change in mankind with the first sin? Here is where I think Kierkegaard (with Ambrose) must be right, that the story of Adam and Eve means that "[each] man is at once himself *and* the whole race, in such a way that the whole race has part in the individual and the individual has part in the whole race." Once we concede this point to Kierkegaard, the rest falls into place, including our responsibility for an evil we will inevitably commit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

men sinned" (with its implication that the specter of death generates sin; this, at any rate, is Father Joseph Fitzmyer's choice for translating *eph'hô* in his recent Anchor Bible commentary on Romans). If this translation is accurate, then Augustine is fundamentally right and this verse in the Bible comes very close to asserting a doctrine of original sin: in other words, we die not because we commit individual sins of our own volition; rather we sin, and *inevitably,* we die, and *inevitably,* as a result of Adam's sin.

Ad tertium: as to the third objection, we must take seriously the testimony of those raised in, and later reacting against, Augustinian strains of Christianity who claim that a stress on original sin leads to a morbid preoccupation with and fear for one's salvation. But this concern must be coupled with a sober reflection on the immense harm that has been unleashed on humanity by a denial of this doctrine. One need only compare Henry James, Sr. or Woodrow Wilson, however theologically grim their lives were, with the fate of a Ukrainian farmer, starved to death by Stalin on his altar of collectivized agriculture in his drive to bring to birth the New Soviet Man. And if Calvin's view that newborn infants are "odious" in the sight of God has led to warped pedagogy (a point never really established by historians; indeed the Puritans were noted for their love of their children), this can hardly compare to the appalling way Jean-Jacques Rousseau reared his children. Rousseau insisted that man is born a "noble savage" who is corrupted not by his own heart of darkness but by civilized forces external to the innocent self; yet he fathered a number of illegitimate children and farmed them out to orphanages, never to make contact with them again.

It might sound intolerably paradoxical to say this, but it is precisely the very harm that sometimes comes from the doctrine of original sin that proves its validity. This is a point made time and again by Leszek Kolakowski, the Polish emigré intellectual now at the University of Chicago, author of a three-volume history of Marxist thought and a man who therefore knows something of the harm visited upon the human community by doctrines of progressivism. In his recent book of essays, *Modernity on Endless Trial,* he shrewdly notes how this third objection to original sin can be turned into a supporting argument:

> The possible disastrous effects of the concept of original sin on our psychological condition and on our cultural life are undeniable [because of its use to keep people "in their place" and not alter unjust social structures]; and so are the disastrous effects of the opposing doctrine, with its implication that our perfectibility is limitless, and that our predictions of ultimate synthesis or total reconciliation can be realized. However, the fact that both affirmation and rejection of the concept of original sin have emerged as powerful destructive forces in our history is one of many that testify in favor of the reality of original sin. In other words, we face a peculiar situation in which the disastrous consequences of assenting to either of two incompatible theories confirm one of them and testify against its rival.

Finally and in conclusion, I would like to add my own version to this argument: to deny this doctrine is not to escape the gray doldrums of Jansenist/Calvinist Christianity but to warp the very core of the Christian gospel: that God so loved the world that He sent his only Son to save that world from its sin. But why so extreme a remedy for so adventitious a fault?

There is a trend afoot these days, noticeable even in the later writings of Karl Rahner, to see the Crucifixion as an admirable example of love "to the end." Of course for Rahner this love must be Jesus' love. But this focus on Jesus as model and exemplar prompts the question of what *God* was doing in Christ's death. How and why is *God* reconciling the world to Himself in the death and resurrection of His Son?

Ironically enough, this sentimentalism of stressing Jesus' exemplary love has already been tried and found wanting. The pagans of antiquity used Jesus' manner of death as a reproach to Christians; Socrates' approach to death, they claimed, was much more admirable, since he faced death unflinchingly and without fear, whereas Jesus agonized over the prospect of death and prayed that the cup of suffering might be taken from him. But even if one grants a change in sensibility and that people of today can be led to admire Jesus' perseverance and willingness to sacrifice himself in the face of gut fear, it still leaves unanswered why *God* would choose so extreme a remedy for a condition so easily ameliorated by good pedagogy, rather like a doctor who recommends a regimen of chemotherapy to cure a common cold.

Rather than face this issue directly, more and more Christians, I have discovered, are resorting to a kind of Sunday School moralism, a sentimentalism of love-thy-neighbor that is more concerned with thinking nice thoughts than facing hard issues. This can be confirmed by dropping in on most churches on a Sunday morning and listening to the sermon, which more often than not spends its time inculcating the virtues of "family values" or moral earnestness than proclaiming that hard gospel preached by Paul of the price paid in the Blood of the Lamb for our redemption.

Perhaps with good reason. There is no doubt that original sin is a hard doctrine. For if we are infected with an original corruption to the very core of our natures, then there is a great deal of evil that cannot be uprooted—not an easy doctrine to accept in our activist times. Without the aid of God, unearned and unmerited, so this doctrine says, our misery is incurable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No wonder, too, that Christians are more and more opting for a theology of universal reconciliation, hoping for an empty hell, a theological opinion most vigorously defended recently by the late Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. And while he is certainly right that there are certain biblical warrants for this hope, I also feel that the attraction that many Christians increasingly feel to that doctrine can be worrisome. In this accommodating climate perhaps the Church would do well to heed the admonition of Kolakowski:

> It is hardly surprising that the optimistic philosophy of universal reconciliation should tempt contemporary Christianity so strongly. After the many failures it suffered through its inability to cope with a secular civilization and its mistrust of intellectual and social changes beyond its control, after its spurious success in overcoming the Modernist crisis at the beginning of this century, a Great Fear seems to have pervaded the Christian world—the fear of being trapped in an alien enclave within a basically un-Christian society. This Great Fear of being out-distanced and isolated now impels Christian thinking towards the idea that the most important task of Christianity is not only to be "within the world," not only to participate in the efforts of secular culture, not only to modify the language of its teachings so that they are intelligible to all men, but to sanctify in advance almost any movement that arises spontaneously from natural human impulses. Universal suspicion seems to have been supplanted by universal approval; the dread of a forced retreat to the Christian culture of the *Syllabus of Errors* . . . appears to be stronger than that of losing one's identity.

It is my deep conviction that any mitigation of the doctrine of original sin will prove disastrous for the health of the Church in the future, and for just the reasons that Kolakowski adduces. If the experience of human history from Rousseau to Stalin means anything, it must be that we are stuck, like it or not, with the doctrine—nay, the reality—of original sin. But as St. Paul knew, this need not be a morbid doctrine. For our diagnosis has come with a cure. Even Augustine's formulation is perfectly understandable to people today, for he, perhaps even more than St. Paul, got to the heart of the issue when he noted that although (by virtue of our nature as human beings) we are free to do what we like, we are not free (by virtue of original sin) to like what we ought to like. And this insight is the beginning of the journey toward that holiness which God has destined for His Church. For as the Rev. N. P. Williams so wonderfully notes, "The ordinary man may feel ashamed of *doing* wrong: but the saint, endowed with a superior refinement of moral sensibility, and keener powers of introspection, is ashamed of being the kind of man who is *liable* to do wrong."

The argument of this essay is a Thomistic "article" in the literal sense of that word: only one link in a larger articulated chain of theological argument. It is designed only to establish that we must believe in original sin. I do not establish its essence, its mode of transmission, the extent to which it is "analogical," how it might fit into a scheme of evolution, the historicity of Adam, etc. My only argument here, against the whole plausible array of arguments against the doctrine, is that, despite its obvious paradoxicality, it proves to be more illuminating of the human condition than its competitors. As Pascal—who can set forth in two lines what it takes other theologians two books to show—says with his usual precision: "Doubtless there is nothing more shocking to our reason than to say that the sin of the first man has rendered guilty those who, being so removed from its source, seem incapable of participating in it. Certainly nothing offends us more rudely than this doctrine, and yet without this mystery, the most incomprehensible of all, we are incomprehensible to ourselves." FT

November Funeral

From faded grass beneath the bole
the last red windfall hunted down,
last marigold, last aster blown,
the dingy shades of autumn fall
and tinctures drown.

The orange-flash hunters go to ground;
a gray reed takes the wind and sways.
Season of death and fruitlessness:
Green sea-ducks flee the leaden sound
and all tones cease.

Where is the cast of summer's air?
Nothing is until it's gone.
On that gray day we graved her down
the long black hills to dark seas where
dead colors run.

— J. Bottum

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Would Newton Do?

Phillip E. Johnson

Sir Isaac Newton was a man of many talents. After his great scientific discoveries he had a remarkable second career as Warden of the Mint, where he implemented a difficult reform of the coinage that may have saved the British nation from financial disaster. He personally investigated cases of counterfeiting and sent scores of malefactors to the gallows. It is as if Einstein, after producing the Theory of Relativity, had served capably as Secretary of the Treasury or Attorney General. In any competition for the most intellectually gifted human being of all time, Newton would deserve to be on everyone's short list.

Michael White's biography does not stint Newton the great achiever, but its primary emphasis, as the subtitle indicates, is on the "sorcerer"—specifically Newton the alchemist and decipherer of hidden prophecies in the Bible. This disreputable (and unsuccessful) side of Newton was long suppressed or minimized by historians who were determined to portray him as one of the founding fathers of Enlightenment deism. It first came to public attention when John Maynard Keynes purchased a large collection of Newton's papers in 1936 and subsequently described Newton as "the last of the magicians . . . , the last great mind which looked out on the visible and intellectual world with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than 10,000 years ago."

Newton did not believe that God merely wound up the clockworks and then let the universe run by itself. On the contrary, he insisted that God was constantly active in the physical world, and, with a dedication bordering on obsession, he developed his heretical Arian theology in secret. He took the Bible seriously as a collection of data derived from a supernatural source, and he studied the prophecies of Daniel and Revelation with methods as rigorous as those he applied to gravity and optics. He devoted the greater part of his professional life to alchemical experiments that were both physically and legally dangerous. The physical danger was due to the constant fires and the use of toxic chemicals like mercury. The legal danger arose because alchemy had been made a felony by gold-hoarding sovereigns who feared that the alchemists might succeed.

Not even Newton could do the impossible. He learned a great deal from alchemy about chemistry and experimental technique, but he never found the philosopher's stone or turned base metals into gold. As for biblical prophecy, Newton meticulously developed a grand scenario predicting that the Jews would return to reclaim Jerusalem in 1899 and that the second coming of Christ would occur precisely forty-nine years later. That might look pretty good, if we could reinterpret those dates as rough predictions of

PHILLIP E. JOHNSON *is Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and author of* Defeating Darwinism by Opening Minds.

Books Discussed in this Article

ISAAC NEWTON: THE LAST SORCERER. By MICHAEL WHITE. *Addison-Wesley. 403 pp. $27.*

THE SCIENCE OF GOD: THE CONVERGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC AND BIBLICAL WISDOM. By GERALD SCHROEDER. *Free Press. 226 pp. $25.*

CRACKING THE BIBLE CODE. By JEFFREY SATINOVER. *Morrow. 346 pp. $23.*

EVOLUTION'S HAND: SEARCHING FOR THE CREATOR IN CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE. By JOHN CAFFERKY. *East End Books. 200 pp. $20 Canadian.*

NATURE'S DESTINY: HOW THE LAWS OF BIOLOGY REVEAL PURPOSE IN THE UNIVERSE. By MICHAEL J. DENTON. *Free Press. 453 pp. $27.50.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the beginning of modern Zionism and the founding of a Jewish state. But such post hoc adjustments constitute cheating when one is trying to be scientific.

Modern scientific materialists regard Newton's devotion to alchemy and theology as a regrettable distraction from his scientific achievement, but it is another form of cheating to divide a genius so neatly into his reputable and disreputable parts. Michael White makes the case that Newton's supernaturalism was closely linked to his scientific achievement, particularly his theory of gravity. He even suspects that Newton invented the famous apple story to conceal the scandalous fact that his theory of gravity grew out of his alchemical researches. There is reason to credit this. Gravity, conceived as a nonmaterial force acting instantaneously over vast distances, may have seemed more occult than alchemy to the seventeenth-century mind. Indeed, Leibniz dismissed Newtonian gravitation as "a chimerical thing, a scholastic occult property." Newton for his part disparaged mere "hypotheses," by which he seems to have meant vague or speculative ideas that cannot be tested by experiment. The theory of gravity is one of the greatest achievements of the scientific mind precisely because it explicates something which can be known (the precise effects of gravity), and leaves untouched the underlying mystery (the nature of gravity) which Newton's science could not penetrate.

Newton's attempt to turn alchemy into a genuine science was nowhere near as unpromising from a seventeenth-century viewpoint as it seems today. The premise that one can transform one kind of metal into another was in no way absurd, considering that the science of our own time teaches that the chemical elements were created from primordial hydrogen and helium in the interior of stars. Impressive transformations do occur in chemical laboratories, and alchemists (like modern evolutionary biologists) must have considered it arbitrary to set limits to what they could achieve. We know now that gold is itself an element that cannot be created by conventional chemistry, but we know such things because of scientific developments that owe a great deal to the failed efforts of the alchemists. The problem was that the alchemists were trying to accomplish something that required a far more advanced knowledge than they possessed. Perhaps some of our contemporary scientific projects, when viewed from the perspective of a future century, will look like alchemy in this respect.

I would even defend Newton's attempt to treat the Bible as a source of data from which scientific predictions could be derived. Michael White explains that Newton's aim was very much like that of the boldest scientists of our own time. "He was interested in a synthesis of all knowledge and was a devout seeker of some form of unified theory of the principles of the universe." That aim is shared today by Newton's successor as Lucasian Professor at Cambridge, Steven Hawking, who wrote for an admiring public that unification of the four fundamental forces of physics would permit mortals to "know the mind of God." Similar dreams of a "theory of everything" are shared by biologists like Harvard's Edward O. Wilson, whose recent book *Consilience* urges us to found our ideas about things like religion and literature upon the solid rock of Darwinian evolution. Newton's premise that you need more than physics and chemistry if your ambition is to understand *everything* seems far more sophisticated to me than the narrow reductionism of his modern successors. I grant that Newton was drilling a dry hole, but I would still argue that, if your wish is to know the mind of God, it makes sense to start with the assumption that God *has* a mind.

I enjoyed White's biography, but I want to put his portrait of Newton to good use rather than merely to appreciate it. How would Isaac Newton have approached the investigation of our modern versions of alchemy and biblical prophecy? From White and other sources I derive a picture of the Newtonian mind which has the following characteristics:

First, in comparison with twentieth-century scientists, Newton was metaphysically unprejudiced. He would take seriously questions, particularly those involving supernatural influences, which the materialists of his day and ours would reject out of hand. Second, whether he was dealing with gravity or alchemy, Newton disliked vague theories and purely logical concepts, which add little to our understanding. He wanted theories to be expressed precisely, preferably in mathematical terms, so that they predicted certain very definite outcomes and excluded others. Third, Newton had a certain creative genius for testing empirically those precisely defined theories. Fourth, even Newton was successful only when he focused his mighty intellect on a problem that could be solved with the technology available to him, and unsuccessful when he picked the wrong puzzle to solve. If Newton had tried to discover the nature of gravity rather than its precise effects, he probably would have been as unsuccessful as he was with alchemy.

With that background, we can better understand how the Newtonian mind might approach two modern problems that would have fascinated both the scientist and the sorcerer in him.

Gerald Schroeder is a physicist and Bible scholar who taught at MIT before moving to the Weizmann institute in Israel. His book *The Science of God* is a wide-ranging attempt to reconcile the Torah with scientific knowledge. Much of it consists of an attempt to present a non-Darwinian approach to evolution, and I will discuss this aspect of the book later, along with other books advocating "guided evolution." For now I am interested in Schroeder's most original contribution, which is his use of relativity's "time dilation" principle to reconcile the six-day creation described in Genesis with the approximate age

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of fifteen billion years that modern science estimates for the universe.

Schroeder starts by noting that the generations of humans starting with Adam adds up to 5757 years. The biblical "clock" for this purpose starts *after* the initial six days, a mysterious preliminary period which ancient commentators said contains "all the secrets and ages of the universe." Before Adam, and especially before the creation of the earth, the Bible speaks of time from the viewpoint of the universe as a whole, which Schroeder interprets to mean at the moment of "quark confinement," when stable matter formed from energy early in the first second of the big bang.

Relativity theory teaches that time passes much more slowly in conditions of great gravitational pressure than it does on earth. Using these familiar principles, Schroeder calculates that a period of six days under the conditions of quark confinement, when the universe was approximately a million million times smaller and hotter than it is today, is equal to fifteen billion years of earth time. Genesis and modern physics are reconciled.

I leave it to Schroeder's fellow physicists to say whether he has done the math right. My interest is more in the significance of the correlation. Why does a respectable scientist risk God only knows what ridicule from his peers to establish a harmony between Genesis and science about such matters as the age of the universe and the lifespans of the patriarchs? (Schroeder accepts the biblical dating as literally accurate after the creation week, and so he believes that Methuselah really did live 969 years, due to slower metabolism in antediluvian times.) Why are Jewish audiences fascinated by a kind of argument that has previously been thought to be attractive only to fundamentalist Christians? According to the dominant modern theories, the book of Genesis was pieced together from a variety of legendary sources, all stemming from ancient peoples who were utterly ignorant of modern science. If such a book happened to get the age of the universe right, it would be a fluke. Any correspondence between the six days of Genesis and the scientifically determined age of the universe must therefore be a meaningless coincidence—unless the author of Genesis knew something modern science thinks he couldn't have known.

A mixed-up reviewer of *The Science of God* in the *Washington Post* wrote that "Schroeder is no fundamentalist," and that "unlike the current proponents of the 'Bible Codes,' Schroeder takes the text seriously as a text." Jeffrey Satinover's *Cracking the Bible Code* tells a different story. Among the most distinguished scientific proponents of the Torah Codes, Satinover lists Gerald Schroeder, who "after publishing more than seventy scientific articles . . . left it all to come to Jerusalem where he lectures to people from all over the world about the interface of science and religion." Satinover also writes that a first-century Judean kabbalist named Nechunya asserted that the hidden teaching of Genesis is that the universe is "not a mere few thousand years old as the text seems to claim on the surface, but is 15.3 billion years old, the very age arrived at only recently" by science. Once you understand that Schroeder is a believer in the existence of hidden codes in the Torah, codes that (if genuine) reveal a supernatural intelligence, then you can understand why he thinks that reconciling Genesis with modern science is a worthy project. Schroeder and other speakers on this subject draw large audiences because many educated people have become convinced that the Codes are real, and this is an important cultural phenomenon.

Rational discussion of the Torah Codes issue is impeded by the publicity given to a sensational book, *The Bible Code,* by Michael Drosnin, which was instantly repudiated by all the reputable mathematicians who deal with the subject. Journalists consigned the subject to the "sightings of Elvis" category, thus concealing the real debate from public awareness as effectively as the obsessive secrecy with which Newton concealed his alchemical researches. If you want to understand the real Torah Codes issue from the viewpoint of a fair-minded sympathizer, I recommend Jeffrey Satinover's book and the review of it in this journal by William A. Dembski (August/September). If you want to read the negative case powerfully stated by a highly qualified (and Orthodox Jewish) critic, start with the web site of Cal Tech physics and math professor Barry Simon [http://www.wopr.com/biblecodes/TheCase.htm]. More books are anticipated, including one by Doron Witztum, the leading advocate of the Codes, and I am inclined to wait before coming to any opinion. I'll just provide here a brief description of the controversy, as the necessary background for explaining the Newtonian approach.

The basic claim is that, if you take the Hebrew text of the Torah, running all the letters together and omitting the spaces, significant word patterns (such as names of persons, plants, and places) emerge at equidistant letter sequences (ELS). In other words, one finds the words and combinations by starting at some point and taking every sixth letter, or every tenth, or any other constant sequence, going either forward or backward. A great many of the resulting word patterns could be due to chance, but some examples appear to be intentional. A particularly simple and charming example comes from the opening passages of Leviticus, which describe the Aaronic priesthood. Surprisingly, there is no direct reference in the text to Aaron himself (AHRN in unvocalized Hebrew). The esteemed Israeli mathematician Eliyahu Rips checked the 716-letter passage by computer for appearances of AHRN at equidistant intervals, and found 25. Mathematical analysis predicted 8.3, and the odds against 25 occurrences was calculated at 1 in about 2 million. (The math is undisput-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ed, but critics say that the statistical effect vanishes when a somewhat longer passage is tested.) Any single example of this sort might be a fluke, but if there are many similar examples (and that of course is the claim) then chance at some point becomes untenable as an explanation.

The above example illustrates what some call the "moderate" Torah Codes hypothesis. If the examples really are a deliberate coding, and not a product of chance or biased testing, then the Torah seems to have been written by an awe-inspiring (but not necessarily supernatural) intellect. This would be an immensely important discovery in itself, and would demolish the dominant theory that the Torah was patched together by many authors over a period of centuries. Of course, a basic premise of *any* Torah Codes hypothesis is that similar codes do not appear in other literary works, including other books of the Bible, when comparison tests are run. A Hebrew translation of Tolstoy's *War and Peace* is the customary control text for testing the uniqueness of the Torah in this respect.

There is also an "extravagant" Torah Codes hypothesis, illustrated by the "great sages" experiment that has been at the center of the Torah Codes controversy. Because an adequate description of the experiment would be distracting here, I refer readers to Satinover and the web pages for the specifics. For my present purpose it is enough to say that the Torah supposedly encodes not only information concerning matters which a human author of the Torah conceivably could have known, but also information about persons who lived centuries after the Torah was written—specifically famous persons of medieval and modern times, from Maimonides to Hitler. The extravagant hypothesis seems incredible, but it comes with an impressive show of meticulous verification from mathematicians and cryptologists and it has convinced some previously skeptical persons of high intelligence. For this reason the Codes are playing an important role in the rise of Orthodox fundamentalism in Israel, and have also attracted the attention of some Christians.

I expect readers join me in regarding the whole subject with suspicion, because we have so often seen the credulous taken in by similar-sounding claims. We may even be suspicious on theological grounds, because the whole thing sounds too much like the very unbiblical process of fortune-telling. (I wish the moderate hypothesis, so intriguing in itself, could be evaluated independently of the sensationalism that is inherent in the extravagant hypothesis.) Our suspicions are not to the point, however, when the subject is how Isaac Newton would have looked at the matter. The Torah Codes hypothesis combines elements of conventional biblical prophecy and alchemy, and I have no doubt that Newton would have seen it as a possible avenue to the ultimate truths that he was seeking. He would not have rejected even the extravagant version out of hand, but would have labored to make it specific and testable. This is also what both the Torah Codes advocates and their skeptical adversaries have tried to do.

How does one test whether the codes are genuine? I can best describe the basic principle by explaining how *not* to do it. If you take any large database and try out enough possibilities, you will eventually discover some amazing correlations. The inherent manipulability of statistical analysis is familiar to lawyers because of the "junk science" that is endemic in litigation. Exactly the same statistics can be used to prove that a drug either does or does not cause some disabling condition, and it is child's play to make a case that any database of criminal sentencing decisions or hiring decisions embodies discrimination of some kind. All you have to do is try out enough combinations until you hit pay dirt, a practice that statisticians call data-dredging or "cherry-picking."

That is why it is critical to the credibility of the great sages experiment that the names of the sages and the accompanying details were selected on objective criteria from a standard Jewish encyclopedia, so that there was no opportunity for cherry-picking—if the experiment was done as advertised. Of course the skeptics suspect that the cherry-picking was done first, and then the encyclopedia may have been brought in as a post hoc justification for a combination that happened to work. (Some of the skeptics are reluctant to charge deliberate fraud, but it is hard to attack the methodology without suggesting that the advocates surreptitiously took advantage of "wiggle room" to pick the ripest cherries.) The skeptics have asserted that alternate spellings of the names could just as well have been used, in which case *War and Peace* would have fared better than the Torah. The proponents of the Codes respond that it is the skeptics who are doing the cherry-picking, and that's where I'll leave the matter for now. I wouldn't look for either side to land a single knockout blow, but as the results of additional tests are published it will eventually become clear to unprejudiced observers that one side is finding its predictions confirmed and the other side is regularly taking evasive action to explain away the facts.

From a Newtonian perspective the scientific enterprise is working exactly as it should. A frankly supernatural hypothesis is not being dismissed on a priori grounds (although some of the skeptics would plainly like to do just that if they could) but is being debated on scientific grounds in public territory. The rigorous statistical methodology which both sides profess to practice provides a valuable lesson in how to tell the difference between genuine scientific testing and the counterfeit version which looks only for confirming evidence to buttress a favored belief. And that brings me to evolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Darwinian theory starts with facts that everyone acknowledges, and then goes on to make a gigantic extrapolation that is highly controversial. Organisms vary, and variations that are genetic in origin may be inherited. Some variations make the organism either more or less fit to survive and reproduce. Since only those organisms that succeed in reproducing leave descendants, it is practically true by definition that favorable variations will tend to spread through the breeding population, and unfavorable variations will tend to disappear. This may be termed a process of "change in gene frequencies," and that is the most common textbook definition of "evolution."

None of that is controversial, and none of it explains the interesting part of evolution, which is the part that tells us how we get all the varieties of plants and animals in the first place. Gene frequencies can and do vary in stable populations, and natural selection may simply be preventing change by weeding out the mutants. The standard Darwinian textbook claim, of course, is that the same process of constant variation that occurs in stable species sometimes results in the appearance of new species, and eventually in organisms that are as radically different as vertebrates and invertebrates, or even plants and animals. The grand theory is that all of evolution, from the first living molecule to human beings, is nothing more than the accumulation of small genetic variations over vast stretches of geological time. This is usually coupled in textbooks, however, with some vague qualification that "the details of the process are still being investigated," or even that "some scientists believe that other mechanisms are at work." Upon investigation, the "other mechanisms" turn out to be Darwinian after all (chance, punctuated equilibria) or else speculative (hopeful monsters, self-organizing systems). When the smoke has cleared, the standard neo-Darwinian model remains the only game in town.

Dissatisfaction with Darwinism emerges because well-informed persons who are not blinded by prejudice realize that the extrapolation from observed microevolution to a complete history of life is unsupported by evidence, and that scientists tolerate it only because of the difficulty of coming up with an acceptable alternative. I won't detail the argument here, since I have made it in four books (especially *Darwin on Trial*), but I'll just say that very few scientists, when pressed, will explicitly endorse the Darwinian extrapolation. They prefer to defend the vague proposition that "evolution has occurred," and to concede that there is little consensus on the precise mechanism. When evolution means only that variations happen, or that there is a pattern of relationship among living creatures (as there is among automobiles, symphonies, or judicial opinions), then this claim is uncontroversial because it is empty. It is as if Newton had announced that the explanation of gravity is "attraction." That's not wrong; it's just not very informative.

Physicist Gerald Schroeder, geologist John Cafferky, and biochemist Michael Denton are all skeptical about Darwinism, but insist that "evolution has occurred." The authors come not only from different scientific disciplines, but have differing motivations. As we have seen, Schroeder is primarily interested in reconciling science and Genesis, although this program does not mean for him what it does for Protestant fundamentalists. Because the Six Days of quark confinement time equal fifteen billion years of earth time, and because Jewish scholars have never read the first chapters of Genesis literally, Schroeder can easily accept most of the standard evolutionary story, provided that it is directed by divine providence and ends with God putting the breath of life (*ruach*, in Hebrew) into man and making him a living soul (*neshama*). Cafferky is a Christian who as a geologist saw the absurdity of the standard chemical evolution scenarios, by which life is supposed to have emerged from a (nonexistent) prebiotic soup. One might say that he accepts the geology of evolution (i.e., the standard fossil history, which he relates skillfully) but not the Darwinian mechanism. The latter has always found its primary support in materialist philosophy and doesn't fit the fossil evidence much better than it fits the religious view that God created man and endowed him with a soul.

The biochemist Denton's book is in some ways the most interesting, and in other ways the most baffling. Denton provides a wealth of information about just how marvelous the world is, and just how carefully each feature of it had to be "tuned" to make it possible for weird things like us to come into existence. Even a mundane substance like water has features that seem practically miraculous when you stop to think about it, and Denton rightly devotes a whole chapter to the astonishing properties of this "vital fluid." Denton thus carries forward into chemistry and biology an argument that has become almost standard in cosmology: the natural laws of the universe had to be so finely calibrated to make life possible that it is hard to avoid concluding that there is some purpose behind the whole show. At the present time biology is dominated by vehement materialists like Francis Crick, Richard Lewontin, Stephen Jay Gould, and Richard Dawkins, whereas cosmologists frequently sound like budding theologians. (One prominent mathematical physicist, Paul Davies, has even won the Templeton Prize for "progress in religion.") Perhaps the time will come when biologists will follow the physicists and abandon their love affair with strict materialism, but they will have to pay a heavy price. Biologists have long committed all their prestige to defending Darwinism, and they can't defend the theory without the philosophy.

The confusing part about Denton is his own phi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

losophy. His subtitle says that the book is about "How the laws of biology reveal purpose in the universe." This implies that the laws are one thing, and the purpose behind them is something else. Intelligent agents have purposes, and to talk about the universe having a purpose is either to talk about God or to attribute God-like qualities to the universe itself. Yet Denton also insists with emphasis that "the cosmos is a *seamless unity which can be comprehended ultimately in its entirety by human reason and in which all phenomena, including life and evolution and the origin of man, are ultimately explicable in terms of natural processes.*" Then whose purpose are we talking about, and does the purpose itself come about through natural processes? Furthermore, what empirical evidence is there that the laws of biology and physics are sufficient (as opposed to merely necessary) to produce life? Denton explains that he means to exclude a priori any possibility that God acted during the course of cosmic history, and hence to disavow special creation. This move is understandable for an author who is under suspicion and wants to persuade the scientific world to take his ideas seriously. (Denton's first book, *Evolution: A Theory in Crisis,* was much more radically critical of evolutionary naturalism, and hence was dismissed by Darwinists as "creationist.") I am sympathetic with Denton's problem, but I predict that the Darwinian materialists will be implacable. They will realize as I do that, once the existence of a purpose-giver external to the material world is admitted, it will not be so easy to confine such explanations by a priori stipulations.

Evolutionary biology, whether practiced by strict materialists, theists, or Aristotelian teleologists, bears a striking resemblance to alchemy. Both disciplines involve transformations, and both have a certain scientific basis in that some transformations actually do occur—within limits. The genuine science becomes alchemy when ambitious investigators assume dogmatically that they can extrapolate from one kind of change to another, and imagine that they know how to transform lead into gold, lifeless chemicals into living organisms, and bacteria into human beings. I am sure Isaac Newton would tell us that the way to find out whether these claims are true is to make them specific, and hence testable, and then to see if they pass objective tests. I'll provide three examples, one from each author under review, to illustrate how this can be done. I need to emphasize that scientific testing cannot prove a negative, such as that "macroevolution does not occur," or that "there is no code of any kind concealed in the Torah." All that testing can do is to consider a specific prediction, and say whether it is confirmed or disconfirmed.

1. *Fossil Studies.* Like many fossil experts, John Cafferky uses the extinct therapsids, or "mammal-like reptiles," as his prime example to prove that at least one macroevolutionary transition has occurred, although he also cites it as evidence *against* the Darwinian mechanism. Very briefly, mammals have three ear bones and reptiles have only one. The therapsid class contains species which seem intermediate between reptiles and mammals in this respect, with jaw bones in transition towards the ear. The claim is sometimes made that specific therapsids actually are ancestors of today's mammals, and at other times in the more modest form that the therapsids illustrate certain characteristics that the true ancestors would be likely to have had. Cafferky says that "for those who want to dispute the 'fact' of evolution, this is the case to crack."

What's wrong with the proof? Well, it's flagrant cherry-picking. The fossil record, like the Torah, is a database. If armies of Darwinists, convinced on a priori grounds that their theory is true, go through millions of fossils looking for confirming examples, they are bound to find something that looks like a possible transformation. This is not scientific testing, and the Torah Codes proponents would never dare to try to get away with anything so blatant. The way to test any hypothesis is to say in advance precisely what you expect to find, and then to examine without prejudice all the available data to see whether the prediction is generally confirmed. Because the fossil record is incomplete, greater weight should be given to areas where fossils are relatively plentiful (marine invertebrates) than to areas where fossils are relatively rare (land vertebrates, like the therapsids). Test any specific evolutionary theory in this manner, and you will come out with the conclusion that hard evidence of transformations at the higher levels of the taxonomic hierarchy (e.g., phyla, classes) is conspicuous by its absence.

2. *Embryology.* Schroeder endorses a modified version of the "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" formula of Ernest Haeckel, Darwin's unscrupulous German supporter, to illustrate how embryonic development resembles "evolution." Haeckel's long-discredited notion survives in fragmented form, as in the common but false claim (repeated by Schroeder) that human embryos have gills. Schroeder also reproduces a set of drawings from the magazine *Scientific American* purporting to show that vertebrate embryos are similar at early stages of development, and develop the distinctive characteristics of their species in later stages. In fact the drawings are fakes, drawn by Haeckel to indicate what he thought the embryos ought to look like. The fraud has repeatedly been exposed, first during Haeckel's lifetime and most recently by embryologists in 1997, but the drawings continue to be used in textbooks and in popular books on evolution. Photos of equivalent embryos actually show only a vague similarity, and in any case the different vertebrate embryos develop to this point of relative commonality by radically different meth-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ods. This unexpected variation in early embryonic states is entirely contrary to Darwinian predictions. I give this example not to embarrass Schroeder, who as a physicist reasonably assumed that he could trust the usual scientific sources, but to illustrate how the normal processes of scientific testing have been suspended in the field of evolution. This example involves more than just selective use of evidence; it involves the embracing by an entire scientific community of a fable, despite the continual availability of disconfirming evidence from experts.

3. *Molecular genetics.* Michael Denton makes the standard assumption that DNA contains a blueprint or recipe that specifies every detail of embryonic development. In his own words, "From the initial fertilization of the egg cell every single one of the unimaginable infinity of biochemical and developmental events which shapes the growing mass of embryonic cells into a human form is under the control of the DNA master tape." Even though this "DNA is everything" thesis is very widely assumed, it is not supported by the experimental evidence reported in the scientific literature. Proteins encoded by DNA affect development, but the complete "program" is as yet undiscovered. Although DNA mutations can produce spectacular birth defects, this does not mean that they can reprogram the developmental process. The notion that we can reprogram the developmental process by DNA mutations is likewise questionable. For example, a PhD dissertation by Paul Nelson, to be published in late 1998 by the University of Chicago's distinguished "Evolutionary Monographs" series, explains in detail how all attempts to change the direction of embryonic development by inducing mutations have failed. This point is of central importance, because all existing macroevolutionary scenarios depend on the assumption that one can reprogram the DNA "recipe" by inducing mutations, and thus change the direction of development and produce a viable adult phenotype. If this assumption were restated as a testable hypothesis, and examined objectively, I see no reason to believe it would survive.

The battle between science and sorcery that went on inside Isaac Newton's mind remains a living issue today, but it has taken new forms. Scientific materialists think that "science" is identical with their philosophy, which is why they accept Darwinism uncritically and think that they can understand everything if they have a complete theory of particle physics. I stand with Newton as a proponent of metaphysical open-mindedness, and think that any theory can be scientific if it is stated precisely and tested empirically. The price of sticking to testability is high, however. It is that scientists have to admit to the public, and to themselves, that there are a lot of important questions they cannot answer for now, including the mystery of how complex organisms came into existence.

I would not say that Newton was the last of the sorcerers. He went down some strange paths, but he tried to make his inquiries genuinely scientific. Some admirers have called Charles Darwin "the Newton of biology." It would be more appropriate to say that Darwin was the Sigmund Freud of biology, because like Freud he was a man with brilliant ideas and a persuasive manner who deliberately framed his theory so it could evade true empirical testing. His successors have followed his example. It is probably too much to hope that they will be the last of the alchemists. FT

All Souls' Day

We stack the dead
names of the faithful
high in the incensed air,
light prayers beneath them
till the altar burns with words.
The nave knows their smoke,
remembers our memories of them.
The chancel recants our absence
from their lives until we live
again in the space at the rail
beside them, these saints
unSainted, the faint flames
of our unmartyred selves
riding their iridescent fires.

Marjorie Maddox

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Essay

The Pro-Life Movement Then and Now

Dave Andrusko

ARTICLES OF FAITH: A FRONTLINE HISTORY OF THE ABORTION WARS. By CYNTHIA GORNEY. *Simon & Shuster. 575 pp. $27.50.*

WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION WAR. By JAMES RISEN and JUDY THOMAS. *Basic Books. 402 pp. $25.*

Cynthia Gorney's prodigiously researched *Articles of Faith: A Frontline History of the Abortion Wars* stands as a tribute to perseverance and intellectual integrity, a welcome reminder that evenhandedness can carry the day even when the subject matter is as multifaceted, controversial, and inflammatory as abortion. There are, to be sure, explicit and implicit conclusions with which many readers, including this one, will strongly disagree. In addition, because the book was originally intended to culminate with the events of 1989, an otherwise gracefully written effort concludes with an awkward ten-page epilogue that carries the story up to 1997. Notwithstanding these objections, *Articles of Faith* is to abortion what Anthony Lukas' *Common Ground* was to school desegregation, as many reviewers have observed. Its luster shines even brighter when compared with James Risen and Judy Thomas' *Wrath of Angels.*

Gorney, a former reporter for the *Washington Post,* was instructed in early 1989 to write a Sunday magazine piece about a case coming out of Missouri known as *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* which the Supreme Court had agreed to hear. Nine years later it's very difficult to appreciate the reaction on both sides to the Court's decision to hear the case, but at the time the conventional wisdom was that the Supreme Court might well use *Webster* to dismantle *Roe v. Wade.* (It was not until he voted in the 1992 *Casey* decision that the greening of Justice Anthony Kennedy became unmistakable.) It seemed a potentially historic shift was in the offing. Boning up for her trip to Missouri, Gorney expected to find a rich assortment of background materials that would explain why Americans react they way they do to abortion, who the partisans were, and how and why their personal stories led them to understand the significance of abortion in such profoundly different ways. However, nothing of a nonpartisan stripe existed. Two years later she left the *Post* to write the book that would largely fill the void.

Whether the medium be news reports or full-blown books, abortion advocates typically get all the good lines and the flattering profiles. Not here. The beauty of *Articles of Faith* is that it really is nonjudgmental. After six years and a staggering five hundred interviews, Gorney became a self-taught polyglot, able to "speak" each side's "language" like a native. Indeed, she has so immersed herself in her respective protagonists' worldviews, become so familiar with their idioms, that she not only presents each side's best arguments, she often argues their case better than they do.

Missouri serves as the prism through which Gorney interprets and explains "the abortion wars." Consequently, she does not address those aspects of the pro-life movement not present in Missouri. Gorney's narrative focus turns on the intersecting fortunes of two fascinating characters: Judith Widdicombe, a brusque, hardcharging obstetrics nurse turned abortion clinic operator, and Sam Lee, who seemed destined to become a priest but instead became first a leader of the abortion clinic sit-in movement and later a highly respected pro-life lobbyist. (Although there are no saints in *Articles of Faith,* Gorney's descriptions of Lee suggest he at least made the first cut.) For most of the book Gorney tells her protagonists' stories in alternating chapters, with an artist's eye for revealing detail and a novelist's ear for telltale remarks.

In Gorney's rendering, there is little in Judith Widdicombe's background that would foreshadow her emergence as one of the principal pro-choice leaders in Missouri, the founder of St. Louis' first abortion clinic and the first to do second-trimester abortions. In 1968 Widdicombe was a thirty-year-old middle-class Methodist woman, who along with her unassuming husband led a quiet and conventional life.

DAVE ANDRUSKO *is Editor of the* National Right to Life News, *based in Washington, D.C.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Her self-image was of a "caretaker." An obstetrical nurse, one night a week she volunteered to counsel on a suicide-prevention hotline. She began to receive calls from women who were not suicidal but who were seeking abortions. She was quickly drawn into a secret abortion-referral service run largely by mainline Protestant ministers.

During that time, Widdicombe led the ultimate schizophrenic life, "working labor and delivery in a Catholic obstetrical ward while shuttling women to and from abortionists." Some women would even come to her home to complete their abortions. Widdicombe anesthetized her conscience by repeating the word "potential" to herself. As Gorney writes, "What landed in the plastic basin in the Widdicombes' back toilet was a potential human being, the premonition of a human being, the first rough arrangement of eyelids and fingerprints and human skin." The "actual" human being was the woman.

To its enormous credit, *Articles of Faith* includes unblinkingly straightforward, euphemism-free descriptions of gruesome abortions. Widdicombe brought her chief abortion doctor to Washington, D.C., to learn how to perform a new technique, "D&E." As he observed the abortionist's technique and listened to his matter-of-fact explanation of what he was doing, "a small arm with a hand on it dropped into the surgical pan. A *hand*." He "felt momentarily short of air, as though someone had punched him hard in the stomach. . . . What was wrong with him? Why was he suddenly thinking about Nazi Germany?" The truth was that while over six years "he had observed his share of bloodied parts," never before had his work "required him to consider so plainly the mechanics of dismemberment."

Lee's story is even more compelling. Introspective to a fault, Lee, who was twenty in 1968, was a man who "wanted to understand spiritual commitment, and in particular the kind of commitment that makes tangible, dramatic changes in individual human lives." After learning about St. Francis of Assisi and coming to admire the Franciscans' unity of life and moral commitment, Lee's spiritual pilgrimage brought him to the Franciscan House of Studies near St. Louis University in 1978. A group of young, idealistic Catholics had gathered and were discussing a sit-in at a St. Louis county abortion clinic, a conversation that included fiercely earnest discussions about civil disobedience, fasting and prayer, and a peaceful presence in the face of an unjust law. Intrigued by what was then an approach in its infancy, Lee devoured all he could read for and against abortion and quickly emerged as a leader of the group.

Gorney shows that Lee and physician Matt Backer (who functions as the representative pro-lifer in the book's early chapters) were convinced by the same arguments that swayed many of the early opponents of abortion. At the very core was the knowledge that there are universal moral principles that apply across all faiths and every philosophy. To defend defenseless unborn life is not a principle unique to or exclusively derived from Catholicism, or any other organized religion, any more than opposition to racism is. Safeguarding human life is rather an *ethical* principle that an unbiased reading of medical science and common sense affirm independent of religion altogether. Respect for life is, as Backer saw it, "written on the heart."

Gorney's two protagonists finally clashed at Widdicombe's abortion clinic. By the nature of the book's narrative structure, then, a great deal of attention is paid to the "Direct Action" movement, whose principal activities were to protest at abortion clinics, try to persuade women not to abort, and engage in civil disobedience leading to arrest. Unlike James Risen and Judy Thomas in their *Wrath of Angels*, Gorney does not caricature the rest of the pro-life movement as bit players whose only role is to obstruct.

While the movement was never a monolith, the absolute commitment to nonviolence was the sine qua non of all the early leaders of the sit-in, Gorney explains. Their whole point was to show that the violence was *inside* the clinic. Borrowing from the civil rights movement, of which they considered themselves heirs, they held, as an early classic pamphlet put it, "With Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., we must come to believe that 'unearned suffering is somehow redemptive.'" That "capacity to endure," it was argued, "is greater than the abortionist's capacity to destroy."

Not unexpectedly, however, there were disagreements, both externally and internally. Most of the mainstream right to life movement, religious and nondenominational alike, was deeply skeptical of what it saw as largely a diversion of limited energies and resources from more productive activities—education, legislation, electoral politics. Moreover, as Gorney demonstrates, it also worried about the potential for violence—either out of frustration or as a response to provocation—and pondered what would happen if ever there were an excuse to unleash the awesome legislative and legal resources of the federal government against the pro-life movement collectively.

Internally, according to Gorney, these early leaders saw sit-ins partly as symbolic actions but primarily as interventions that could actually save individual babies on a given day. In that light there were passionate debates over just how "passive" passive resistance was, or ought, to be. As *Articles of Faith* ends, far more militant "rescues" are replacing "sit-ins." Ominously, in complete opposition to the behavior of the ordinary rescuer and the mainstream right to life movement, there emerged a small circle of people who were "ambivalent" about how clinic bombings should be regarded. Attending a national convention of Direct Action people, Lee "could see that in the moral climate the Direct Action people were creating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for themselves, clinic bombers were assuming the role of the frontline hero pushed just a little too far." Later, Lee began an apprenticeship at the state capitol, eventually becoming a full-time pro-life lobbyist, having been won over by the idea that well-crafted legislation can be a "serious tool."

Meanwhile Widdicombe had burnt out. She quit her abortion clinic, got a divorce, went through extensive therapy, and headed to Washington. She opposed what turned out to be a huge public relations bonanza for abortion advocates, the 1989 Washington, D.C., "March for Women's Equality/Women's Lives." A few months later, when the Justices in the *Webster* decision appeared to invite further protective abortion statutes, Widdicombe, the veteran, sensed the call to return home to rouse the complacent. Back in Missouri, however, her political strategy was ultimately crushed by the strong opposition of younger, less experienced pro-abortion feminists. Lee likewise had differences over strategy with fellow pro-lifers. Gorney's dramatic closing scene is of Widdicombe and Lee meeting in a hallway at the state house and hugging, the implication being that both are the victims of the "zealots" of their respective movements.

Along with the stories leading up to the *Webster* decision, Gorney includes a several-chapter-long survey of the beginnings of the illegal abortion "underground," the origins of the abortion "reform" (later repeal) movement, the cases moving through the legal pipeline challenging abortion statutes, the story of Widdicombe's own abortion, and her decision after *Roe* to open an abortion clinic. Despite the breadth and complexity of the sources she examines, Gorney writes in prose so lucid that the reader is effortlessly pulled along page after page, making the book an indispensable tool for future historians of abortion.

As noted, the narrative in *Articles of Faith* ends in 1989. The epilogue added to bring events up through 1997 makes for a gloomy compendium, the choice and interpretation of events telling us where Gorney believes the battle is today. Lethal violence by murderers prompted Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Justice Department to lower the hammer, drastically limiting the right of pro-lifers to demonstrate peacefully outside abortion clinics. The Supreme Court's 1992 *Casey* decision solidified the constitutional "right" to abortion, with several Justices explicitly buying into the abortion-as-gender-equity argument. A few months later Bill Clinton was elected and went on to appoint two pro-*Roe* justices. The recent (and continuing) debate over partial-birth abortion, which pro-lifers see as a major force in reorienting the entire abortion debate, warrants only a few sentences. The closing paragraph examines the very modest accomplishments of the "common ground" project, which has brought some pro-lifers and pro-choicers together to seek proposals they personally can agree are acceptable.

All in all—the impression is left—pro-lifers gave it their best and pro-choicers fended them off. Combine this uncharacteristically one-dimensional synopsis with the fact that the focus of Gorney's "frontline history" is the intertwining stories of an abortion clinic owner and a pro-life protestor who worries that a later generation of Direct Action people operates "principally from the gut," and certain conclusions are implied. One with which I strongly disagree is that because, in their different ways, both the "peaceful presence" approach of the early people who sat-in and the political/legislative/educational strategy of the mainstream pro-life organizations "failed," it shouldn't surprise anyone that some loose cannons began bombing clinics and shooting abortionists.

This is the explicit thesis of Risen and Thomas' *Wrath of Angels: The American Abortion Wars.* In 1994 Risen, a *Los Angeles Times* reporter, and Thomas, a reporter who now works for the *Kansas City Star,* met in Wichita where both were covering the trial of the woman accused of attempting to kill Kansas abortionist George Tiller.

This is a book about ever-escalating violence, which the dust jacket misleadingly calls the "rise and fall of the American anti-abortion movement." The authors' thesis is that the pro-life movement split in two, sparked by the failure of the "polite incrementalists" to enact a constitutional amendment or change the Supreme Court's composition sufficiently to reverse *Roe.* This "frustration and despair" opened the door to Direct Action, initially led by young, quasi-pacifistic leftist Catholics who were eventually superseded by far more aggressive conservative fundamentalist Protestants.

The book offers heavy-handed psychological explanations: talk of "innermost demons," "pent-up religious zeal," and "fear of commitment" abounds. One of the "liberal Catholics" that Risen and Thomas write about supposedly needed to risk arrest at clinic sit-ins "as penance" for outliving an older brother who died in Vietnam (the younger son had subsequently secured conscientious objector status).

Risen and Thomas do their best work in chronicling the ratcheting up of the tactics of confrontation, harassment, and violence. In the search for larger numbers, peaceful organizers became less careful in their screening practices. Thus, at the time planning for peaceful sit-ins in Maryland was commencing, one new recruit was using that information to conspire with another man to blow up abortion clinics. In retrospect, the reader sees that at each juncture, as the ante was raised, no one sufficiently prominent in the Direct Action movement stood up to loudly say, "Stop!" Indeed, Risen and Thomas write, privately some were in support and/or agreed not to oppose violence publicly.

The authors show how Operation Rescue founder Randall Terry attracted people by building on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the foundation established by the likes of theologian Francis Schaeffer and pediatric surgeon (and later Surgeon General) C. Everett Koop, who had chastised conservative Protestants for sitting on the sidelines. (It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of their book *Whatever Happened to the Human Race?* and the twenty-city film and lecture tour they undertook to awaken the evangelical community.) Terry won people over by portraying rescues as a kind of "atonement" for the earlier silence of most churches on abortion. According to Risen and Thomas, Terry "shamed" pastors into mobilizing their flocks by charging that "church leaders who ignored abortions had blood on their hands." They could wash away this "blood guiltiness" by "doing everything possible to stop abortion." Risen and Thomas, otherwise sloppy in their discussions of evangelicals, do note the one great irony of the *Roe* decision: "These [Protestant evangelicals] set out to transform the law, but in the process they transformed themselves, transformed their theological beliefs, and ended generations of isolation. Now, thanks to Harry Blackmun and *Roe,* they are in the political arena to stay."

Wrath of Angels, however, would have been a far better book had Risen and Thomas been more able to empathize with the convictions that compelled millions of conservative Protestants to act upon their opposition to abortion. For most, their motivation was not a response to some fire-and-brimstone pronouncement from the pulpit but a deep shame that their churches had failed (as Koop descried in his autobiography) "to do something to reverse the perilous realignment of American values on these life-and-death issues."

Once Operation Rescue began routinely to disregard injunctions to stay away from abortion clinics, the die was cast. As the protests grew larger and less disciplined, local authorities, police, and judges took an increasingly hard, even brutal, line. A devastating series of lawsuits, trials, judicial rulings, and finally federal legislation spelled the end of Operation Rescue as a prominent national organization. When Terry lost the leadership of the organization, Risen and Thomas argue, it opened the door to increasingly unstable characters. One woman, engaging in a series of ever-more-violent actions, wrote in a computer file that she considered the arson of an abortion clinic "a birthday present to Jesus."

Risen and Thomas, and Gorney as well, interviewed some of the early protest leaders, who expressed a sadness that they did not explicitly and forcefully oppose the escalation of attacks against the "machinery" of abortion. The early focus of sit-ins emphasized attempting peacefully to persuade pregnant women not to abort. Increasingly, that switched to trying to keep the abortionist away from his instruments; the latter efforts sometimes included glue-in-locks, stink bombs, stalking, and worse. However, what the authors do not examine is how profoundly dangerous was the attempted distinction between acts of aggression and violence against "property," and acts against people.

Today, Risen and Thomas see a spent "anti-abortion movement." It could not be otherwise, because while they talk of the "two pro-life movements," for them Direct Action *is* the pro-life movement. Read closely and it is easy to see that they have internalized the disregard, even contempt, that Direct Action activists so often felt for other pro-lifers. The attitude of one of the very first peaceful sit-in activists was, alas, all too typical. He believed that the early right-to-lifers lacked commitment. "Most seemed to treat anti-abortion activity like a hobby rather than a matter of life and death," the activist decided. According to Risen and Thomas' account, his impatience with those he initially derided as "just a bunch of right-wing nuts" led him to the insulting conclusion that they did not respect the unborn.

Because of this sense of superiority, the activists proudly did not take into account the political ramifications of their actions. In weighing the legacy of violence against abortion clinics and clinic personnel, two items are worth noting. Around the time of the twenty-fifth anniversary of *Roe,* the Associated Press sent out a twelve-item summary of major abortion events that have taken place since 1973. *Half* of these concerned instances of violence. In another poll, commissioned by CBS News/*New York Times* and reported last January, 44 percent of the respondents said they considered "anti-abortion activists" in their states "extremists." By contrast, 66 percent considered "abortion rights advocates" in their states "reasonable."

For many reasons, it is neither hype nor hope to disagree with such bleak prognoses for the pro-life movement. In a polite way, Gorney dismisses the bedrock pro-life assumption that the American public will turn against abortion if it understands the truth about what abortion does and to whom. She also neglects another key ingredient in the pro-life program: helping people to understand the obsessive abortion mentality of the pro-choice movement. Yet on these and related fronts, the pro-life movement has made substatial breakthroughs in the last two years, while the pro-choicers have met setbacks that indicate deep problems for their defense of abortion.

Plunging surgical scissors into the heads of babies inches away from delivery and then vacuuming out their brains is, understandably, extremely difficult to defend even for many pro-choicers. What made matters worse is that the pro-choice establishment simply did not tell the truth. This all came out when Ron Fitzsimmons of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers bluntly admitted that when he parroted the company line—that these grotesque abortions are rarely performed and virtually always on babies with severe fetal abnormalities—he "lied through [his]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

teeth." As Fitzsimmons well knew, there are thousands of partial-birth abortions performed annually, most on healthy babies.

Paralyzed by the fear that the whole foundation will tumble if a single brick is removed, pro-choicers have gotten themselves in another bind by opposing the Child Custody Protection Act. This law would make it a federal crime to transport a minor across a state line to obtain an abortion if this was to circumvent a state law that requires parental or judicial involvement. Beyond exhibiting an in-your-face contempt for parental rights, such behavior (acknowledged to take place thousands of times each year) affords the statutory rapist the opportunity to destroy the evidence of his crime.

All of this is altering public opinion. Polling data reveal a hefty upward surge in the number of people who, when asked, identify themselves as pro-life and a slow, steady increase in the percentage of people who oppose the reasons for which most abortions are performed. The percentage of respondents in a 1998 CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup poll who said they considered themselves pro-life was 48 percent, up from only 33 percent three years before. In like fashion, a careful reading of the cross tabulations of a separate Gallup poll revealed that a total of 63 percent believe that abortion should either never be legal (15 percent) or legal only in a "few circumstances" (48 percent).

Moreover, the percentage of Americans who say abortion should be legal "under any circumstances" has shrunk from one-third to one-quarter. Why? Lydia Saad, the Gallup Poll's managing editor, writes that this drop was "coincident with the emergence of a loud national debate over partial-birth abortion." If opposition is confined to partial-birth abortions "then perhaps not very much will have changed," she writes. "If, however, opposition to abortion in the cases of the partial-birth procedure makes the public more receptive to other limits on abortion or if the issue forces a fundamental reconsideration by Americans of whether they consider themselves pro-life or pro-choice, then the observed change in Gallup's abortion trend will clearly be more profound."

However, pro-choicers would not be the able defenders of the status quo that they are if they weren't acutely sensitive to the need to co-opt and deflect public anxieties and discomfort with abortion. Without denying that some are sincere, one must look with great skepticism at the recent stream of articles calling on abortion advocates to admit that there is an inescapable moral dimension of some considerable gravity to abortion. Taking these at face value is made even more difficult when such "concessions" rarely even hint at preventing *any* abortion. Ironically, this softer approach has prompted some pro-choice veterans to an unexpectedly brutal candor. "Any pretense that abortion is not killing," argued former Planned Parenthood President Faye Wattleton in *Ms.* last year, "is a signal of our ambivalence, a signal that we cannot say yes, it kills a fetus, but it is the woman's body, and therefore ultimately her choice." Very revealing in a different way was an article earlier this year in the *Washington Monthly* bemoaning the fact that post-abortion counseling is the almost exclusive provenance of pro-lifers. Headlines in the *New York Times* announcing that the pro-choice movement can no longer count on the younger generation of women is still more evidence that the momentum has shifted.

Far from failing, as the Gorney and Risen/Thomas books suggest, the pro-life movement has kept the abortion debate very much alive. Externally, the abortion issue is now an ingredient in everything from campaign finance reform to the role of HMOs. Internally, fewer and fewer within the movement brush aside the necessity of attempting to secure legislative and legal protection for the unborn, which necessarily requires serious, long-term involvement in electoral politics. This near-consensus did not exist even five years ago. Further evidence of this newfound sophistication is that it has become almost a cliché that peaceful, legal, cultural transformation and legislative/political initiatives are not competing but rather complementary approaches.

The strength of the pro-life house has always been that it has many rooms. There is space in one wing for those who place their primary emphasis on education, legislation, and politics, for crisis pregnancy centers in another, for working with post-abortion women in another, and for peacefully, legally "changing the culture" in still another. The true genius of the pro-life movement is that in whichever of these ways people choose to use their energies, it contributes to winning the day for mothers and their unborn children.

Pro-choicers have always been snared in a trap: they see the mother in isolation not only from her child but from everyone else. Mother and child are, of course, interdependent, in two obvious senses. First, the child's fate ultimately hinges on convincing her mother not to abort. Second, abortion is uniquely evil in that it destroys the child and maims the mother. Moreover, no one must ever underestimate the importance of those who surround the woman experiencing a crisis pregnancy. Husband or boyfriend, parents, and friends must function as her natural support system, for it is their yea or nay that so often tips the "choice" in one direction or the other.

At the core of the conclusion that the "abortion wars" will go on indefinitely without much change is the assumption that the two sides speak different languages: one invokes the woman, the other the unborn child. In truth, pro-lifers are bilingual, lifting up both mother and child. And because they are fluent in both languages, they can lead American women by the most natural route imaginable out of that morbid solipsism which is at the center of Justice Blackmun's world. FT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Supreme Court 1998

Michael W. McConnell

When the Supreme Court packs up its bags at the end of June each year, court watchers invariably scan the year's work for evidence of ideological trends. In keeping with the myth that the current Court is "conservative," the public is generally regaled with a chorus of alarms or expressions of relief, as the decisions warrant. Perhaps it is time to recognize that the balance of power on the "Rehnquist Court" is with the center-left. To be sure, the glory days of judicial activism are over, but that does not make the Court "conservative" in any serious way. The Rehnquist Court is mostly nonideological, with a tendency to make symbolic gestures toward the politically fashionable ideas of the secular elite. Seven appointments by Republican Presidents have left astonishingly little mark.

This term was no exception. About half the decisions were unanimous. Justice Anthony Kennedy was the most frequent swing vote; Chief Justice William Rehnquist, surprisingly, was second. Justice Clarence Thomas departed from his fellow conservatives more often than in the past. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor did so less often. Of the divided cases, the conservatives won a few small victories for property rights and the liberals won a few—more significant—victories for expanded civil rights liability. The most surprising decision of the term was that Ellis Island is not in New York. If I were a Justice, I would hold that the Supreme Court building is not in the District of Columbia.

The most significant cases of the term were the sexual harassment decisions, *Burlington Industries v. Ellerth* and *Faragher v. City of Boca Raton*. This is a notoriously confused area of the law, and the Court's signal contribution this year was to make it marginally less so. In theory, sexual harassment cases involve "statutory construction"—determining the meaning of a law passed by Congress. But since federal statutes say nothing about sexual harassment, and Congress is hardly anxious to take on the thankless task of telling us what it means, the courts have been forced to make up the law, both procedural and substantive, out of whole cloth.

The cases posed the question: When can employers be sued for acts of sexual harassment where the employer was not aware of the conduct and the worker suffered no adverse employment consequence? In 7-2 opinions, the Court held that employers are liable for the offensive conduct of their supervisory employees, but may raise an affirmative defense if they took "reasonable care" to prevent sexual harassment and the worker failed to take advantage of "any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer."

This expansion of liability will almost certainly generate more lawsuits, since the promise of money damages creates an incentive for workers to eschew informal resolutions of workplace problems. Some employer groups have nonetheless praised the decision on the ground that it brings greater clarity to the law. That may be true, but the decisions still leave important questions unanswered. For example, the Court has provided little guidance about what an employer must do to establish "reasonable care." Indeed, the Court provided no guidance at all, except to hint that employers should promulgate an anti-harassment policy, make it known to all employees, and provide a complaint procedure. Prudent investors will buy stock in harassment law consulting firms.

Interestingly, the Court reached a different conclusion for cases of sexual harassment under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded educational programs. In *Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District*, written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held

MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL *is Presidential Professor in the University of Utah College of Law.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that a public school district cannot be held liable for money damages for sexual harassment of a student by a teacher unless the district had "actual notice of, and [was] deliberately indifferent to," the misconduct. That is a far more difficult standard for plaintiffs to meet. It is, nonetheless, a sensible decision. The principal statutory remedy for Title IX violations is administrative, with notice to the offending school district and prospective remedies. Some twenty years ago, the Court decided to allow private suits for money damages under Title IX, even though the statute made no mention of them. The *Gebser* case did not overrule that decision, but it recognized that when Congress chooses to rely primarily on enforcement tools other than private litigation, the Court should hesitate before creating expansive doctrines of liability.

In the employment cases, the Supreme Court seemed oblivious to the consequences of unleashing plaintiffs' lawyers on the nation's workplaces to enforce codes of civil behavior. Plaintiffs' lawyers, advocacy groups, and juries are unlikely to draw fine lines between "hostile" environments and mere boorish (or politically incorrect) behavior. Employers, faced with liability if they do not do "enough," but no liability if they do "too much," have every incentive to go beyond the theoretical requirements of the law: to engage in ever more intrusive monitoring of the workplace, to root out sexually themed conversation if it might offend *anyone.* (Employment lawyers have, for example, suggested that jokes about the President and Ms. Lewinsky might be too risque for the nation's workplaces.) It is hard to believe that this outbreak of prudishness will improve civility, or ease the entry of women into the workplace on equal terms. It is more likely to breed fear and resentment.

Even apart from the sexual harassment cases, the conservatives on the Court did not have a good year. Their only significant 5-4 victories in noncriminal constitutional cases were in relatively minor property rights disputes. In *Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,* the Court held, unsurprisingly, that interest on client trust accounts belongs to the client and cannot be taken by the state and distributed to worthy causes. It had become common practice for states to use the proceeds of these trusts to pay for low-income legal services, and thereby avoid legislative restrictions on the use of appropriated funds. Now legal services lawyers will have to raise funds the old-fashioned way.

More surprisingly, in *Eastern Enterprises v. Commissioner of Social Security,* the Court struck down a 1992 federal statute requiring companies that employed coal miners 35-50 years ago to pay into a retirement benefit plan they never agreed to fund. Four Justices (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Thomas, and Antonin Scalia) concluded that this was an unconstitutional "taking" of private property, and Justice Kennedy concluded that the Act violates the Due Process Clause. The decision was not surprising on first principles: money is property, and the property was taken. But in previous cases, only slightly less egregious, the Court had blessed Congress' ability to impose retroactive obligations on companies for the benefit of retired workers. The case could be of considerable importance if it breathes life into the old idea that retroactive legislation violates the rule of law.

In *Clinton v. City of New York,* the Line Item Veto Act decision, the Court split along unusual lines, with the surprising troika of Scalia, O'Connor, and Stephen Breyer in dissent. The Act, passed in 1996 as part of the Republican "Contract With America," authorized the President to "cancel" any specific items of spending or limited tax benefits if he found that this would reduce the budget deficit, not impair any essential governmental function, and not harm the national interest. He was required to report the cancellation to Congress, which then could repass the provision as ordinary legislation under expedited procedures. The majority held that this is a violation of Article I, §7, which permits the President to veto legislation only in its entirety.

The majority opinion is not convincing. As Justice Breyer pointed out, when the President "canceled" certain spending items, "he did not *repeal* any law nor did he *amend* any law. He simply followed the law, leaving the statutes, as they are literally written, intact." The only real constitutional question is whether Congress may delegate to the President the authority under certain circumstances not to spend funds Congress has authorized. For almost two hundred years, until Richard Nixon abused the power, Presidents "impounded" (meaning refused to spend) funds under various circumstances, consistent with the implied will of Congress. Since the 1930s, Congress has had extraordinarily broad power to delegate discretionary authority to the executive branch, so long as it prescribes an "intelligible principle" according to which the executive must act. This can include such broad standards as the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." It is hard to see how the Line Item Veto Act could be struck down under these precedents.

Fortunately, the damage done is easily remedied. If Congress wishes to reenact the Line Item Veto Act in substance, all it needs to do is to rephrase it and impose more specific standards; the advantage of a formalistic opinion is that it invites a formalistic response.

National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) v. Finley was the constitutional case of the term with the greatest potential impact on the tone and quality of our public culture. Responding to public outcry over incidents where the NEA funded art of a homoerotic, sacrilegious, or otherwise offensive nature, Congress

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

passed an amendment requiring the Endowment to "tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." The so-called "arts community" reacted with indignation to the notion that, when accepting the public's dollar, it should comply with the public's sensibilities. Opponents of the provision went to court and persuaded the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the amendment is unconstitutional on its face.

A six-Justice majority led by Justice O'Connor upheld the amendment on its face. It did so, however, by interpreting the statutory language as "advisory" and as "aimed at reforming procedures rather than precluding speech." The Court thus ducked the significant question: What limits, if any, apply to the government's decision to grant or withhold subsidies for speech or artistic expression?

Justice David Souter, the sole dissenter, would have confronted the issue head-on. According to Souter, the government may discriminate on the basis of viewpoint only when the government itself is speaking or when it is providing funds to private parties to convey the government's own message. When the government provides broad-based subsidies to speakers to convey their own ideas, the government may make restrictions based on content (for example, it may fund poetry and not rock-and-roll) but may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Since, in his opinion, the considerations of "decency" and "respect" are "quintessentially viewpoint based," Justice Souter argued that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, took the opposite tack. According to Scalia, the First Amendment is "inapplicable" to government decisions about the funding of speech. Consequently, when establishing a program of subsidies for artists, Congress can discriminate on the basis of viewpoint as well as content.

In my opinion, Justice Souter's legal categories are correct, but he was wrong in concluding that "decency" and "respect for diverse opinions" are viewpoint-based restrictions. Justice Scalia's distinction between funding and regulation is inapplicable in an age when government most often asserts its power through selective funding and through control over public land and institutions. Justice Scalia joined the Court's decision three years ago in *Rosenberger v. University of Virginia*, holding it unconstitutional for a public university to bar student publications from receiving money on account of their religious viewpoint. It is inconsistent to say, now, that the First Amendment does not apply to exclusions from government funding.

To make these legal distinctions work, however, the idea of "viewpoint discrimination" has to be limited to cases in which the government seeks to exclude participants on the basis of the philosophy, worldview, or opinions they express rather than the manner in which they express them. The NEA Act satisfies this, more sensible, definition of viewpoint neutrality. It is impossible to imagine a "viewpoint" that would be excluded by the standards of "decency" and "respect for diverse opinions." Even the viewpoint that one should be indecent or disrespectful can be expressed decently and with respect for the sensibilities of others.

Indeed, if Justice Souter is correct that "decency" is "quintessentially viewpoint based," it is hard to see why "artistic excellence" is any less so. Doesn't this favor "mainstream" artistic tastes (at least in the "arts community") over other artistic perspectives? Is it conceivable that the NEA would fund art that portrays homosexuality as immoral or a woman's proper place as being in the home? What about artists who wish to rebel against the prevailing standards of artistic excellence in the most powerful way they can: by producing art that is inartistic or mediocre? Excluding them is no less (and no more) "viewpoint based" than excluding those who wish to express their contempt for "mainstream mores," or for their fellow citizens, by producing art that is indecent or disrespectful of others. If Justice Souter's analysis is correct, the proper result is not to fund indecent or disrespectful artists, but to strike down the entire statute.

Unfortunately, not a single Justice embraced this analysis. Souter fell for the idea that the "arts community" should tap public funds but have no public responsibility; Scalia and Thomas would abandon constitutional protections against the power of the purse; the other six Justices were content with a muddle. This decision, along with the workplace sexual harassment cases, suggests a theme: the Court is unwilling to stand up for common sense when fashionable political opinion runs strongly the other way. The Rehnquist Court rarely does much harm, but neither does it show much courage. FT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books In Review

And Now Introducing . . .

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. By RAYMOND E. BROWN. *Doubleday. 878 pp. $42.50.*

Reviewed by
Luke Timothy Johnson

THOSE unaware of the constantly changing state of biblical scholarship might suppose that introducing such a little book ought to be a relatively straightforward task, but there is no end to the writing of Introductions to the New Testament. Since the pioneering effort by W. D. Michaelis in 1750, the Introduction has been a standard item in the scholarly repertoire, serving both as an assistance to readers and—just as often—as an opportunity for intellectually ambitious scholars to make a statement on the canonical collection as a whole.

Raymond Brown followed his massive and influential studies on the birth and death of the Messiah for the Anchor Bible Reference Library with this substantial Introduction in the same series. It turned out, sadly, to be his valedictory work: Father Brown died unexpectedly of a heart attack in early August. Given that fact, as well as Fr. Brown's eminence within the New Testament guild both for his substantive contributions and for his symbolic role as one of the first Roman Catholic scholars to reach full assimilation within a field long dominated by Protestants, this publication deserves particular attention. Readers of this review should know that I am also the author of a large introduction to the New Testament and weigh my remarks accordingly. If this circumstance might tempt me to make comparisons, it also surely helps me better understand the peculiar challenges involved in constructing this sort of book.

The difficulties begin with deciding what sort of Introduction to write. Brown did not produce the standard college textbook with its historical narrative and predictable popularization. Nor did he write an academic handbook with prose only fellow academics could crack. He instead combined the elements of the classic *Einleitung* (which emphasizes factual information and scholarly debates) with a user-friendly style and format.

BROWN'S INTENDED READERS are theological students, pastors, and committed laypeople. This is not an easy audience, for it comes to the subject with some knowledge but often also with misinformation, bias, and a resistance to instruction. Brown does a particularly good job of identifying and clarifying the issues such readers bring to the New Testament; his style and his choice of issues for discussion alike are obviously shaped by a fundamentally pastoral concern. Fr. Brown was always very much in the service of the Church; it will startle only those unfamiliar with his previous work to learn that this volume—touching repeatedly on the knottiest and most controversial questions of Christian origins—bears the Imprimatur and Nihil Obstat.

Another classic feature of Brown's *Introduction* is its focus on the canonical writings of the New Testament, rather than on the history of early Christianity and its literature. (In one way or another, of course, both topics necessarily intrude, and Brown's strategy here may not be entirely successful. More on this below.) The book does offer useful appendices summarizing "Jewish and Christian Writings Pertinent to the New Testament" and "The Historical Jesus," but otherwise, the compositions of the New Testament itself remain steadily in view.

Part 1 takes up such "Preliminaries for Understanding the New Testament" as text, canon, and methods of interpretation, as well as two chapters devoted to the political, social, religious, and philosophical world in which the writings were composed. Parts 2-4 treat of the compositions themselves, beginning with "The Gospels and Related Works," moving through the "Pauline Letters" and ending with "The Other New Testament Writings." These broad groupings are fairly standard and commonsensical, although one might wonder why the three letters of John are included with the narrative compositions (Gospels and Acts) rather than with the other Epistles.

The book offers general framing essays in appropriate places. Before the treatment of the specific Gospels, for example, there is a lengthy and useful essay on the Gospels in general, and the Synoptics in particular. Before dealing with Paul's undisputed letters Fr. Brown provides an essay on New Testament Letters as well as an appreciative sketch of Paul's life, thought, and character. Before considering the disputed Pauline letters, he takes up the issues posed by pseudonymity. And the beginning of the book features "data that will be of service" throughout the volume, such as abbreviations, general information about the Bible (including the virtues and failings of contemporary translations), chronologies, and maps.

THE TREATMENT of the respective New Testament compositions follows a standard pattern. Chapters devoted to the Gospels begin with a "General Analysis of the Message," which amounts to a content summary according to the narrative sequence. A consideration of various critical issues follows, such as the Gospel's use of sources, the identity of the author and readers, and the date—the usual questions considered "introductory." There then follow a series of "Issues and Problems

---

LUKE TIMOTHY JOHNSON *is Robert W. Woodruff Professor of New Testament and Christian Origins at Candler School of Theology, Emory University. His* Writings of the New Testament: An Interpretation *(Fortress, 1986) will soon appear in a second edition.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for Reflection." These are sometimes of a highly technical character (for example, questions of text criticism), and other times engage broad interpretive or pastoral issues (in Matthew's Gospel, for example, the Virgin Birth and the role of Peter). A similar sequence is followed with the epistles, though with an added section called "Background" that tries to locate the letter in its historical circumstances.

A useful "Summary of Basic Information" begins each chapter devoted to a composition. Conversation with scholarship takes place both within the text and in sometimes extensive footnotes. Bibliographies at the end of each chapter are selective: only English titles are included (a reasonable limitation), books are preferred to articles because of greater accessibility, and positive recommendations among commentaries and studies are indicated by the use of boldface.

Raymond Brown's usual strengths are abundantly displayed here. Two in particular deserve comment. First, he was a great explainer. Give him a problem of virtually any sort and he would expound its causes, delineate its features, and clarify the arguments for one side and the other as well as any scholar has ever done. Those who are aware of the number and complexity of the issues he dealt with here will be the most appreciative. Second, he was always fair and considerate in his exposition of controverted questions. He thought of himself as a centrist, and whenever possible sought out the reasonable compromise between extremes. Although critical of attempts to make of Q more than a descriptive category, for example, this *Introduction* is thoroughly at home within the "Two-Source" solution to the Synoptic Problem. On any issue, the reader gets to hear both sides. Fr. Brown's own cards are always in clear view on the table. He admits, for example, to presenting and siding with "the majority view" of scholars in virtually every case. The only place where his patience appears slightly strained is in response to the contemporary predilection for apocryphal literature, particularly among some historical Jesus questers. If one goal of an introduction is to inform responsibly, then Brown's effort is successful.

DESPITE THE SIGNIFICANT accomplishment represented by this volume, it has some noteworthy deficiencies. The first is chronic to all serious scholarship that seeks also to be accessible to a wider readership than an increasingly self-involved guild, namely, inconsistency in level of discourse. As noted, Brown (and undoubtedly also his editors) went to considerable lengths to make the volume useful to the ordinary reader. And Brown's style here generally makes up in clarity what it lacks in verve. But there are places where the citation of authors and scholarly allusions threaten to overwhelm both the reader and the point being discussed. Brown was not immune to the scholarly vice of looking over his shoulder at his professional colleagues even as he addressed the crowd. The pastors, seminarians, and parishioners whom Brown intended to be his target readers will have to struggle through some of these discussions.

Another weakness of the book is the flip-side of its scrupulous reporting of opinions. One wishes Fr. Brown would have used his enormous learning and influence to nudge the conversation more assertively. Sometimes the majority is wrong. If scholars of Brown's stature are unwilling to declare themselves in opposition to the majority, then the situation will never change. I have in mind here above all Brown's unwillingness to decide for the Pauline authorship of 2 Thessalonians despite the arguments the book offers in its favor and the weakness of the arguments against it. Here is a case where he could have helped *make* the majority.

I mentioned earlier that Brown's decision to focus on the writings was a good one. But his avoidance of a more thorough and sustained consideration of the symbolic world out of which the writings emerged has two consequences. One is that readers are less likely to appreciate the ways in which the worlds of Judaism and Hellenism both shaped and were reshaped by this new literature. The other is that readers are given virtually no sense of the question that most requires asking if the New Testament writings are to be understood at all, namely, what experiences and convictions moved these ancient writers so to engage and reshape their symbolic worlds?

BROWN'S STRENGTH here is in explaining rather than interpreting. Readers receive reliable information but are given little direction on how to engage the New Testament writings as literary compositions. Although Brown occasionally mentions literary and rhetorical analysis, his appreciation is distant indeed. His analyses of content tend to be flat, with little notice given to the texture of the respective writings. He discusses genre, to be sure, but such discussions affect his readings in no discernible fashion. Brown gives his readers too little sense of the experiences and convictions that generated the writings and too little appreciation of the specific contours of the compositions that expressed and interpreted such experiences and convictions.

In sum, Fr. Brown's final scholarly offering is a reliable and extremely useful compendium of information about the New Testament that can function as a resource both for the general reader and for the professional. The last major Roman Catholic introduction to the New Testament was by Alfred Wikenhauser in 1960; the breadth of learning and ecumenical spirit in this much more than adequate successor make it worth the consideration of all students of Scripture.

Coming in December:
CONTRACEPTION:
A SYMPOSIUM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cahill's Gift

THE GIFTS OF THE JEWS: HOW A TRIBE OF DESERT NOMADS CHANGED THE WAY EVERYONE THINKS AND FEELS. By THOMAS CAHILL. *Doubleday. 256 pp. $23.50.*

***Reviewed by* Dennis Prager**

THOMAS CAHILL'S moving and intelligent book is largely not about its title, *The Gifts of the Jews: How a Tribe of Desert Nomads Changed the Way Everyone Thinks and Feels.* Cahill's numerous profound points—most of which are in fact all about the ways in which the Jews "changed the way everyone thinks"—form only about 20 percent of the book, the rest being a loving recounting of major stories of the Hebrew Bible telling the history of the Jewish people and the development of their relationship with God—from Abraham to the prophets and the Hebrew Bible's later writings. For anyone unfamiliar with the biblical stories narrated here—e.g., most graduates of an American university—*The Gifts of the Jews* is a terrific place to begin to learn about them.

Sadly, most readers, I suspect, will pass over or forget most of the more profound points, which are often mentioned in as few as two sentences. I have therefore decided to note all the ways I could find in which Cahill demonstrates the Jews' effects on humanity. Unless a reader read with a pen and paper as I did, these points can easily be missed, and certainly easily forgotten.

FIRST AND FOREMOST, the Jewish Bible changed history by literally creating history. Every religion in the world saw the world in cyclical terms, as a Great Wheel (see, for example, the flag of India). In describing the cyclical worldview, Cahill cites Henri-Charles Puech, author of *Man and Time*: "No event is unique, nothing is enacted but once . . . ; every event has been enacted, is enacted, and will be enacted perpetually; the same individuals have appeared, appear, and will appear at every turn of the circle."

Judaism alone differed. According to the Jews' way of viewing life, events actually move forward; they do not merely repeat themselves. In their rejection of this universal mode of thought, Cahill writes, "The Jews were the first people to break out of this circle. . . . It may be said with some justice that theirs is the only new idea that human beings had ever had." The results of this utterly transformative way of understanding life? In Cahill's words, "Most of our best words, in fact—*new, adventure, surprise; unique individual, person, vocation; time, history, future; freedom, progress, spirit; faith, hope, justice*—are the gifts of the Jews."

Cahill is right to emphasize this transformative Jewish contribution. If all is a circle, nothing we do matters, none of us matter, life does not matter. It will all happen again. What we do doesn't matter—for our actions to matter, they must be able to influence the future. But the future cannot be influenced if everything happens over and over.

If, on the other hand, the Jewish view is adopted, everything matters—every act I engage in matters, and therefore I matter—so much so that each one of us changes history by everything we do. Cahill offers two excellent—and, to my knowledge, original—explanations of why the Bible's genealogies, sections of the Bible that bore most of us, are of vast importance. One is that the listing of these individuals' names—even the names of women—was the He-

DENNIS PRAGER *is a writer, theologian, and daily talk show host on KABC Radio in Los Angeles. His most recent book is* Happiness Is a Serious Problem *(HarperCollins). He also writes a newsletter,* The Prager Perspective.

CALVIN
College

SEMINARS IN CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP

Susan M. Felch, Director

June 21 - July 30, 1999

Realism vs. Antirealism
William P. Alston
Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Syracuse University

God and Evil
Peter van Inwagen
John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame

The Faculty Summer Seminar program seeks to promote quality scholarship that reflects a Christian perspective by encouraging Christian scholars to pursue current research in their disciplines. Applicants must hold an earned Ph.D.

Made possible with funds from The Pew Charitable Trusts.

For more information or to apply contact:
Anna Mae Bush, Coordinator
Seminars in Christian Scholarship
Calvin College, 3201 Burton Street SE, Grand Rapids MI 49546
e-mail: abush@calvin.edu • fax: 616-957-6682
phone: 616-957-8558 • website: www.calvin.edu/fss

Deadline for applications is Feb. 1, 1999.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



As a world-class marathoner, he knew what it felt like to run out of gas during a race. So he cooked up a batch of low-fat, nutritious, sports energy bars in his Berkeley kitchen. Selling them out of the trunk of his '64 Falcon, he created a healthy following among athletes. And his own dynamic company, *PowerBar, Inc.* With over $100 million in sales. Fearless entrepreneurs like Brian Maxwell find a kindred spirit in Forbes. The business magazine that explores new trends and ideas while others rehash the past.

Forbes
CAPITALIST TOOL

www.forbes.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

brew Bible's way of saying that every one of these persons was uniquely significant. No such listing of commoners' names exists in pre-biblical literature. Cahill's other explanation of the importance of the genealogical listings is that they are the Bible's way of telling us that the Bible is history, not mythology—and in a very carefully worded paragraph, Cahill thereby differs with Joseph Campbell, for whom the Jews and their claims to historicity and utter rejection of mythology were an immense nuisance.

THE SECOND transformative Jewish contribution was its understanding of God. The Hebrew God, unlike every god before, "cannot be manipulated," and this God "is a real personality who has intervened in real history, changing its course and robbing it of predictability."

Third, when God defeated the demi-god Pharaoh, "In one fell swoop, this subversive narrative delegitimizes all political structures claiming god as their author—delegitimizes, in fact, all the political structures of the ancient world." That is why the Ten Plagues were directed against Egyptian gods—blood, the first plague, for example, changed the Nile-god into blood, and the ninth, darkness, blotted out Ra, the sun-god, chief god of the Egyptians.

Fourth, the Jews gave the world the notion of human freedom—on two levels. The first and more obvious is the Torah's rejection of slavery as a norm in the human condition—which is why black Americans took so much solace in the Hebrew Bible's exodus narrative. The less obvious but no less important way was another result of the Bible's complete rejection of the cyclical view of life: "We are not doomed, not bound to some predetermined fate; we are free. If anything can happen, we are truly liberated—as liberated as were the Israelite slaves when they crossed the Sea of Reeds."

Fifth, through the Ten Commandments, "for the first time . . . human beings are offered a code without justification. Because this is God's code no justification is required. . . . Who but God can speak ten words—'Thou-shalt' and 'Thou-shalt-not'—with such authority that no further words are needed?" Though Cahill does not elaborate—again, my one overriding problem with this beautiful book—the key point here, as I have always understood it, is that which is good is good because God says it is good; God does not say something is good because it is so already. God is the source of morality; morality does not exist without God. Moral sentiments—"I do not like killing"; "I feel that stealing is wrong"—may exist without God, but they are only sentiments.

Jesus Calls it
"Today, the Gospel Message about the family is at the heart of the New Evangelization."
—JOHN PAUL II
The John Paul II Institute offers graduate degree programs leading to the Master of Theological Studies, Licentiate in Sacred Theology and Doctorate in Sacred Theology.
Join us for a challenging program with a distinguished faculty and motivated students. For a catalog call 202-526-3799, e-mail jpiinst@cais.com or write:
PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE
STUDIES ON MARRIAGE & FAMILY
NE, Washington, DC 20017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SPENCE
PUBLISHING

BOOKS *for the* CULTURE WARS



NEW

C.S. LEWIS
Memories and Reflections

John Lawlor
Foreword by Walter Hooper
ISBN 1-890626-08-2
Cloth $22.95

as a set with BRANCHES TO HEAVEN
$35.00

"A treasure...almost as good as another work from Lewis's pen."
–Walter Hooper

NEW

BRANCHES TO HEAVEN
The Geniuses of C.S. Lewis

James Como
ISBN 1-890626-01-5
Cloth $22.95

as a set with MEMORIES AND REFLECTIONS
$35.00



"This is a *different* book on Lewis. It has a substantial thesis, which is worked out with a dexterity that is a sheer pleasure to read."
–Thomas Howard



THE AGE OF CONSENT
The Rise of Relativism and the Corruption of Popular Culture

Robert H. Knight
Foreword by Gary L. Bauer
ISBN 1-890626-05-8
Cloth $27.95

"Knight offers an instructive guide to the deeply dysfunctional ideas behind our current dilemma."
–Michael Medved



THE EXAMINED LIFE
The Art of Knowing, Owning, and Giving Yourself

Dennis Helming
ISBN 0-9653208-1-2
Cloth $24.95

"Helming's contribution is vital common sense."
–George William Rutler



NO LIBERTY FOR LICENSE
The Forgotten Logic of the First Amendment

David Lowenthal
Foreword by Harvey C. Mansfield
ISBN 0-9653208-4-7
Cloth $27.95

"... bracing, refreshing—and more than a bit shaming."
–Weekly Standard

DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY
A Brief Against Feminism

F. Carolyn Graglia
ISBN 0-9653208-6-3
Cloth $29.95

NEW

ISBN 1-890626-09-0
Paper $18.95



"Mrs. Graglia offers a thinking woman's argument for putting family first."
–Wall Street Journal

NEW

THERE'S MORE TO LIFE THAN POLITICS

William Murchison
Foreword by William F. Buckley Jr.
ISBN 0-9653208-3-9
Cloth $22.95

"Bill Murchison is my second-favorite colmnist! He is a true gentleman who doesn't use rhetorical tricks to get attention but appeals–in a good-ole-boy Texas way–to your common sense."
–Cal Thomas

NEW

GODDESS UNMASKED
The Rise of Neopagan Feminist Spirituality

Philip G. Davis
ISBN 0-9653208-9-8
Cloth $29.95

"Davis has written a comprehensive and revealing study of the history and development of modern Goddess spirituality."
–Library Journal

To order or request a catalogue, call 1-888-SPENPUB • www.spencepublishing.com
Spence Publishing Company • 501 Elm Street, Suite 450 • Dallas, Texas 75202

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SIXTH, the Jews gave the world a day of rest. "No ancient society before the Jews had a day of rest." As one who observes the Shabbat, I can attest to its life-changing effects. Cahill correctly notes that "Those who live without such septimanal punctuation are emptier and less resourceful." And though he does not note it, Cahill's point about the centrality of human freedom in the Jewish conception of life is also made evident in the Shabbat commandment. Those people who work seven days a week, even if they are paid millions of dollars to do so, are, in the biblical conception, slaves.

Seventh, Israel was "the first human society to so value education and the first to envision it as a universal pursuit."

Eighth, the Hebrew Bible's "bias toward the underdog is unique not only in ancient law but in the whole history of law." "However faint our sense of justice may be, insofar as it operates at all it is still a Jewish sense of justice."

Ninth, the Torah's and Judaism's credo, which ends with the words "God is one," led to "the possibility of modern science." "For life is not a series of discrete experiences, influenced by diverse forces. We do not live in a fragmented universe, controlled by fickle and warring gods." The scientific search for a unifying theory of the universe is one of the effects of the Bible's monotheistic revolution.

Tenth, the Jews invented the concept of the spiritual. "There is no way of exaggerating how strange a thought this was. . . . The word that falls so easily from our lips—*spiritual*—had no ready counterpart in the ancient world."

Now, if Cahill is right about the Jews changing everything—"We can hardly get up in the morning or cross the street without being Jewish. We dream Jewish dreams and hope Jewish hopes"—what are we to make of this? This thesis raises many more questions. Here are three:

Were the Jews, or at least some Jews, moral/spiritual/intellectual supermen or simply a vehicle for God's intervention into human affairs?

What are the Jews supposed to do today?

Where do Christianity and Islam fit in the divine scheme?

As a believing Jew, the first is simple to answer. The Torah itself emphasizes the lack of any intrinsic specialness to Jews. For some unknown reason, God chose the Jews to be His "special treasure," and therefore His emissary to humanity to communicate these brand new, world-transforming ideas to humanity.

According to Judaism, the Jews are God's third attempt to have people treat each another decently. The first was conscience, the voice in all human beings telling them that some things are right and some



ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE

- Highest classification among baccalaureate colleges in America by Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Featured in Peterson's *Competitive Colleges* and Barron's *Compact Guide to Colleges*.

FAITHFULNESS

- Entire faculty voluntarily takes Oath of Fidelity to the Holy Father and the Magisterium every year.

AFFORDABILITY

- Competitive Tuition.
- Comprehensive Financial Aid Program.

To learn more about the best buy in Catholic higher education contact:
Paul Heisler ❖ Christendom College ❖ Front Royal, VA 22630
(800) 877-5456 ❖ admissions@christendom.edu ❖ www.christendom.edu

CHRISTENDOM COLLEGE
A ROMAN CATHOLIC COLLEGE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SAINT LOUIS ABBEY

A Benedictine monastery of Catholic priests and brothers

We seek men who would like to join us in exploring the mystery of God in prayer; in living a common life; and in participating in our apostolates of teaching at Saint Louis Priory School, pastoral work in Saint Anselm's Parish, and other important ministries.

Look into our world, and learn more about our Benedictine way of life by visiting our new web site:

http://www.stlouisabbey.org

or contact Fr. Ralph Wright, OSB, Saint Louis Abbey,
500 South Mason Road, Saint Louis, Missouri 63141, USA.

Tel: 1-800-638-1527 or 1-314-434-5774
Fax: 1-314-576-7363 E-mail: fr_ralph@priory.org



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wrong. This didn't work. People acted rotten from the beginning. So God destroyed the world except for righteous Noah and his family and started all over relying on the revelation of seven basic moral laws ("The Seven Laws of the Sons of Noah"), and not solely on conscience. When that failed God revealed Himself and more laws to one people—the Jews. Perhaps an eternal people can teach people morality even better than the eternal God.

This may help answer the question about Christianity and Islam—at least in a way that one sympathetic Jew can answer it. Though Judaism regards God's revelations to the Jewish prophets as God's last revelations, even Jews—maybe especially Jews—could see that a thousand and more years later the world was not getting much more moral, that for whatever reasons the Jews were not having a universal moral impact. It is therefore quite understandable, even for a religious Jew, to understand why some Jews concluded that a fourth moral revelation was necessary. Believers in this fourth attempt to bring more love into the world became known as Christians. Some six hundred years later in Arabia, another part of the world influenced by the Jews, some non-Jews believed that a fifth divine revelation was necessary. They are known as Muslims. As a believing Jew, I regard these world religions as further confirmation of the power and authenticity of God's gifts to the Jews.

AS FOR WHAT Jews should be doing *now*, the answer is simpler than its execution. Jews should be spreading ethical monotheism to the world's peoples. Sadly, most do not. Most religious Jews live lives that are too insular to affect other Jews, let alone non-Jews, while most non-religious Jews, if they identify with a mission to influence humanity, choose to do so through secular ideologies. To put it in a sentence, the Jews who most live Judaism don't talk to the world, and the Jews who talk to the world don't live Judaism. Both groups should read *The Gifts of the Jews*—as should non-Jews, especially those who believe that their religion has superseded Judaism.

I especially invite anti-Jewish Muslims and Christians to read Cahill's one-sentence summary of anti-Semitism: "The hatred of Christians [and, one may add, Muslims or secular Nazis and Communists] for Jews may have its ultimate source in hatred of God, a hatred that the hater must carefully keep himself from knowing about." I spent five years writing with Rabbi Joseph Telushkin an entire book (*Why the Jews? The Reason for Antisemitism*, Simon & Schuster paperback) arguing this very point.

Now someone—preferably though not necessarily a non-Christian—needs to write "The Gifts of the



CIR

WE PROTECT YOUR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

Since its inception in 1989, the Center for Individual Rights has successfully defended the rights of religious individuals, associations, and institutions against government discrimination. For example, in 1991 CIR agreed to represent the publishers of a religious student newspaper in federal First Amendment litigation against the University of Virginia because of the University's refusal to allow the paper to participate in a neutral funding program. CIR took the students' case all the way to the Supreme Court and in 1995 won what is perhaps the most significant, pro-religious decision by the High Court in more than 50 years. Since that time, CIR has continued to provide free legal assistance to deserving clients in cases that raise important constitutional issues involving freedom of religion. If your religious liberties are being threatened, call CIR today, or visit our Religious Liberty Web Page at http://www.wdn.com/cir/liberty.htm.

Center for Individual Rights ▪ 1233 20th Street, NW, Suite 300 ▪ Washington, DC 20036
(202) 833-8400 ▪ e-mail: cir@mail.wdn.com ▪ web: http://www.wdn.com/cir

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is the Catholic Church the Whore of Babylon, or...



Liberalism is supposed to be synonymous with open-mindedness, yet most liberals continue to be deeply bigoted against Catholicism. According to Bill Donohue, whose Catholic League vanquished Disney's Catholic-trashing TV show *Nothing Sacred*, anti-Catholicism is "the last respectable bias." Liberal opinion has long regarded the Catholic Church as something like the Whore of Babylon. But nowadays liberals feel compassion for whores, would love to see prostitution legalized and whores unionized from sea to shining sea, with the Department of Health and Human Services running the whorehouses.

So there's a little problem: How can liberals continue to hate the Church when they themselves embrace whoredom — indeed, would love to make every woman a whore?

Consider the rest of the liberal utopia: raunchy sex ed, titillating TV shows and movies, free condoms for every teenager, free abortions in case the condoms fail, full rights and benefits for shack-ups, same-sex "marriage" (helps devalue the currency of real marriage, you know), and adultery a matter of privacy not character. So yes, the liberal vision is: Every gal a slut.

So it won't do to lambaste the Church for being a whore. Therefore the Church is now castigated for being a prude — the Prude of Peoria, shall we say. Indeed, liberals today could only love the Church if she did in fact become the Whore of Babylon.

We at the NEW OXFORD REVIEW, a militantly Catholic monthly magazine, aren't cowed by the liberal bigots. We present the authentic Catholic vision to a hostile culture in a forthright way. Not surprisingly, *Newsweek* finds us "cheeky."

Curiously, we're also ecumenical — but not in the mush-headed way the liberal cultural chieftains would approve. We look to evangelicals, the Eastern Orthodox, traditional Anglicans, and similar brethren for allies.

If you're a Catholic with a backbone, or a sympathetic non-Catholic, stand up for Jesus and subscribe today!

(Please allow 2 to 8 weeks for delivery of first issue.)

...the Prude of Peoria?

SPECIAL DISCOUNT RATES FOR FIRST-TIME SUBSCRIBERS

- ☐ One-year subscription ..... $14 (regularly $19)
- ☐ One-year student, unemployed, or retired person's subscription ..... $12 (regularly $16)
- ☐ Two-year subscription ..... $23 (regularly $35)
- ☐ One-year non-U.S. subscription ..... US$24 (regularly $29) Payment must be drawn in U.S. Dollars.
- ☐ Sample copy $3.50

➔ *Our prices are so low because you can't pay by credit card and payment must accompany order. Send letter or this coupon with check payable to NEW OXFORD REVIEW. Mail to:*

NEW OXFORD REVIEW
Room 212
1069 Kains Ave.
Berkeley CA 94706

NAME (Please print or type)

STREET ADDRESS OR P.O. BOX

CITY STATE ZIP

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Christians." For these are very great and include something called the United States of America. America is largely a Christian gift, and unless most of us Americans understand this, and unless Christian influence endures, this gift will surely be taken away. European rejection of those gifts gave us Nazism and communism. Even a Jew knows that.

Problems of Ecclesiology

AFTER OUR LIKENESS: THE CHURCH AS THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY. By MIROSLAV VOLF. *Eerdmans. 314 pp. $28.*

***Reviewed by* Avery Dulles**

MIROSLAV VOLF, a Croatian Protestant, is a professor at Fuller Theological Seminary. The present book, translated from the German original, is an outgrowth of his *Habilitationsschrift*, directed by Jürgen Moltmann at the University of Tübingen. In the opening chapters Volf enters into a dialogue with Joseph Ratzinger as a representative of Catholicism and with John Zizioulas as a representative of Orthodoxy. He tries to show how the ecclesiologies of these two authors are linked with their trinitarian theology—Western in the case of Ratzinger and Eastern in the case of Zizioulas. As the work continues, the author partially relinquishes the dialogue form and concentrates on developing a "free church" position that contrasts with the "episcopal" ecclesiologies of his two dialogue partners.

Under the rubric of free churches Volf includes a variety of denominations derived from the Reformation, including Baptists, Congregationalists, Quakers, and Pentecostals. He uses as his point of departure for free church ecclesiology the first Baptist, John Smyth, but he disavows Smyth's non-trinitarian and individualist orientations. Seeking to offset the tendencies toward Christomonism and individualism in Protestant ecclesiology, he advocates a strongly trinitarian vision of the Church that seeks to do justice to both person and community.

The presentation and critique of Ratzinger and Zizioulas, though it takes up a hundred pages, is perhaps the least interesting feature of the book. Because of constrictions of space the presentations are inevitably fragmentary, and the criticisms, mounted from the author's own perspective, will not convince readers who have difficulty with that perspective. In any case these particular authors, brilliant as they may be, do not exhaust the doctrinal possibilities of their respective communions.

THE MORE ENGAGING aspect of the book is its positive proposal. The author's free-church synthesis is original, though indebted in varying measures to Paul, Luther, Käsemann, and Pannenberg as well as to contemporary sociologists such as Niklas Luhmann, Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, Peter Berger, and Rodney Stark.

In these substantive chapters the episcopal models of ecclesiology endorsed by Ratzinger and Zizioulas are made to serve as a foil against which Volf projects the merits of his free-church theory. Whereas the Catholic and Orthodox theologians accept a hierarchical form of polity, he proposes a democratic and egalitarian style of organization. Whereas they acknowledge certain structures as being divinely instituted and unalterable, he prefers a charismatic society in which all institutions are provisional. Whereas they favor an organic model in which in-

AVERY DULLES, S.J., *holds the Laurence J. McGinley Chair at Fordham University.*

MA Philosophy

What does it mean to say that persons have dignity? How do we know they have rights? How do we respond to those who deny human freedom? What is the nature of the difference between man and woman?

Answer these questions for yourself by studying in our one-year MA philosophy program that focuses on the philosophy of the human person. Here you will delve into the philosophy of recent personalist thinkers including John Henry Newman, Max Scheler, and Karol Wojtyla while studying the Western philosophical tradition represented by Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas.

Whether you come simply to reflect on the questions of human existence, or to equip yourself for advanced studies in literature, law, history, or theology, you will find a most congenial community of students and teachers at Franciscan University.

Franciscan University of Steubenville ©
University Boulevard, Steubenville, Ohio 43952-6701
1-800-783-6220

1996

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dividual Christians are taken up into the "whole Christ," he adheres to an interpersonal or social model in which all the members are dynamically related to one another and to the Lord. Whereas they insist on the necessity of communion with the universal Church, he holds that the Church is essentially local. Contending that Christ is present in every congregation that gathers in his name, he denies the reality of any universal Church existing above or behind the local churches. Most fundamentally, Volf's ecclesiology is marked by a futurist rather than a realized eschatology.

This futurist eschatology may be illustrated by Volf's treatment of catholicity. Whenever the Scriptures speak of the Church as the fullness of Christ, as the Bride, and as the Temple, he prefers to understand these terms as applying to the glorious future Church. The *una sancta*, Volf believes, will not exist until Christ returns in glory to establish his definitive kingdom. For the present, then, churches are catholic to the extent that they anticipate, in a provisional and fragmentary way, the eventual gathering of the full people of God. It is not necessary for local churches to be in actual communion with one another, still less with a Petrine church as the center of catholic unity. It suffices that the local churches be open without distinction to all who confess Christ and that they seek communion with all other churches. For a particular church to isolate itself or claim catholicity in an exclusive way is to offend against catholicity. Volf seems to regard the Orthodox, and perhaps the Catholics also, as being guilty of such exclusivity.

VOLF'S FUTURIST ECCLESIOLOGY stands in some tension with apostolicity, although he is far from rejecting this traditional attribute of the Church. The Christian revelation, he insists, is already given in its completeness and is passed on through historically mediated apostolic scriptures. Even though the churches have no infallible organ to interpret the message, the power of the Spirit enables them to grasp and preach the word of God with confidence. To be a Christian one must profess Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior; one must be baptized and celebrate the Lord's Supper. The churches must hold fast to the apostolic preaching. In this limited sense, says Volf, "it is true that 'there is no church without correct doctrine.'"

Although Volf sees ministry as indispensable for mediating the grace of word and sacrament, he denies that any ministerial office is essential. He explicitly sets himself against the teaching of Ignatius of Antioch on the necessity of bishops, presbyters, and deacons for the very existence of the Church. Church office for him is a humanly instituted means for the local church to govern itself, but the election and installation of officeholders, he believes, is more than a merely human occurrence; it should be accompanied by the invocation of the Holy Spirit.

AS THE TITLE and subtitle make evident, Volf wants to ground his ecclesiology in a proper understanding of the Trinity. Catholics and Orthodox theologians, he remarks, understand the Trinity in a hierarchical manner, giving primacy to the Father and making the other two persons unilaterally dependent on the Father according to the order of their procession. This theory, in his judgment, serves to undergird the hierarchical ecclesiologies that Volf criticizes in his discussions of Ratzinger and Zizioulas. Following in the footsteps of his mentor Moltmann, Volf proposes a "perichoretic" model of the Trinity in which the three divine persons are reciprocally interdependent. He rejects the classical identification of the three divine persons with their re-

herder&herder

A Herder & Herder Selection

"A WORK OF ENCYCLOPEDIC PROPORTIONS"—CHOICE

Bernard McGinn
Flowering of Mysticism
Volume III of the Presence of God: A History of Western Mysticism
Men and Women in the New mysticism—1200-1350
"The newest volume in a series destined to become the authorative study of Christian mysticism".—*Church*
The Flowering of Mysticism explores with freshness and depth the theological and spiritual significance of the 13th and 14th centuries.
0-8245-1743-1 $29.95 paperback



Bernard McGinn
Foundations of Mysticism
Volume I of The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism —Origins to the Fifth Century
0-8245-1404-1 $24.95 paperback



Bernard McGinn
Growth of Mysticism
Volume II of the Presence of God: Gregory the Great Through the 12th Century.
0-8245-1628-1 $24.95 paperback



THE CROSSROAD PUBLISHING COMPANY
370 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10017

At your bookstore or call
800-395-0690

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lations of origin on the ground that this identification would preclude any retroactivity of the Son and the Spirit on the Father. The persons, he maintains, have a personal existence really distinct from, and prior to, their relationality.

This review would not be the place to undertake a full critique of Moltmann's trinitarian theology as taken up by Volf. But I may indicate some misgivings. I would be inclined to question whether Scripture gives any hint of the "retroactive" influence of the Son and the Spirit on the Father. I find it hard to see how the "social" model, as here developed, escapes the pitfall of tritheism. The theory seems difficult to reconcile with the *homoousion* of Nicea and the teaching of several other councils. Although the term *perichoresis* has a legitimate theological usage, it does not warrant the conclusions Volf draws from it.

Volf maintains that his nonhierarchical ecclesiology, based on a nonhierarchical doctrine of the Trinity, is culturally appropriate and therefore facilitates the transmission of Christian faith in the contemporary situation. The free churches, he contends, are successful in marketing themselves, whereas clergy-controlled churches are in danger of collapse in societies such as our own. This thesis deserves further examination on the part of sociologists of religion. It seems to run up against the received opinion that the most adaptive churches are declining and that relatively conservative churches are growing. However that may be, Volf would surely agree that the task of the Church is not to satisfy the tastes of religious consumers but to testify to the "whole counsel of God" revealed in Jesus Christ.

ALL IN ALL, Volf gives us much to think about. He is exceptionally well informed about the matters he discusses. His proposals are consistent and thoroughly thought through. His free-church ecclesiology, ecumenical in inspiration and intention, deserves broad ecumenical attention. This reviewer found particular value in Volf's theology of charisms and in his observations on the need to activate an all too passive laity.

From a Roman Catholic point of view, I am inclined to say that this book accurately describes a promising reality within present-day Christianity. Local churches that follow Volf's principles do indeed "reflect something of the eschatological communion of the entire people of God with the triune God." But is such an anticipatory ecclesiality sufficient? Does there exist on earth, since Easter and Pentecost, a church founded upon the apostles, with Jesus Christ as its cornerstone—a church that embodies, in a real though imperfect manner, the new life brought into the world by the Incarnate Son of God? If the true Church of Jesus Christ subsists anywhere within history, every style of Christianity that lives apart from it suffers from a serious deficiency.

In short, this volume raises in acute form the issue of Christian eschatology. Volf finds that Zizioulas falls into an excessively realized eschatology—a criticism that has also been voiced from a Catholic point of view. But does not Volf go to the opposite extreme? What is the correct balance between the "already" and the "not yet"?

OUR SUNDAY VISITOR'S
DID DARWIN GET IT RIGHT?
CATHOLICS AND THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION

While evolution—the common descent of species—is still a plausible scientific theory, Darwin's ideas about how this process occurred are collapsing. As the façade of Darwinism steadily crumbles, the teaching of the Catholic Church is emerging as the sound voice of truth.

Did Darwin Get It Right? sorts out the facts about evolution by showing that Catholic belief about God's creation and scientific evidence about the origins of the universe are mutually compatible. By demonstrating that Darwin used his own highly dubious philosophical notions and his own circumspect religious sentiments to explain the mechanisms of evolution, George Sim Johnston provides a solid Catholic perspective between Fundamentalism and scientific determinists.

Did Darwin Get It Right?
By George Sim Johnston
0-87973-**945**-2, hardcover, $14.95, 176 pp.

Available at bookstores. MasterCard, VISA, and Discover customers can order direct from **Our Sunday Visitor** by calling **1-800-348-2440**. Or, send payment plus $3.95 shipping/handling to:

OUR SUNDAY VISITOR • 200 Noll Plaza • Huntington, IN 46750
1-800-348-2440 • osvbooks@osv.com

OurSundayVisitor
Periodicals • Books • Tapes • Curricula • Software • Offering Envelopes.
For a free catalog call 1-800-348-2440.
A8ABBDFT

The Politics of the Possible

RAYMOND ARON: THE RECOVERY OF THE POLITICAL. By BRIAN C. ANDERSON. *Rowman & Littlefield. 215 pp. $58 cloth, $19.95 paper.*

Reviewed by
Jean Bethke Elshtain

THERE HAS BEEN a resurgence of in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terest in Raymond Aron in France, though the English-speaking world takes less notice of him than it ought. Brian C. Anderson attributes the new French attention to Aron's "lifelong resistance to the temptation toward totalitarianism and the literary politics that usually attended that temptation," which is suddenly in style. Aron's "sober defense of political reason" meshes with the "resurgence of philosophical rigor and political responsiblity among the Parisian intelligentsia." In the English-speaking world, however, the Cold War having been won, Aron's refusal to join the ranks of the apologists for Stalinism is not as exciting as it once was: thus do scholarly fates wax and wane. More importantly, though, Aron's thought seems counterintuitive to those influenced by American optimism. Aron's particular habit of mind emphasizes reason and discernment, refusing any "final synthesis." But that portion of the West led by the United States (which France has always resisted for good reasons and bad, no doubt) is in thrall at present to its own enthusiasm, the confident prediction of the final, coming victory for the synthesis of "markets and democracy." Many do not see the triumphalist dimensions of their projective enthusiasms, while the words we associate with Raymond Aron—realism, liberalism, a sense of the tragic—mark him as a distinctly sober observer.

Whatever the reason for his eclipse in the English-speaking West, that Aron is at last no longer a stranger to his own country's intellectual establishment can only be good news, in part because what French thinkers do so often becomes fashion, especially in America. Writing with great clarity of style from a stance of interpretive charity, Anderson helps us to sort out Aron's enormous oeuvre. He begins by unpacking Aron's *political reason*, asking: "What does it mean to *think politically*?" For one thing, it means one isn't Jean-Paul Sartre, the "archetypal example" of anti-political, "literary politics," a manner of "engaging with political life that deliberately . . . ignored reality and that preferred to remain on the level of an abstract theory or a kind of pure, contentless moralizing." Individual persons and whole societies are viewed through the theory and what gets destroyed on paper (so to speak) often is destroyed in real life—like kulaks in the Soviet Union. But the mounds of bodies piling up do not really matter

JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN *is the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago and the author, most recently, of* Real Politics: At the Center of Everyday Life *(Johns Hopkins University Press).*

Mere Christianity[3]

G. K. Chesterton C. S. Lewis Fyodor Dostoyevsky

If you read Chesterton, a Roman Catholic, C. S. Lewis, an Anglican, and Dostoyevsky, an Eastern Orthodox Christian—you get three writers, three traditions, but one faith, Mere Christianity—in three dimensions.

If you appreciate these three writers, you will also enjoy **Touchstone**, a new bimonthly journal of mere Christianity. **Touchstone** is edited by and for traditional Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox Christians.

You may ask: only three dimensions? Well, no; the number really is arbitrary. The ancient faith of the Church is ever new and multidimensional and found throughout the length and breadth and depth of the Church's 2,000-year history. By subscribing to **Touchstone** you will get news, opinion, history, literature, reviews, and resources that will give you a deeper, broader, and fuller picture of the Faith once for all delivered to the saints—in at least three dimensions, if not more. (3-D glasses not included.)

Touchstone

A JOURNAL OF MERE CHRISTIANITY

Send in today for a NO-RISK TRIAL subscription!

Touchstone

A JOURNAL OF MERE CHRISTIANITY

Subscription Dept. • P.O. Box 3000
Denville, NJ 07834

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

_____

CITY_____

STATE_____ ZIP _____

☐ Please enter a trial subscription to *Touchstone* for one year (6 issues) and **bill me for $19.95.** If I am not satisfied with the first issue, I may cancel within 30 days and receive a full refund.

☐ I save $3.00. **Enclosed is payment of $16.95 for one year** (6 issues) of *Touchstone*. If I am not satisfied with the first issue, I may still cancel within 30 days and receive a full refund.

6FTS06

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Have you seen our most recent catalogues? They include, inter alia, titles in these areas:

1. Karl Barth
2. Biblical Studies
3. The Book of Common Prayer
4. Catholic Recusancy 1559-1829
5. Comparative Religion
6. Eastern European Church History
7. Ecclesiastical Architecture
8. Erasmus
9. Graeco-Roman Texts/Studies
10. Romano Guardini
11. Hagiography
12. Historiography
13. Hymnology
14. Judaica
15. Liturgical Texts/Studies
16. Mariology
17. Jacques Maritain
18. Marriage
19. Mediaeval Texts/Studies
20. Mennonites/Moravians/Quakers
21. Missions/Missiology
22. The Modernist Controversy
23. Pascal + Jansenism
24. Patristic Texts/Studies
25. Philosophy
26. Protestant Americana
27. Reformation/Counter-Reformation
28. Shakespeare
29. Spirituality/Mysticism
30. Teilhard de Chardin
31. Thomistic Studies
32. War/Peace/Pacificism

If you want our most recent catalogue, just ask:

Loome
Theological Booksellers
320 North Fourth Street
Stillwater, Mn 55082
Phone: 651-430-1092
Fax: 651-439-8504
e-mail:
LoomeBooks@prodigy.net
Website:
http://www.booktown.com

because the theory is all that counts.

To avoid such sacrifices for theories, Aron refused to articulate a vision or model of the good society. He was interested instead in better rather than worse arrangements. Politics is always a matter of partial projects: comparative justice, relative fairness, and so on. As Anderson writes, "Aron had too profound a sense of the diversity of history to admit easily to a strong notion of an ideal society or best regime, or to succumb to the extreme generalities favored by literary political thinkers."

Refusing to advocate a best regime does not mean, of course, that one simply demurs when it comes to normative judgment. But Aron made distinctions between actually existing regimes rather than their imaginary counterparts, and judged them according to their effects on human flourishing. This is a far more demanding project than creating some ideal city in speech, because it means one actually has to pay attention to existing orders and arrangements. One must respond politically to architectonic thinkers like Marx; the only way to do this is historically and empirically—look at what has happened and is happening on the ground, so to speak. With St. Augustine, Aron understood that we are always in the Empire, always born into a political configuration of some sort. How porous or rock-solid is it? What is the repertoire of actually available civic and ethical concepts with which one is obliged to work? That which is new always emerges out of that which already is.

With this backdrop, we can appreciate Aron's sympathy with political actors, the statesmen. We are obliged to ask, in Anderson's words, "What would you do if you were in [the statesman's] place?" This is part of what it means to think politically, because politics is about action in a realm of uncertainty; politics is about human choice, but these choices are not infinite. Aron walked a fine line between an excess of determinism and an equally unacceptable radical freedom or voluntarism. Reasonable and responsible action emerges out of the tension between these two equally dangerous presuppositions. Human freedom is possible, but we are always, in quite palpable ways, determined by our histories and that of our own time and place. From this Aronian stance, one can advance probabilities but not lodge confident predictions and thundering prophecies. This subtlety is attractive only to those who can live with ambiguity and uncertainty, those who do not see the earthly city as the site within which to enact messianic projects.

ANDERSON ARGUES compellingly that there is no way to leap out of our historic skins; that would be to repudiate finitude itself, something mortal creatures cannot do. "The finitude of the human subject logically excludes access to any complete understanding of the historical totality," he writes. Thus a responsible politics is one that appreciates the limits to our understanding: we don't know enough and can, in principle, *never* know enough to advance epistemological and political certitude. A word comes to mind here—humility—a term one certainly doesn't associate with the Jean-Paul Sartres of the world.

But Aron's deep historicism never slipped into epistemological relativism, settling into a position more of epistemological pluralism. Interpretive pluralism is, Anderson insists, Aron's way of "granting to the historical and social world its manifest complexity." This puts one immediately inside the problem of relativism, of course, but unlike the relativist, Aron never simply gives up on the difficulty of "deciding between two different interpretations." To say that Aron didn't fully sort this out is to understate. But he understood that this is the problematic into which any responsible thinker falls. His political answer? "Imperfect liberal regimes" are our best bet politically. They are not magnificent edifices. But at least they take account of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the frailty of our human condition.

There is much more to recommend in this densely packed, lucid volume. The discussion of Aron's "critique of ideology" contains powerful moments, as does Anderson's unpacking of one of Aron's chief passions and concerns, the world of international and diplomatic relations. Here again Aron avoids abstractions of a sort that dangerously misunderstand the competitive nature of international relations as well as an amoral realism that obliterates any space for ethical restraint and reflection. Morality, for Aron, is woven into the very fabric of things, but so is competition. Anderson concludes by situating Aron within the universe of contemporary political theory. His comparison of Aron to a figure he in many ways resembles, Isaiah Berlin, is particularly compelling. Anderson's effort to bring the attention of our political theorists back to Aron is worthy of our thanks.

Beyond Reductionism

RELIGIOUS MYSTERY AND RATIONAL REFLECTION. By LOUIS DUPRÉ. *Eerdmans. 147 pp. $20.*

***Reviewed by* David B. Hart**

THE NINE ESSAYS that constitute this volume are all concerned, in some fashion or another, with questions of religious experience: its form, its nature, its susceptibility (or resistance) to philosophical scrutiny, its very possibility in cultures that have (for the most part) taken leave of all their gods. The collection as a whole, however, derives its unity (not to mention a kind of haunting urgency) from its pervasive concern with one question in particular: how does one describe the subjective and objective elements of religious experience without reducing one to the other, or reducing religious experience in general to some merely anthropological constant, devoid of any transcendent dimension?

The richest and most suggestive piece in the collection is perhaps the first ("Phenomenology of Religion: Limits and Possibilities"). Could there be a phenomenology of religious experience (or, as Dupré prefers to say, of the "religious act") that would take equal and unprejudiced account both of the objective symbolism in which every properly religious phenomenon is made available to consciousness and of the subjective experience by which the believer receives and (in phenomenological parlance) *intends* the object of faith? The Romantics tended to dissolve all religion into an expressive subjectivity, while the "scientific" study of religions tends to treat religious symbols simply as functions of the "human" or the "social." Dupré argues, on the other hand, that only if the two moments are taken together in their integral dependence on one another does it become possible to describe the peculiar kind of intentionality that informs the religious act. Religious acts (as opposed to other "symbolic" intentions) present a unique problem, though, because while the experience is inescapably immanent, it comprehends a transcendent object. And so the question must be raised: can there really be a phenomenology of religion, in the end, that accomplishes more than a sort of clinical examination of the various extrinsic forms of religious expression?

Dupré's answer is that there can and must be, because the transcendence of the object of religious intention appears within the religious experience itself, in its very constitution, and so no responsible or meaningful phenomenology dare ignore the degree to which, within the religious act, human symbolic creativity is provoked and saturated by an object that transcends it—or to be more precise, by an object that is intended as transcendent. No phenomenology that ignores the fundamental passivity at the heart of the religious act, the

DAVID B. HART *is Lecturer in Religious Studies at the University of Virginia.*

NEW BOOKS

Christianity and European Culture
Selections from the Work of Christopher Dawson
GERALD J. RUSSELLO, Editor



"[A] marvelous introduction to the thought of an unjustly neglected twentieth-century giant." ~Robert Royal

"Superbly introduced and shrewdly chosen, this selection of hard-to-find Dawson essays is a powerful contribution. It covers all the central themes of this greatest of all historians of Christian cultures." ~Michael Novak
262 pp. / $24.95 paper

Hesburgh: A Biography
MICHAEL O'BRIEN
An engaging biography of one of the greatest Catholic leaders in American history. O'Brien chronicles Father Theodore Hesburgh's career as Notre Dame president, political appointee, U.S. Civil Rights Commission chairman, and priest.
368 pp. / Illus. / $34.95 cloth

NEW IN PAPERBACK . . . . . .

At the Limits of Political Philosophy
From "Brilliant Errors" to Things of Uncommon Importance
JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J.
"This thoughtful book . . . provokes all of us, whether believer or unbeliever, to confront again or for the first time, the insoluble mystery that is reason and Revelation." ~Daniel J. Mahoney, *Crisis*
272 pp. / $19.95 paper

The Catholic University of America Press

To order, please call 410/516-6953

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

element of irreducible givenness that is experienced in the object (and so experienced as exceeding the symbolic forms that embody the subjective intention), can really be said to have disclosed the distinctively religious within the field of its investigations. The argument at this point is delightfully lucid, and only mildly subversive: within the expansive "science" of philosophical phenomenology, which means to limit reflection to objects that appear within immanent cognition as representation or as value, the contours of an experience of transcendence as such can be glimpsed. Since the religious activity of symbolic religious representation invokes and expresses in stable and analogous forms that which exceeds all representation, phenomenology cannot deny that a radical receptivity invests our active projections of symbolic meaning with more significance than they can—as objects of immanent reflection—contain. The symbols do not exhaust or even capture their transcendent object. But, then, what is the relation of this transcendence to these symbolic forms? Is the transcendent merely a noumenal absence from representation, a silence that our symbols indicate but cannot reflect? Is religious meaning, in short, a message or merely a construction?

For Dupré, of course, the answer is the former. The great promise he finds in phenomenology in its developments after Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is the possibility it opens up of supplanting a sterile correspondence model of truth with the more ancient model of truth as disclosure, as the radiance by which the object of reflection really shows itself—gives itself—to the subjective intention. Such a model of truth makes room for the notion of revelation, for the idea of a transcendence that declares itself, that is Word and light and meaning, appearing gratuitously, even if it does so necessarily under the forms provided by a human creativity. Even if every religious truth comes to consciousness as a construction, a mythic, symbolic, and ritual invention, it also comes as a gift that—appearing within the elaborate architecture of the religious act—still surpasses intention, and overflows the understanding of the one who receives it.

OF COURSE, this all perhaps begs a certain question. Dupré's concern about the reductive nature of "scientific" discussions of the religious act is well taken, but this does not yet clarify the degree to which the concrete symbols of religious faith adequately reflect the truth they indicate. To what degree are the particular contents of a given religious tradition ultimately indifferent? If all religious experience *as such* refers to an object irreducibly transcendent of the intentionality that seeks it, however that object may give itself to experience, do religious symbols actually express the "Absolute" or merely constitute an occasion for indicating its otherness? Does Dupré's argument really show how the objective and subjective elements of faith shed light upon one another, or does it merely call attention to a universal religious intuition that embodies itself in a variety of shifting shapes, at different times and in different places, now Christian, now Islamic, now Hindu? If truth discloses itself, if it bears witness to itself, does it ever do so in such a way as to necessitate a *particular* dogmatic content? Can so general a phenomenology ever make room for theology as a discourse of truth?

But perhaps the question is misguided. The play between the objective matter of faith (say the event of Jesus of Nazareth in history) and the subjective act of interpretation (the meaning-intention that informs faith) can never be exhaustively determinative of the symbols that express it, but this does not render those symbols arbitrary. Dupré takes quite seriously the ancient (Platonic and Christian) idea of illumination: the light of truth can be received only under the forms of a creative and poetic capacity in consciousness, perhaps, but that very capacity also already participates in Being's light, and receives it from without. Consciousness, thus conceived, is not a transcendental faculty (the Kantian or Husserlian ego) that comprises within itself concepts that to a greater or lesser degree correspond to, or reflexively constitute objects of cognition simply exterior to itself; it is instead an openness to the radiance of things.

Being is an analogical and expressive medium, whose structures of meaning coincide in the ever more eminent, always openly manifest, and necessarily interdepend-

CIPS
CATHOLIC INSTITUTE FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES
7007 Bradley Boulevard • Bethesda • MD 20817

An Institute that assists in the formation of mental health professionals seeking to integrate the Catholic faith with their role as practitioners

CERTIFICATION PROGRAM FOR:

•Psychologists •Clinical Social Workers •Professional Counselors
•Psychiatrists •Psychiatric Nurses •Child, Marriage & Family Therapists
•CEU's for Professionals listed above pending approval

September 19 - 20, 1998
Catholic Personality Theory From The Old Testament to John Paul II 12cr
Kenneth Schmitz, Ph.D.
Mary Shivanandan, S.T.D.

October 24 - 25, 1998
When Virtues Defeat the Deadley Sins: Restoring Freedom 12cr
Romanus Cessario, O.P.

Register by faxing information to: (301) 365-4379 or
by phone: (301) 365-2853 E-mail: cips1@erols.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ent transcendentals of beauty, goodness, truth, and unity. In "Truth in Religion and Truth of Religion," Dupré depicts religious truth as a kind of deepening of vision, a constant conversion towards Being's transcendent depth of truth and goodness. One is "in the truth" before one can simply "know" the truth; it is a way of being rather than simply a way of conceiving.

In "Experience and Interpretation: A Philosophical Reflection on Schillebeeckx's Theology," Dupré considers the question of how revelation can unfold within history, within the horizons provided by the varying cultural conditions of different ages, without thereby losing its historical particularity or its objectivity; experience and interpretation are inseparable from one another, he argues, and both continuously develop over time. And in "Religious Symbolism and Aesthetic Form," a brief and elegant essay on the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, he considers the expressive power of beautiful form, the power of creation to manifest the depth of Being's mystery, and the way in which the Christian appropriation of beauty as a transcendental is altered by the crucified radiance of Christ. And in every case, Dupré's theme is light; his is a classic phenomenological concern for illumination and concealment, splendor and obscurity, the visible and the invisible, and the mystery of vision.

THIS IS ALSO to say, incidentally, that Dupré's theme is darkness: the darkness of evil and suffering, the darkness of the *via negativa*, the dazzling darkness of mystical union, and the dark night of modern humanity's interior retreat from faith. Of the mystery of evil no "explanation" is offered, of course, no theodicy, but Dupré takes the problem as the occasion for one of the few concretely dogmatic proposals to be found in this book: he insists upon the futility, in the face of cosmic suffering, of theories of atonement whose grammar is one of mere ransom and satisfaction, and upon the necessity therefore of seeing in the Incarnation the revelation of a God who suffers with and in the suffering of his creatures, and whose power and perfection are not threatened—but demonstrated—by this very capacity to enter into the conditions of creaturely estrangement from him. And in a move of great subtlety (and charity), Dupré suggests that in the ever more fragmentary and private realms of symbolic imagination that are so characteristic of modern humanity's experience of truth, within the desert of the isolated ego, and even in the realm of our pandemic atheist disenchantment, there is an analogy of and (perhaps) invitation to the apophatic language of the mystics, who knew how the privation of names for God can also be a preparation to bear the presence of a mystery that always surpasses each of the symbols in which it variously arrays itself, a presence known most fully as the wound of an unutterable and transcendent love.

One could continue reciting the virtues of this volume at far greater length. At the last, however, it need only be said that, for so slender a volume, and one written with such lucidity and such restraint, Dupré's book has a remarkably suggestive force; it carries about it a kind of mysterious surfeit of meaning. Each essay implies many more questions that need to be asked, and opens up numerous and unexpected perspectives upon those it directly engages. And it is worth noting (though anyone familiar with Dupré's work in the past will expect nothing else) that each essay is characterized at once by the rigor of its thought and the limpid prose of its exposition. Not to wax too fulsome, but it is a beautiful book and one that merits far more than one reading. Issues of such magnitude and difficulty are rarely presented in so obliging a form.

Toward a Religious Humanism

SACRED PASSION: THE ART OF WILLIAM SCHICKEL. By GREGORY WOLFE. *University of Notre Dame Press. 176 pp. $95 cloth, $48 paper.*

***Reviewed by* Allen G. Weakland**

SEVENTY-FIVE years ago, T. S. Eliot said, "What is needed of art is a simplification of life into something rich and strange." Nearly a half-century later, Jacques Barzun

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

Christianity and Politics: Special Issues

The Review of Politics will mark the passing of this millennium with two special issues given to essays and scholarly studies engaging in some way the relationship of Christianity and Politics. A broad interpretation of that theme is encouraged. Welcome are manuscripts that consider topics (or some aspect or instance thereof) such as Christianity and Liberalism, Catholicism and American Democracy, Christianity in Post-Modern Analysis, and thinkers such as Thomas More, John Calvin, Alexis de Tocqueville, Jacques Maritain, John Courtney Murray and Reinhold Niebuhr. Welcome are studies that bring the resources of the Christian tradition to bear on some problem of national or international politics. Welcome are studies in religion and politics in which Christianity is approached comparatively and/or in which systematic empirical research plays a role.

Communications indicating an intention to submit a manuscript are encouraged. Manuscripts will be received until April 1, 1999.

All manuscripts should be submitted in QUADRUPLICATE to *The Review of Politics*, Box B, Notre Dame, IN 46556. Further information can be found on our World Wide Web Homepage at http://www.nd.edu/~rop. Questions may be addressed to the editor at ROP.Editor.1@nd.edu.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

echoed these sentiments in his Mellon Lectures when he said that the artifacts and ideas of advanced civilizations had become a "dreadful clutter," the antidote to which was to move towards "some form of primitivism." Gregory Wolfe, editor of *Image: A Journal of the Arts and Religion* and author of *Malcolm Muggeridge* and *The New Religious Humanists*, has discovered in the relative obscurity of Loveland, Ohio, an artist of genuine spirituality who is showing the way towards such a primitive simplicity.

William Schickel, born in Stamford, Connecticut, in 1919 and reared in Ithaca, New York, was never far from the concerns of the art community. His grandfather and namesake was a prolific architect who, among other commissions, designed Manhattan's St. Ignatius Loyola Church and the landmark Century Building. His mother, née Agnes Ryan, was an amateur artist of some depth, but died when William was only three.

As a Catholic in WASPish Ithaca, William came to find solace in boxing as a way of striking back at local bullies who mocked his faith. And so he was attracted to the University of Notre Dame—the Fighting Irish had an excellent boxing program. Once there, he fell sway to the Fine Arts department, where a resurgent neo-Thomism, trumpeted by Professor Frank O'Malley, captured the imagination of the young Schickel with its vision of Christian humanism.

The philosophical lights of this movement—Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon, and Etienne Gilson—gradually began to shape Schickel's approach to art. Their vision sought to restore the imbalances that were seen to have arisen between nature and grace, faith and reason, the sacred and the profane. Nonetheless they excoriated artistic traditionalism, going so far as to become firm believers in abstraction in artistic representation. In those days, the "Culture Wars" hinged not on abortion or homosexual rights, but on whether Abstract Art was an anarchistic or nihilistic indulgence, or whether it was truly a leap forward in free expression. Schickel's intellectual mentors took a positive stance towards abstractionism, and Schickel took up their fight.

SCHICKEL'S WORK—represented here by 175 full-color photographs—brings us face-to-face with the concerns of our own culture war, especially as it is manifested in clashes between traditionalists and liberals in the Church over the past three decades. Wolfe early-on confronts this dichotomy directly. Remarking on Schickel's strong allegiance to the Catholic Church and his steadfast fidelity to the Magisterium, the author insists that Schickel has "refused to live in the past." "To Schickel, there is an important difference between being a conservative and being a reactionary. The conservative, he believes, must find a language in which to make timeless truths understood in the present. The reactionary, on the other hand, clings to an old language from which the spirit has fled."

For Schickel, that conservative language is found in the ordinary, everyday realities, a reflection of his belief that "the sacramental life of the Church is a recapitulation of the daily rituals of eating and drinking, working and resting, gathering and dispersing." Thus Schickel, whose versatile work has encompassed painting, sculpture, stained glass, furniture, and architectural design, in one of his most inspiring works turned a simple barn in his own Loveland into a quite reverent place of worship. Known as the Grailville Oratory, the building emphasizes the original post, truss, and beam structure, and uses the original windows for the clerestory. A shafted light well, open to natural sunlight, stands above the altar and floods it with light like grace descending. But, as Wolfe points out, it "also echoes the shaft in the barn where the hay was thrown down to the cattle. Out of such homely metaphors Schickel fashions his religious art."

Ideologues in the culture wars might object to such confusion of the sacred and profane, perhaps forgetting that Jesus was born in a

---

ALLEN G. WEAKLAND, *the former editor of* The New American Review: A Journal of Civility and the Arts, *is co-author of* The Private Albert Einstein.

"A Must Read series of books about sex addiction that contain principles that apply to all addictions.

"How To Stay Away From Lust One Day At a Time **is a compelling series of books that uses the first book of Moses, Genesis, in its focus on lust. The series transfuses a spiritual awakening to anyone whose life is affected by compulsive sexual behavior and is searching for ways to deal with it.**



If you suffer from any addiction and believe in the power of prayer this new series can profoundly improve your life.

SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY OFFER
ORDER VOLUME 1 FOR ONLY $9.95 + $3. S. & H.

800-380-3704

VOLUMES 1-4 $49.95 + $4.00 S & H

MONEY BACK GUARANTEE

Use Your Credit Card or send your check or money order to:
Emmet L. Billroy Publishers, Dept. FT
1013 Centre Rd., Suite 350 Wilmington, DE 19805-1233
Visit our web site at www.billroy.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stable. How often have we heard criticisms of the carbon-copy, mass-produced factories and gymnasiums that pass for churches these days? But seeing Schickel's work reminds us of the difference between taste and tackiness.

AGAIN AND AGAIN, Schickel's works depend on simple materials, simply constructed, such as plain, thin iron crosses, granite altars, ceramic holy water fonts, and oaken choir stalls for his renovation of Gethsemani Abbey in Kentucky, the oldest Trappist Monastery in the United States, and home, once, to Thomas Merton.

Another commission, the National Shrine of Philippine Duchesne in St. Charles, Missouri, was close to Schickel's heart. He had been diagnosed in 1952 with incurable cancer of the lymph system. But after a pilgrimage to St. Charles to pray to (then-Blessed) Philippine, his cancer vanished. When faced with renovating the shrine, really just the transept and a section of the nave of an originally intended basilica, Schickel perhaps had G. K. Chesterton's dictum in mind: the key to authentic reform is the need to return to the original form and discover in it what is relevant for the present. Taking the cold and forbidding shell of the original structure, he placed the sanctuary and altar in the center of the building, allowing the congregation to face the altar from three directions. This was one year after the completion of Vatican II, and Schickel's design served as a vanguard for myriad churches-in-the-round that have followed since. In his renovation, a striking baldacchino of copper, brass, aluminum, and steel rods over the altar serves the same purpose as does the light shaft in the Grailville Oratory.

Wolfe was criticized before for falling under the spell of his subject in the Muggeridge biography, overinflating Muggeridge's stature as a Christian apologist. Although art books of this sort do generally fall into the "groupie" category, one might have hoped that the author had accepted this criticism and had been somewhat less agog at Schickel's every expression. Take, for instance, Schickel's stained glass designs. Almost without fail, he turns his back on representational scenes, opting rather for abstract, geometric patterns out of his feeling that traditional biblical scenes or saintly figures create a distraction to true worship. But this should prompt the question, unasked by Wolfe—a distraction to whom? To a man of obvious intellectual and analytical sensibilities? Or to the average parishioner who "doesn't know much about Art, but knows what he likes"? For example, in his Gethsemani Abbey restoration, Schickel's geometric stained glass, sharply triangular, is described by Wolfe: "The general movement remains vertical, a rising motion of the spirit toward God." But does the average worshiper see past shards of colored glass to the intended symbolism? If, as I suspect, he doesn't, isn't this, then, a larger distraction —this uneasy feeling of niggling irregularity—than comfortable old shoes like St. Peter or an imploring Christ beckoning from the windows? A greater critical distance would well serve Wolfe's project of promoting religious humanism.

IRONICALLY, in those few works in which Schickel does represent humanity realistically, the effect is extremely meaningful and touching. For instance, in one of his secular projects—the Kane County Correctional Complex in Aurora, Illinois —Schickel included a photographic wall depicting Solzhenitsyn, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Dorothy Day, and Johnny Cash, reminding inmates with a neighboring plaque that "The people shown in these photos all suffered confinement and went on to do great things." Similarly, on a wall accessible only to prison staff, photos of Solzhenitsyn, St. Paul, Day, and others serve as reminders to the staff that, occasionally, some people are wrongfully incarcerated.

Schickel, approaching eighty, still labors at his crafts. (He is currently

U.S. Postal Service
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION

1. Title of publication: FIRST THINGS: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life

2. Publication No. 005476.

3. Date of Filing: Sept. 25, 1998.

4. Frequency of Issue: Monthly except combined issues June/July and August/September.

5. No. of Issues Published Annually: 10.

6. Annual Subscription Price: $29.

7. Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication: 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010-7002.

8. Mailing Address of Headquarters or General Business Offices of the Publisher: 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010-7002.

9. Names and Complete Addresses of Publisher, Editor, and Managing Editor. Publisher: Institute on Religion and Public Life, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010-7002. Editor-in-Chief: Richard John Neuhaus. Editor: James Nuechterlein. Managing Editor: Matthew Berke, Institute on Religion and Public Life, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010-7002.

10. Owner: Institute on Religion and Public Life, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010-7002.

11. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities: None.

12. The Purpose, Function, and Nonprofit Status of this Organization and the Exempt Status for Federal Income Tax Purposes Has Not Changed During the Preceding 12 Months.

13. Publication Title: FIRST THINGS: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life.

14. Issue date for circulation date below:
Average: November 1997 through October 1998
Actual: October 1998

15. Extent and Nature of Circulation:	Avg. No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	Actual No. Copies of Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date
A. Total No. copies (Net Press Run)	36,099	34,968
B. Paid Circulation 1.Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, and Counter Sales	1,966	3,825
2. Paid or Requested Mail Subscriptions	29,796	29,302
C. Total Paid Circulation (Sum of 15B1 and 15B2)	31,762	33,127
D. Free Distribution by Mail	338	339
E. Free Distribution outside the Mail	---	---
F. Total Free Distribution	338	339
G. Total Distribution	32,100	33,466
H. Copies Not Distributed. 1. Office Use, Leftovers.	2,251	1,502
2. Returns from News Agents	1,748	---
I. Total (Sum of G, H1 and H2)	36,099	34,968
Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation	98.9	99.0

16. Statement of Ownership will be printed in the November 1998 issue of this Publication.

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS
Editor-in-Chief

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

working on three different commissions in three different states.) Overall, he has produced an impressive body of work which, thankfully, demonstrates that liturgical arts (which Schickel prefers to call "ritual arts" because "it stresses the way in which these objects participate in the drama of religious ritual") can be tastefully done in a modern idiom without lapsing into the triteness or sentimentality that plagues so many of our newer churches. Even so, Schickel has been criticized in the past for abetting liberalism via relativism and lack of commitment, an argument he counters by appealing to the distinction between doctrine, which is permanent, and discipline (ritual, language, and arts), which changes with the times. Wolfe notes how this brings to mind St. Augustine's description of God's beauty as "ever ancient, ever new." In Schickel's case, Wolfe has done us all a service in educating us about this simple and dedicated and faith-full laborer.

Just Friends

FOR FIDELITY: HOW INTIMACY AND COMMITMENT ENRICH OUR LIVES. By CATHERINE M. WALLACE. *Knopf. 177 pp. $22.*

***Reviewed by* J. Budziszewski**

FOR FIDELITY is written for baby boomers who got married without knowing what they were doing and are now trying to explain the matrimonial ideal to their kids—kids who are, predictably, even more antinomian than they are. As a defense of marital faithfulness, the book is pretty thin gruel. On the other hand it clearly answers a fascinating question you might not have thought of asking: What can still be said for faithfulness if you part from all the ancient wisdom but can't quite bring yourself to part from the sexual revolution? From this point of view, the interesting thing about Catherine Wallace's book is not that her argument is thin, but that it can be made at all.

Mrs. Wallace is so ambivalent about her own premises that great care is needed to sort out what she means. She calls herself a Christian, tells traditional stories, and employs logical reasoning, yet in the end she rejects not only revelation and tradition, but reasoning itself. New Testament sexual teachings are nothing but "dirt and greed"; tradition is a "hierarchal structure of repression, exclusion, and exploitation"; and it's better to "trust our guts" than to think things out, because "fidelity doesn't make any logical sense at all, and were reality commensurate with logic, then matrimony as I imagine it would be entirely illusory." The fact that she has just made a claim about reality by offering a logical argument seems to escape her.

What she does embrace is more startling still, because it includes everything that makes fidelity seem unreasonable: passion as holy, self as body, desire as need. For the first, she quotes approvingly from John Keats, who was "certain of nothing but the holiness of the heart's affections and the truth of imagination." For the second, though she admits that the proposition "I am a body" doesn't "work . . . all the time for everyone," nevertheless she insists on its truth; "all energy is bodily," and nothing that cannot be explained in bodily terms is true. Weirdest of the three is her view that intimacy requires "the acknowledgement of one another's needs at face value, without question. Your needs are no longer merely yours but as nearly my own as possible. If you say you need something, I need for you to have it—without second-guessing, without cautious, evaluative skepticism."

The examples she gives are relatively innocuous—she knows one couple in which the husband has a "need" to climb rocks, and another in which the wife has a "need" to make arrangements of them. But what happens when one spouse claims to "need" something degrading, immoral, or contrary to the "needs" of the other? If Mr. Wallace said he "needed" a little on the side, would Mrs. Wallace "need" for him to have it? So far as I can see, the answer would be yes. The only reason she gives for her amazing view is that a declaration of a need may reflect a deeper need that cannot be declared. No doubt that is true, but it in no way follows that for spouses to give each other whatever they want is always good for either. One of the things spouses need most deeply is to be accountable to each other.

MRS. WALLACE'S definition of fidelity can be summarized in four phrases: one at a time, of either sex, only while it lasts, no vows needed. Let's take a look at each element.

"One at a time" is the core of the

J. BUDZISZEWSKI *is Associate Professor of Government and Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, and author of* Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law *(InterVarsity, 1997).*

$35,000 Research Fellowships for Christian Scholars

The Pew Evangelical Scholars Program, sponsored by the Pew Charitable Trusts, announces its program of Research Fellowships for the academic year of 1999-2000. Sixteen grants of $35,000 each will be awarded to scholars pursuing research in the humanities, social sciences, and theology. Applicants must have a Ph.D. and be a Canadian or U.S. citizen, or be employed in North America. Christian scholars from all religious backgrounds are most welcome to apply.

Applications are due by November 30, 1998. For further information contact:

Michael S. Hamilton • Pew Evangelical Scholars Program
810 Flanner Hall • University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556

Phone: (219) 631-8347 • Fax: (219) 631-8721 • E-mail: ND.pesp.1@nd.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

idea, although, as we have just seen, even this element is questionable—for although Wallacean faithfulness means not having sex with anyone else at the same time, it also requires letting the other partner have whatever he says he needs.

Element two, "of either sex," follows from the author's indifference to the procreative and unitive goods of marriage. One would think that she upheld and connected them: on one page she compares the "new life" that arises from sexual union with the "new growth" that arises from intimate relationships; on another she declares that the "fullest enactment" of sexual desire takes place when physical and psychological intimacy "are celebrated together in a single life-generating act." But such passages are misleading. "New life," for the author, is a symbol not backed by substance, because, as she repeatedly maintains, sexual ethics and the facts of fertility have no connection whatsoever. Her idea of sexual intimacy is equally sterile, because, for all her emphasis on it, she has no conception of its sine qua non: the *complementarity* of male and female, the fact that their union surpasses all others precisely because they are different from each other, not only physically but psychologically. How she can believe "I am a body" yet overlook physical complementarity is especially mysterious. This blind spot renders her unable to tell the difference between erotic union and ordinary friendship. Matrimony, she says, is "the building block of all human community because it is the paradigm of friendship in general—differing in degree but not in kind." The more obvious result, of course, is her view that "Homosexuality can be moral or immoral in exactly the same ways and for exactly the same reasons as heterosexuality."

Element three, "only while it lasts," follows from the author's tendency, despite a great deal of talk about fidelity as a "discipline," to view love not as a holy commitment of the will but as one of those holy emotions that make her quote Keats. Once it "breaks down," the marriage is dead and divorce becomes a "blessing." This view will hardly be sustaining to mortal spouses, who often fall in and out of love with each other several times during a lifelong marriage.

Element four, "no vows needed," follows from the same deficiency. "The vow is to the man what the song is to the bird, or the bark to the dog," said Chesterton; "his voice, whereby he is known." Unfortunately, though big on "commitment," Mrs. Wallace is deaf to its native tongue. The closest she comes to speaking of promises is speaking of "witness" to the initiation of commitments. "Legal" witness is important in her view only if the couple are rich or plan children. She does see genuine value in "communal" witness, but only if the couple "already belongs to a community that understands and supports sexual commitment," for example a church. Sadly, "lots of good people have not found such a community," a description, incidentally, which turns out to include herself. From such remarks we learn many interesting things about the author's world: contraception is 100 percent effective, poor women are not hurt by divorce, and churches are so rare that lots of good people can't find one. What we don't learn much about from these remarks is fidelity.

AND THAT BRINGS us back to our starting point. Having discarded the ancient wisdom but chained herself to the sexual revolution, what can Catherine Wallace say in favor of fidelity? Here we must take a detour into Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of a "practice." Practices are social activities like tournament chess or concert flute. But not every social activity is a practice; to rate the name, an activity must have certain special features. To begin with, a practice is cooperative, complex, and internally coherent. Moreover, certain standards of excellence are part of its very definition—this is why we say that careless flutists haven't a clue what musical performance is about. In turn, the effort to achieve these standards has three results. First, the participants cultivate their powers of achieving excellence. Second, they achieve certain goods—not only those which are "externally," or coincidentally, connected with the practice, but others which are "internally," or intrinsically, connected with it. For tournament chess, the external goods include prestige, money, and status, but the internal goods include analytical skill, strategic imagination, and competitive intensity. Finally, by striving for excellence in the practice the participants not only achieve these goods, but also achieve greater and greater understanding of them.

Although Wallace is trying to follow MacIntyre, her terminology is a little inconsistent, so I will use MacIntyre's terminology instead. With this little help, her argument can be put in a nutshell. (1) Matrimony is a practice. (2) The discipline of fidelity is one of the standards of excellence that define it. (3)

The Catholic Tradition

THOMAS LANGAN

"This is a remarkable work. There are few who possess Langan's historical knowledge and philosophical depth. His reading of the past is informative, insightful, and provocative, all at once. . . . Anyone who wishes to know what Catholicism is, friend, foe, or uninformed Catholic, will find this volume a veritable treasure."

—JUDE P. DOUGHERTY

544 PAGES, $34.95

University of Missouri Press
2910 LeMone Boulevard
Columbia, MO 65201
1-800-828-1894
http://www.system.missouri.edu/upress

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Intimacy is one of the goods internal to it. (4) Without fidelity, intimacy is impossible.

SO FAR AS IT GOES, I think all this is precisely correct. In one way, the argument even goes further than necessary. The author does not need to roll out MacIntyre just to tell us, as she does, that fidelity is to marriage as yeast is to cinnamon buns. The analogy could be true and helpful even if MacIntyre were wrong. More serious is that in four other ways, the argument does not go far enough.

In the first place, it is a little hard to see why the author refuses to discuss the goods externally connected with faithful matrimony—for example the avoidance of disease and out-of-wedlock pregnancy. The only reason she gives is that none of these goods offer a "sufficient" account of sexual fidelity. As we are about to see, her argument about intrinsic goods doesn't offer a "sufficient" account either, and in any case, the fact that something is not the whole story hardly means that it is not a part of it. But there is more. Wallace not only declines to speak *of the external goods, she scorns* those who do. She accuses them of "repression" and "indoctrination" merely because they overlook a different part of the story than she does. I agree with her that it sends the wrong message to warn teens that having babies cuts into earning potential—that's not pro-chastity, it's pro-sterility. But how is it "repressive" to tell them that sex should wait until they can give their babies a stable home?



In the second place, her understanding of what counts as an internal or external good is distorted because she views her subject in a vacuum. In her view, fidelity is intrinsic to matrimony but stabilizing families is merely a side effect. Why not say instead that fidelity is intrinsic to matrimony but that matrimony is a building block in the yet greater practice of building stable families? Again, she holds that fidelity is intrinsic to matrimony but keeping God's commandments is merely a side effect. Why not say instead that fidelity is intrinsic to matrimony but that matrimony, for those whom God calls to it, is a building block in the yet greater practice of obedience? But obedience is not on her radar screen; it implies "authority," which, with "tradition," she says, has been forever discredited by Kent State.

In the third place, she has no real answer for people who just aren't interested in the practice she recommends. She is quite right that real cinnamon buns are impossible without yeast, that concert flute playing is impossible without practice, and that sexual intimacy is impossible without fidelity. But we don't blame people who are just as pleased by cinnamon biscuits as cinnamon buns, or who would rather play around at music than train for performance. How then are we to answer people who say that as long as they have a sexual outlet they can do just fine without intimacy? How can we explain to them that they are wrong, that they are *not* fine? To do this, it isn't enough to show how matrimony resembles fine baking and virtuoso musicianship. We have *to show how it is different; eventual*ly this requires speaking of all those things Mrs. Wallace refuses to speak about, like the commands of God and the purposes He has implanted in human nature.

SHE TRIES. Though she refuses to speak of the need for obedience, she does speak of the need for transcendence. To be blessed, she says, is "to belong to the Holy, to participate in the Sacred," and in sexual relationships, blessedness just doesn't happen without intimacy. The problem is that when push comes to shove, the author doesn't believe this herself. What she really thinks comes out not in her disquisitions on "the idea of the Holy" and the meaning of the Hebrew stem *brk,* but in the story of her first kiss. She was only sixteen, and "it was glorious . . . my very first glimpse of the erotic dimension of the life energy that is blessing." I'm glad she enjoyed it. But attend: She barely knew the guy and he never called her again. There was no intimacy; the experience was "hormones, pure and primal." If "blessing" can be had on the quick, why bother with fidelity? Romanticism is a slippery slope. If Mrs. Wallace wishes to agree with Keats that passions are holy in themselves, then ultimately she must agree with Shelley that monogamy is bunk.

The final purpose of the book is to explain how to teach fidelity to our children. Here, not much need be said, because again the author is working at cross-purposes with herself. Her first main idea is that sexual desire is but one of many desires that kids have to understand—from which she draws the practical suggestion that children should be encouraged to reason about sexual desire by analogy with the desires they understand already. The problem here is that she has insisted repeatedly that sexual desire is different from other desires because "it cannot be fully satisfied by the solitary individual." This makes analogical reasoning a snare.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Her second main idea is that the best way to teach anything is through stories—from which she draws another practical suggestion, that kids should be told stories not only about honorable behavior but also about appetites themselves. So far so good, but when she gets down to specifics the argument passes over from the meager to the bizarre. What stories about appetites does she suggest? Every one of them turns out to be about gluttony, excess, or indiscipline: the time her great-aunt made too many donuts and she "solved the problem" by eating them all, the first time someone had too much to drink, and the time she failed her qualifying exams in French. The point of story one seems merely that she was tired of donuts for a while, the point of story two that the drinker didn't learn his lesson (it was the first time, remember), and she tells us the point of story three: "the world did not come to an end."

Let us then reason from these stories by analogy. Sexual excess might make you tired of sex for a while, but you'll enjoy telling about it afterward. You probably won't learn your lesson, but the world won't come to an end.

Great, Mom. I'm sure the kids will get the picture.

BRIEFLY NOTED

ABRAHAM GEIGER AND THE JEWISH JESUS. By SUSANNAH HESCHEL. *University of Chicago Press. 317 pp. $48 cloth, $19 paper.*

One of the founding fathers of the modern Western study of Judaism, Abraham Geiger (1810-74) continues to fascinate. In this learned and lucid investigation of his bold reconception of the relationship between ancient Judaism and Christianity, Susannah Heschel shows this German-Jewish historian to have been a richer and more complex thinker than most have thought. Whereas his advocacy of Reform Judaism and a historical-critical approach to the sources has often been taken as a sign of "an apologetic and assimilationist agenda," Professor Heschel demonstrates that his studies actually reconfigured the relationship of Judaism and Christianity in the former's favor. "His argument that Jesus was a Pharisee who sought nothing more than the liberalization of Jewish religious practice became Judaism's favorite tale of Christian origins and the answer to charges that the modernization of Judaism was in fact a Christianization of it." Geiger's goal was thus twofold, to counter the neglect or disparagement of Judaism among Christians and to reclaim the Pharisees as a "liberal, democratic, progressive force within rabbinic Judaism [and] the basis for his justification of modern-day Reform Judaism." By recovering the crucial fact, troubling to Christian theologians, that Jesus "lived and taught Judaism," not Christianity, Geiger effected "nothing less than a radical inversion of Christian claims" and produced a novel but durable "counter-history of Western civilization that placed Judaism, not Christianity, at its center." Heschel skillfully shows that although the study of Christian origins has never been the same after Geiger, the impulse to separate Jesus from Judaism remains potent in New Testament scholarship into our own time and has influenced recent portraits of Jesus as a cynic sage, an opponent of the Jewish purity system, a marginalized Jew, and the like. Regrettably, Heschel's brief conclusion places her discussion within the framework of trendy gender studies, seeing Jesus functioning "as a kind of literary theological transvestite, through which each religion inscribes the other." As if this is not strange enough, she then tells us that "the Christian gazer saves his unpleasure at the realization that the historical Jesus was not a Christian but a Jew by fantasizing Judaism's presumed lack of the phallus, Jesus." Heschel's bizarre conclusion is unworthy of the serious and valuable contribution that her book otherwise represents.

—Jon D. Levenson

THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PERSPECTIVES. Edited by TERRY NARDIN. *Princeton University Press. 286 pp. $39.50.*

This book originated in a conference held in Jerusalem in early 1993 and is published as the first in a series from the Ethikon Institute, with Nardin as Series Editor. It is divided into four major parts: "The Classic Debate: Natural Law and Political Realism"; "Expanding the Dialogue: Judaism and Islam"; "Critical Perspectives: Christian Pacifism and Feminism"; and a concluding "Comparative Overview." The authors are a mix of people at the top of their fields and others less well established. Throughout, the


SEEKING PEACE
Everyone's seeking peace, but few find it. Why? Most people are looking in the wrong direction.
In his fifth book Arnold plumbs a wealth of spiritual traditions and the wisdom of ordinary people who have found peace – sometimes in surprising places. There is a peace greater than personal fulfillment, he writes; a peace greater than nations no longer at war. It is waiting for everyone. But there's a catch: it can't be had without the readiness to embrace change.
Seeking Peace by Johann Christoph Arnold
$20.00, hardcover, 264 pp, 0-87486-958-7
FROM BAKER & TAYLOR, OR CALL PLOUGH
1-800-521-8011
KEYCODE CD025
PLOUGH

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quality of the essays is good, and the idea of the project is to be applauded. Less happy, though, is the choice of topics. Despite the presence of both Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, two-thirds of a team that wrote a book dealing in contemporary terms with just war tradition, and despite the vigor of recent just war debate, there is no explicit treatment of just war tradition as a frame of reference. The section on "Christian Pacifism and Feminism" has no internal consistency. Nardin's essay in the concluding section, which narrows the ethics of war and peace to a dialogue between natural law and realism, hardly honors the diversity of thought of contributors such as Michael Walzer, Jean Bethke Elshtain, or the Mennonite Theo-dore Koontz. Indeed, if this dialogue is what fundamentally matters, then why the sections on Judaism and Islam and on Christian pacifism and feminism, which march to very different drummers? Taken one at a time and in pairs of dialogue partners, the essays are useful contributions; the book as a whole, though, lacks comprehensiveness and unity of focus.

—James Turner Johnson

THE CONFESSION OF ST. PATRICK AND LETTER TO COROTICUS. Translated and with notes by JOHN SKINNER. Prologue by John O'Donohue. *Image/Doubleday. 81 pp. $4.95.*

A renaissance of interest in things Irish has been much in evidence in the past few years: a plethora of Celtic music CDs, the Riverdance craze, and bestselling books by Thomas Cahill *(How the Irish Saved Civilization)* and Frank McCourt *(Angela's Ashes)* come immediately to mind. Perhaps inevitably, the authentic writings of Ireland's patron saint have now found their way into an inexpensive paperbound edition. This attractive new translation reintroduces to a contemporary audience the genuine Patrick, not the snake-chaser of legend, but the flesh-and-blood bishop of British birth who, having been kidnapped by Irish pirates as a youth, returns as an adult to bring the Christian Gospel to the brutish tribes to whom he had been enslaved. John Skinner's translation captures the poetic quality of this humble rustic, providing notes and documenting all scriptural references, while John O'Donohue's prologue pays stirring tribute to Patrick's spiritual discipline. "In him," O'Donohue notes, "the pre-Christian and Christian dimensions of the Irish sensibility find an acute and balanced tension." The volume includes as an epilogue the Lorica or Breastplate, traditionally attributed to Patrick but actually dating more than two centuries after his death, a hymn that nonetheless "breathes his spirit."

—Jeff McAlister

THE 100 MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS IN CHRISTIAN HISTORY. By A. KENNETH CURTIS, J. STEPHEN LANG, and RANDY PETERSEN. *Revell/Baker. 208 pp. $11.99.*

The temptation in reviewing this useful little book is to highlight the events that are not included. And there are some—the reign of Justinian in the sixth century, the Investiture Controversy in the eleventh, the fall of Constantinople in the fifteenth, the French Revolution in the eighteenth—but on balance this is a thoughtful and intelligent list accompanied by informative commentary covering the whole of Christian history. Looking over the "events" one realizes that many of the most significant moments in Christian history are not events in the conventional sense, as for example, Origen begins writing, Francis of Assisi renounces wealth, Thomas Aquinas completes work on the *Summa Theologiae,* Dante completes the *Divine Comedy,* Cranmer produces the *Book of Common Prayer,* Rembrandt completes *Return of the Prodigal Son,* publication of Isaac Watt's *Hymns and Spiritual Songs,* David Livingstone publishes *Missionary Travels,* and others. Yet the authors are right to include "events" of this sort, for writers, thinkers, artists, hymnwriters, musicians (Bach and Handel are mentioned), not simply the bishops and popes and kings, have given the Christian past its distinctive character. In the modern period the choice tilts in an evangelical direction, but the spirit is ecumenical. The commentary is clear and free of

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

THE THOUGHT OF POPE JOHN PAUL II · a celebration of ·

A conference sponsored by Faculty & Staff for Life Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO

January 22-23, 1999

on the occasion of the Papal Visit to St. Louis, MO by Pope John Paul II on January 26-27, 1999.

Registration $35 ($25 before December 15, 1998).
Scholarships available.
Call 314-977-2537.

John Paul II and the Gospel of Life
Helen Alvare

John Paul II and Non-Catholics
Jerram Barrs

John Paul II and the Fall of Communism
Carl Bernstein

John Paul II and Theology
Avery Dulles, S.J.

John Paul II and Philosophy
John Kavanaugh, S.J.

John Paul II and Economics
Rev. Robert Sirico

John Paul II and the Family
Janet Smith

John Paul II and Culture
George Weigel

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Have you heard the latest from Washington?



These days it seems as if everybody is crying for the truth. But how often do you actually feel that you can believe what you hear or read?

If puréed truth and strained journalism makes you want to scream, we'd like to invite you to subscribe to *The Washington Times National Weekly Edition*, the only nationally circulated newspaper in the country with the courage and conviction to cover the news honestly.

Every week, we'll bring you a fresh, honest, unbiased look at the people and events that shape the news in Washington D.C. and around the world. No liberal spin. No hidden agenda. Just vigorous, unapologetic journalism and clean, crisp writing.

Anything less would be downright



☑ **YES!** Start my subscription to *The Washington Times National Weekly Edition* according to the terms I've indicated below. Rush me my FREE copy of *Capital Contacts.**

☐ 1 Year **Only $59.95** ☐ 2 Years **Only $89.95** ☐ 6 Months **Only $34.95**

Choose Payment Method: ☐ VISA ☐ MasterCard ☐ AMEX ☐ Discover ☐ Check Enclosed ☐ Bill Me

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

Credit Card # _____ Exp. Date _____

Signature _____ Phone _____



Remember, you pay their salaries! Don't be shy about telling your Senators and Congressmen exactly what you want! Now you can with *Capital Contacts* — **YOURS FREE** with your one- or two-year paid subscription to *The Washington Times National Weekly Edition.* This hefty, 190-page, spiral-bound guide puts the phone and fax numbers of every U.S. Senator, Congressman, government agency, and White House Cabinet member at your fingertips. This book shows you how it's done and provides proven inside tips for reaching your elected representatives!

*Complimentary copy of *Capital Contacts* available for 1- or 2-year paid subscribers only (while supplies last).
Make checks payable to: *The Washington Times NWE.* Clip and mail with payment to: PO Box 96601, Washington, DC 20090

For lightning-fast delivery, call 1-800-363-9118 (Mention express code: 1423)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

jargon and well suited for the classroom or Bible class.

—*Robert Louis Wilken*

SEXUAL WISDOM: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS, YOUNG ADULTS, EDUCATORS, AND PHYSICIANS. By RICHARD WETZEL, M.D. *Proctor. 338 pp. $12.95 paper.*

"Sexual Wisdom" is something of an overstatement. This book *is* a comprehensive and useful compilation of startling facts and anecdotes exposing the destructive errors of our sexually obsessed society, and in that respect it can be recommended. The problem is Wetzel's guiding principle that most of our sexual ills stem from the misconception that people "need" to have sex. He is technically right that any given person at any given moment doesn't "need" to have sex, but as a vehicle for explaining all sexual behavior, healthy and unhealthy, this thesis leaves a great deal to be desired. Wetzel is forced by his own logic to conclude that most sexual interest outside of marriage (and frequently even within it) is the result of some level of psychosexual dysfunction, a rather extreme claim that most readers will find hard to accept. By the end of the book, one is left wondering why anyone remains remotely interested in sex, given the long list of risks involved. Obviously interest persists, yet when Wetzel tries to explain it in his single chapter on "Good Sex," he concedes that he feels inadequate to the task, and on that score he is quite right. This book may be a practical tool for parents, educators, and physicians, but young adults are unlikely to be moved by its clinical view of a notoriously unclinical matter.

—*Sarah E. Hinlicky*

TRADITIONAL ANGLICANS/EPISCOPALIANS

Get *all* the news of interest to you—about the U.S. Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion at large as well as the Continuing Church internationally—from the publication that has been chronicling the traditional Anglican movement for 33 years—THE CHRISTIAN CHALLENGE. For the full picture of the Anglican world today—balanced and uncensored in an independent magazine published nine times yearly—send $22 for U.S. readers, $25 in Canada and $30 elsewhere, with your name and address, to:

The Christian Challenge®

The Only Worldwide Voice of Traditional Anglicanism
Founded 1962
1215 Independence Ave. S.E., Dept. F
Washington, DC 20003

Checks in U.S., British or Canadian currency are accepted, along with Visa or MasterCard charge orders.

Phone: (202) 547-5409 • Fax: (202) 543-8704
E-mail:CHRISTIAN.CHALLENGE@ecunet.org

STORY OF A STORM: THE ECUMENICAL STUDENT MOVEMENT IN THE TURMOIL OF REVOLUTION. By RISTO LEHTONEN. *Eerdmans. 360 pp. $20 paper.*

WSCF. What's that? Today it is all but forgotten, but thirty years ago the World Student Christian Federation was a major force in the worlds of ecumenical Protestantism. Closely associated with the World Council of Churches, it was a vital link in the network of vibrant church youth organizations in this country and around the world. Presbyterians, Methodists, Lutherans, and others all depended for decades upon these youth movements to replenish denominational and ecumenical leaderships. Now almost all of them are moribund or dead. This important book tells the story of their self-destructing in the pursuit of "radicalization" and "secularization." "The world sets the agenda for the Church," said trendy ecumenical leaders in the 1960s, and the inevitable question was raised: If the world is so far in advance of the Church, what's the point of the Church? Risto Lehtonen, a Finn who was for years at the heart of WSCF and other ecumenical activities, tells this sad story for the first time, and his telling is made all the more powerfully sad by his detailed account of the meetings, documents, and personalities that destroyed WSCF and brought the high promise of the Protestant ecumenical movement into disrepute. It is too easy today to dismiss "oldline" ecumenical Protestantism as a pitiable relic. *Story of a Storm* reminds us of the astonishing faith and vitality that was once there, and how it was recklessly thrown away. For anybody who wants to understand the history of Christianity in the twentieth century, this book is must reading.

WHEN IN ROME: A JOURNAL OF LIFE IN VATICAN CITY. By ROBERT J. HUTCHINSON. *Doubleday. 286 pp. $11.95 paper.*

A reporter who aptly describes himself as something of a smart-aleck muses on a year spent in Rome with his family. The Vatican is very secretive, mainly about secrets that don't matter; it has a magnificent collection of art; the Renaissance Popes were far from being moral exemplars; Rome has superb restaurants; and it is very annoying that Italians don't speak English. That's not much to justify almost three hundred pages, but the tone is light and frequently amusing. While Mr. Hutchinson has no use for inveterate Vatican-bashers, his own Catholicism appears to be a mix of ironic distance and affectionate attachment to Rome as the center of "the Catholic thing." The book is a pleasant read, and may be informative for those not familiar with Rome and the Vatican.

DYING WITH DIGNITY. By HANS KÜNG and WALTER JENS. *Continuum. 144 pp. $14.95 paper.*

In discussion with Jens, a colleague at Tübingen, Hans Küng offers some moving reflections on death and dying, and then launches into a slashing attack on the "Polish messianism" of Pope John Paul II and the encyclical *Evangelium Vitae.* Agreeing with the *National Catholic Reporter,* which he calls "the leading

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organ of American Catholics," that the Pope has put "church credibility on the line," Küng resumes his well-known criticism of the Church's teaching authority in general, and infallibility in particular. Moreover, in their approval of suicide and medical assistance in doing it, the authors are wondrously insouciant about its possible, indeed near inevitable, abuses. In fact, they hold up the practice of the Netherlands, with its notorious record of involuntary killing, as a model.

COMMUNITY WORKS: THE REVIVAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AMERICA. Edited by E. J. DIONNE, JR. *Brookings. 161 pp. $24.95.*

E.J. Dionne of the *Washington Post* notes in his introduction that the idea of civil society was in its current phase launched by Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus in a monograph called *To Empower People*, but has since then taken many and sometimes contradictory directions. It is both a strength and weakness of this collection that it reflects that diversity, from Jean Bethke Elshtain's trenchant cautions about the inability of "communitarianism" to resolve our deepest cultural problems to former Senator Bill Bradley's effusions about "revitalizing our national community"—the idea of a "national community" being about as far as one can get from the Berger-Neuhaus argument for mediating institutions. In sum, the book is a mixed bag but much of it will be of interest to those who are following the discussion.

WITH LIBERTY FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES. By PHILLIP E. HAMMOND. *Westminster/John Knox. 128 pp. $16 paper.*

A professor of religious studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, argues that there is no "naked public square" if we understand that the effective civil religion of the country is not in but "behind" the Constitution, and it is voiced in public by individual conscience as well as conventional religion. Religion is free to pursue its objectives, so long as it is recognized that "the ground rules are secular" and that the language employed is "inappropriate unless it is translatable into terms understandable by all." Such formulations, unfortunately, beg some of the most important questions, resulting in an argument that will not be understandable, never mind persuasive, to most participants in the debate about religion and public life.

TURBULENT SOULS: A CATHOLIC SON'S RETURN TO HIS JEWISH FAMILY. By STEPHEN J. DUBNER. *William Morrow. 288 pp. $24.*

The author is an editor at the *New York Times Magazine* and a couple of years ago wrote a much discussed article which he has expanded into the present book. It is an affecting story of Jewish parents who became Catholic and a son's trying to make peace with his father on a troubled trajectory that finally led him, as he puts it, to follow his blood in returning to Judaism. It is in most respects a singular story from which no great lessons are to be drawn, but the author writes with love and insight about his efforts to cope with the peculiar conflicts of one species of religious pluralism that is to be found, as they say, only in America.

EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY. Edited by STEPHEN V. MONSMA and J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER. *Eerdmans. 211 pp. $18 paper.*

The connecting argument is that the metaphor of the "wall of separation" is giving way to that of equal treatment or equal regard. Essayists include Robert Destro, Charles Glenn, and Michael McConnell, making this volume a very valuable guide to the continuing evolution of church-state legal doctrine. There is good reason to believe that the directions pointed by this book are an accurate indication of where the Supreme Court is moving, which may mean that in the years ahead Mr. Jefferson's "wall" and the incoherent jurisprudence of multi-pronged "tests" to which it gave rise face retirement at long last. Warmly recommended.

Christianity a cause of the Holocaust?
Antisemitism in the New Testament?
A contrary view presented in
Resurrecting The Third Reich
by Richard Terrell
Huntington House Publishers, 1994

"...provides sober and insightful reflection on Hitler's Third Reich. Terrell treats the fearful consequences of big ideas, the integrity of the Bible, and the efforts of believers, both Catholic and Protestant, to oppose the Hitler regime."
----- *Christianity Today*

To order: 1-800-333-6263, ext. 8288
Paper, 224 pg. $12, shipping incl.

The Human Person
in Orthodox Spirituality
By Bishop KALLISTOS Ware

Now you can hear one of the world's most popular Orthodox speakers.

This series on the human person covers the basic Christian teaching on man as created in the image of the Divine Trinity. This teaching is scriptural, precise, doctrinal, clear and easy to follow. Recorded in August 1998.

Contents of this 12 cassette series:
1. Who Are We? (The Heart is Deep)
2. The Inner Kingdom of the Heart
3. Complex Unity: Body, Soul and Spirit
4. The Passions: Enemy or Friend
5. The Feasts of the Human Person
6. Indwelling Christ: Baptism/Eucharist
7. Marriage: A Sacrament of Love
8. Healing: Confession & Anointing
9. The Jesus Prayer
10. The Jesus Prayer in Action
11. Question and Answer Session I
12. Question and Answer Session II

$53 in a cassette album plus $4 mailing

Ask for catalog of 400 other Orthodox audio teaching cassettes.

Orthodox Christian Cassettes
2919 N. 56th St. Springdale, AR 72762
Occassette@aol.com Fax: 501.927.2867
e-mail: Occassette@aol.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


Religion & ETHICS
NEWSWEEKLY
Join Bob
each week for
in-depth cover
of the top
in the news.
Only on Public Television
Check local listings.
We'd like to help you start a dialogue about religion and ethics in your community.
Call or write for our free
• Viewer's Guide
• Discussion Leader's Brochure
• "Talking About Religion & Ethics" Guide for Teachers
Phone: (212) 560-2070
Fax: (212) 560-6948
E-mail: r_e@wnet.org
Web: www.wnet.org/religion
Funded by Lilly Endowment Inc.
PBS
A presentation of Thirteen/WNET in New York
Thirteen · wnet

Attention . . . FIRST THINGS Subscribers

Subscription Information to Better Serve You

Address Changes
Please notify us as soon as possible of your address change as well as the effective date of change. Be sure to include an address label with your old address or your subscriber account number. Please allow 4 to 6 weeks for the change to take effect.

Missing or Damaged Issues
If your copy of FIRST THINGS is damaged or missing, we will replace it as quickly as possible. Let us know the date of the issue and send your subscription mailing label if available. For fastest service, call us toll free at 1-800-783-4903.

Subscription Problems or Billing Questions
We strive to provide the most reliable service possible. Please let us know immediately if your delivery is late or erratic. We'll do all we can to correct the problem. Write us at:

FIRST THINGS
Subscription Department
P.O. Box 3000
Denville, NJ 07834

Renewals
Renewal reminders are sent well in advance of your expiration date. If, however, you wish to check the date of your last issue, or would like to renew by phone, call 1-800-783-4903.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW!

Back-Issue Organizer!



The wealth of ideas and information contained in FIRST THINGS is a valued resource. Now you can protect, organize, and display your back issues in handsome, custom-made cases. Designed exclusively for FIRST THINGS, each durable, pine green case features the title embossed in gold foil on its spine. Personalization foil is included for indexing the year. Coated to resist cracking and fading, these cases are V-notched for easy access. First come, first served — so order your FIRST THINGS organizer cases today!

$8.95 ea. (includes shipping)

Enclosed is $_____ for _____ cases.

NY residents add applicable city/state sales tax.

Name_____

Address_____

(No P.O. Box numbers please)

City_____State____ Zip_____

Please make checks payable to: **FIRST THINGS**

Mail to: Subscriber Services, 129 Phelps Ave., Suite 312, Rockford, IL 61108.

6S1198

Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.



Loose Connections

Joining Together in America's Fragmented Communities

ROBERT WUTHNOW

Acknowledging that there has been a significant change in group affiliations—away from traditional civic organizations—Robert Wuthnow shows that many Americans are finding new and innovative ways to help one another through short-term task-oriented networks. He looks at the challenges that must be faced if these innovative forms of civic involvement are to flourish.

$35.00 cloth

Darwinism Comes to America

RONALD L. NUMBERS

Why do so many Americans still resist the ideas laid out by Darwin in *On the Origin of Species*? Focusing on crucial aspects of the history of Darwinism in America, the distinguished historian Ronald Numbers gets to the heart of this question.

$18.95 paper • $39.95 cloth

The Genetic Gods

Evolution and Belief in Human Affairs

JOHN C. AVISE

In straightforward terms, distinguished evolutionary geneticist John Avise reviews recent discoveries in molecular biology, evolutionary genetics, and human genetic engineering, and explains how they relate to our development—not just our metabolism and physiology, but also our emotional disposition, personality, ethical leanings, and, indeed, religiosity.

"Avise explains thoroughly how evolution operates on a genetic level. His goal is to show that humans can look to this information as a way to answer fundamental questions of life instead of looking to traditional religious beliefs…Avise includes some very interesting discussions of ethical concerns related to genetic issues."

—Eric D. Albright, LIBRARY JOURNAL

$29.95 cloth

Summer for the Gods

The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate over Science and Religion

EDWARD J. LARSON

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize in History

"Bryan's and Darrow's ghosts still haunt us, and the Scopes trial still holds resonance, as we continue to litigate the role of religion and public life and the power of the state to prescribe what shall be taught in public schools. Read *Summer for the Gods* for that well-told story."

—Rodney A. Smolla, NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

$14.95 paper

The One and the Many

America's Struggle for the Common Good

MARTIN E. MARTY

"A fine Niebuhrian sermon, evoking the 'gossamer fabric' that has sustained Americans not as multiculturalists or superpatriots…but as people who are free."

—Jim Sleeper, NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

The Joanna Jackson Goldman Memorial Lecture on American Civilization and Government

$15.95 paper

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

800 448 2242 • www.hup.harvard.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FREE SOCIETY AND THE THIRD MILLENIUM

Summer Institute
Kraków, Poland

July 6-24, 1999

Explore the three systems of a free society - political, cultural, and moral - in the social thought of Pope John Paul II, *The Federalist Papers,* Tocqueville and others in an intensive seminar featuring a distinguished faculty, including:

Michael Novak	A. Paul Ballantyne
Richard John Neuhaus	Russell Hittinger
George Weigel	Graham Walker
Maciej Zieba, O.P.	Derek Cross

Jaroslaw Kupczak, O.P.

Some twenty Eastern European students will be selected and parallel fellowships are available for ten American students. Apply by sending a two hundred word paragraph on the nature of liberty, a longer writing sample, a C.V., and a short cover letter explaining your interest in attending to:

Erica Carson
American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
For more information, call: 202-862-7152
Fax: 202-862-5821
e-mail: ecarson@aei.org

The deadline for applications is April 5, 1999. Fellowships include tuition, lodging, meals, and excursions. Students are responsible for travel costs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PUBLIC SQUARE

A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

Richard John Neuhaus

A World of Our Own Making

Born in February 1997, Dolly is two years old now, or maybe eight years old, because the cell used in cloning her was six years old at the time. Since Dr. Ian Wilmut announced Dolly to the world, some scientists have expressed skepticism about whether she really is a clone, though apparently most experts now concede she is. In any event, the announcement set off an enormous uproar in the media, and also occasioned reflection in more serious circles about the prospect of cloning not sheep but human beings. Two of the most notable reflections were by James Q. Wilson, "The Paradox of Cloning" in the *Weekly Standard*, and by Leon Kass in a long essay in the *New Republic*, "The Wisdom of Repugnance." Those articles, with a brief additional exchange between the authors, have now been brought together in an excellent little book, *The Ethics of Human Cloning* (American Enterprise Institute, 100 pp., $16.95).

Wilson of UCLA, author of books such as *The Moral Sense* (see FT review, November 1993), is a social scientist of rare moral attentiveness, and Kass of the University of Chicago, who has written frequently also in these pages, is simply one of the wisest and most morally serious people I have ever known. In his initial essay, Wilson concluded that, all things considered, we should not be alarmed by the prospect of human cloning. He acknowledged some dangers but wrote, "Provided certain conditions are met, the gains will turn out to exceed the risks." The chief condition is that "Cloning should be permitted only on behalf of two married partners, and the mother should—absent some medical condition that doctors must certify—carry the fertile tissue to birth." The intention is to make sure that the offspring "belong to the parents" and to prevent various misuses of cloning technology. He recognizes that "many devout Christians or Jews" will disagree: "I would ask of them only that they explain what it is about sexual fertilization that so affects God's judgment about the child that results."

Kass' "The Wisdom of Repugnance" is an article both much longer and more complex in its argument that we should respect and learn from our intuitive recoil at the separation of sex from fertility, and the replacement of procreation with the manufacture of children as a "product." (Wilson is a Catholic and Kass, by no means incidentally, is a Jew.) Both original essays are very much worth a careful reading, but I will confine myself to the further exchange in the new book. Kass writes that he does not think that the practice of cloning could be limited in the way that Wilson suggests, but his objections go further than that. "I regard cloning to be *in itself* a form of child abuse, even if no one complains, and a deep violation of our given nature as gendered and engendering beings."

There is a critical methodological difference between the two thinkers. Kass notes that Wilson has elsewhere written perceptively about the importance of a "prearticulate human moral sense," but in this case Wilson does not trust "his own sense of moral disquiet and sets out to explain it with reasons." As any parent knows, the child's question "Why not?" is often hard to answer. Wilson asks "Why not cloning?" and cannot come up with an answer that he finds convincing. Kass writes: "Whether he intends it or not, that move places the burden of proof on those who object to cloning rather than on the proponents. Worse, it requires that the reasons offered be finally acceptable to utilitarians who measure only in terms of tangible harms and benefits but who are generally blind to the deeper meaning of things." Kass, too, employs utilitarian—or what might be called consequentialist—arguments, but he wants to keep our attention fixed on "the deeper meaning of things."

Wilson's initial essay was impatient with such ponderings, and he was particularly dismissive of theologians who would worry about whether a cloned baby would have a soul. Kass is equally impatient with what he views as Wilson's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"superficial" treatment of philosophical and religious considerations. "No thoughtful theologian," Kass responds, "objects to assisted reproduction because it limits God's power to inculcate a human soul; theologians worry not about the impotence of God but about the hubris of man." He cites Anglican Oliver O'Donovan's *Begotten or Made?*, Methodist Paul Ramsey's *Fabricated Man*, and the Vatican's instruction on "The Dignity of Procreation" as representative of the kind of thinking to which Wilson might pay attention.

In favor of cloning, Wilson had noted that in vitro fertilization had also been viewed as "ethically suspect" at first, but is now socially accepted. Kass responds: "Does the growing social acceptability of sodomy or adultery constitute a refutation of Leviticus 18:22 or the Seventh Commandment?" (That's the sixth for you Catholics and Lutherans.) "The arrival of cloning, far from gaining legitimacy from the precedent of in vitro fertilization," Kass writes, "should rather awaken those who previously saw no difficulty with starting human life in petri dishes." It is notoriously difficult these days to make an argument from what is "natural," but Kass urges that we attend to nature's "possibly normative pointings."

Is the Issue Sex or Marriage?

A friend suggested to Kass that the difference between him and Wilson on these matters is that he is chiefly concerned about human sexuality while Wilson's main concern is with marriage and family. Not quite, responds Kass. "[That] difference is more apparent than real, especially if one understands the generative meaning of sexuality and, even more, if one sees that one will be increasingly incapable of defending the institution of marriage and the two-parent family if one is indifferent to its natural grounding in what I call the ontology of sex. Can we ensure, even in thought, that all children will have two parents if we ignore, in our social arrangements, the *natural* (hetero) *sexual* ground of parenthood?"

In his original article, Kass said that a clone, because asexually reproduced and lacking two parents, is a single-parent child. He now writes that "it would be more accurate to say that, since it is the twin rather than the offspring of its 'source,' it has *no* parents, biologically speaking—unless its 'parents' are the mother and father of the person from whom it was cloned." There are other real-world consequences. "Virtually no parent is going to be able to treat a clone of himself or herself as one does a child generated by the lottery of sex. The new life will constantly be scrutinized in relation to that of the older copy. The child is likely to be ever a curiosity, ever a potential source of déjà vu." And what about the look-alike copy of one parent when there are tensions in the marriage or the parents divorce? "Will mommy still love the clone of daddy?"

Kass does not hesitate to invoke the slippery slope, an image much mocked by those who hold that one thing does not usually follow from another. Prenatal screening, sex selection, the normalization of deviancy, and the eugenic implications of new reproductive technologies—cloning in particular—are all upon us. But Wilson says not to worry, so long as we hold fast to marriage and family. "Given the state of our culture," observes Kass, "it is rather late in the sexual day for Professor Wilson's call to rally the family wagons to protect the little beloved clone."

Kass' conclusion is nothing if not definite: "Even if human cloning is rarely undertaken, a society in which it is tolerated is no longer the same society—any more than is a society that permits (even small-scale) incest or cannibalism or slavery. It is a society that has forgotten how to shudder, that always rationalizes away the abominable. A society that allows cloning has, whether it knows it or not, tacitly said yes to converting procreation into manufacture and to treating our children as pure projects of our will. Indeed, the principles here legitimated could—and will—be used to legitimate the entire humanitarian superhighway to *Brave New World.* Professor Wilson's sweet reasonableness of today will come back to haunt him, once he sees what he has unknowingly said yes to. Better he should trust his immediate moral sense."

Professor Wilson gets the last word in this exchange. The "essential difference" between them, he says, is that Kass views the meaning of children in relation to sexuality while he views it in relation to the family. However the child is brought into being, Wilson's concern is whether "the child is likely to do well." "If Dr. Kass thinks that sexuality is more important than families, then he would object to any form of assisted reproduction that does not involve parental coition." One notes that the choice between sexuality and families is a false one, and Kass has already said that cloning should occasion long second thoughts about assisted reproduction in general. Wilson cites a number of studies indicating that children conceived by artificial means (although not, of course, children who have been cloned) do, in fact, generally do well. And that's the only thing that matters.

Arguments and Preferences

Well, not quite. In a somewhat marginally relevant discussion of surrogate motherhood and a case where the woman bearing the child refused to give it up to the couple with whom she had contracted, Wilson disagrees with the court that awarded the child to the couple. "The central fact was that she was the baby's mother. . . . The child belonged to its mother, period." He continues, "Some critics of my view would say that surrogacy is appropriate if the birth mother receives both egg and sperm from the parents who are to own the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

child. That mistakes genetic similarity for the birth effect." These things are asserted but not argued. I agree with the assertions but am impressed that Wilson seems to take them as self-evidently, dare we say "naturally," true, when in fact the crucial questions in such a dispute are over the meaning of "mother" and connections between genetics, contract, and what Wilson calls "the birth effect."

Wilson does not argue so much as he simply expresses preferences. To Kass' concern about the source of the egg in cloning, Wilson responds, "Nor do I much care for the idea of taking eggs from a Nobel Prize-winner." That establishes that James Q. Wilson does not much care for the practice, but does it tell us anything about what should be done about cloning? Later he writes, "We do not want families planning to have a movie star, basketball player, or high-energy physicist as an offspring." That "we" do not want it is undoubtedly true, but, just as certainly, many people might want it, and who are "we" to tell them they can't have it? Wilson goes on to say, "I am not clear as to how those limits might be drawn, and if no one can solve that puzzle, I would join Dr. Kass in banning cloning." He suggests, however, that the "puzzle" can be solved by allowing selection only for race, ethnicity, and sex. But by what moral reason or principle of justice should people be compelled to abide by such limited choices? If all the parties are agreeable, why should a couple be prevented from having a clone of Michael Jordan, Madonna, or—the preference is imaginable—Bill Clinton?

Wilson says that "Dr. Kass is right to stress the mystery and uncertainty of sexual union." But he gives no indication of understanding what Kass means by the mystery or its relationship to uncertainty, and he clearly thinks that Kass is wrong to stress these considerations as they might impinge upon the legality of cloning. Matters such as mystery, it appears, are in the private sphere of aesthetics, or maybe even theology. In the real world, cloning, legalized within the limits that Professor Wilson prefers, will remain, he says, "quite rare." That is because, he concludes on a note of high insouciance, "Sex is more fun than cloning. . . . Procreation is a delight."

Ironic Liberals

One is reminded of Richard Rorty's anti-foundational formula for sustaining a decent and democratic society: "We must hope there will continue to be enough ironic liberals like ourselves." Were the world populated only by eminently decent people such as James Q. Wilson, I am sure Leon Kass would not be as worried as he is. In the real world, however, some people, if not prevented, will do bizarre, destructive, and evil things. Nobody knows for sure what the consequences of human cloning would be, but in his original essay and in his response to Wilson's original essay, Kass offers a very plausible and sobering description of the *probable* consequences. To most of Kass' particulars Wilson does not respond at all. With respect to others, he thinks that very few people would want to do such things, he strongly prefers that they not do such things, and maybe "we" can translate our preferences into legal limits against doing such things. But finally, we are assured, the benefits of cloning human beings outweigh the risks.

The benefits, according to Wilson, are for a very small number of people, namely, couples who cannot conceive a child, either in the uterus or the petri dish, and who choose not to adopt, use a surrogate mother, or receive cells from an unknown donor for in vitro fertilization. Once again, choice is trump. Neither in principle nor in common sense is there any reason to believe that choice could be denied to those who choose what they see as other benefits in human cloning, such as owning the clone of a Nobel Prize physicist. Kass understands this. In his rosy view of the likely consequences of cloning, says Kass, Wilson is "playing Dr. Pangloss," and Wilson maybe believes that Kass is playing Cassandra. They both may be right, but when choice is trumps, Cassandra wins. The exchange, however, goes beyond who has the more adequate reading of our cultural moment and of cloning's probable consequences.

It is a matter of the "ontology" of human sexuality. Are marriage, procreation, and family all of a piece within the ontology of sex? The alternative is a bricolage or tinkertoy approach in which these and other aspects of sexuality (e.g., love, pleasure, loyalty, obligation) can be taken apart and reassembled according to diverse desires. Polymorphous perversity is the technical term for the infantile sexual state in which the child is confused about the purpose of genitals and does not understand coitus as the goal of erotic desire. A large part of civilization's work is the overcoming or containment of polymorphous perversity. In recent decades we have witnessed a vast civilizational undoing; not a sexual revolution but a sexual regression in which millions have been infantilized, encouraged to pretend that they do not know what they do know, and to call the resulting confusion choice.

Delicate Ground

Here we touch on delicate ground. Sexuality as bricolage inevitably raises the issue of contraception. Kass touches on it delicately, noting that in the 1960s the Supreme Court ruling that allowed the sale of contraceptives (*Griswold v. Connecticut*) was in support of *marital* privacy, but it almost immediately became an *individual's* right to *sexual* privacy, married or not (*Eisenstadt v. Baird*). The right to privacy, the right to marry, the right to define marriage, the right to reproduce, the right to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the child of one's choice. The ontology of sexuality lies shattered under a barrage of rights. Such was the prognosis offered with almost eerie (some would say prophetic) exactitude by the 1968 encyclical *Humanae Vitae*. The civilizational undoing is a moral undoing, and in the realm of sexuality, said the encyclical, it begins with the separation of the sexual act from its unitive and procreative end. To which the infantilized respond with the cunning appearance of innocence, "*Which* sexual act?" Our public debates move smartly along: from the sale of contraceptives to easy divorce to abortion to same-sex marriage to cloning human beings. And all in only thirty years.

The polymorphously perverse blame their confusion on the rapidity of technological change, and there is something to that. Not much, but something. The discovery of buggery and baby-killing did not have to await the dawn of the space age. Cloning is different. It is not the cause of our confusion but the result of our confusion. The source of confusion is in heeding the commandment that thou shalt not resist temptation, and cloning is but one more temptation. The results of the sexual regression, more and more people are coming to recognize, have been disastrous for everyone—except, in a superficial way, for rutting males, who have always known how conveniently detachable is sex from its attendant responsibilities. Women and children, of course, have been the chief victims of the liberation from the ontology of sex. In the discussion of abortion, more and more women are saying what all women must know, that it is a phony liberation that is purchased by the death of their children.

Sex seemed such a pretty tinkertoy, and so maddeningly complex. Telling ourselves that we did not know what it was for, we took it apart to find out how it works, and could be made to work in different and exciting ways. After the deconstruction, this part of the anatomy was stuck into that part, and this kind substituted for that kind, until all memory of design was lost in the immeasurable expanse of desire. "Sex is fun," it was said ever more insistently, ever more desperately. Of course there were the spoilsports among us. They remembered, and they mumbled about the nature of the thing, and how it was somehow and inseparably tied up with the nature of us. "Ontology" they called it. They were tolerated, so long as they didn't get in the way of our doing what we wanted to do, even though we had grown tired of wanting to do nothing more than what we wanted to do. Then the prospect of cloning came along, the prospect of making others who would be just like us. The realization dawned that, in talking about clones, we were not talking about them but about ourselves. The debate was not about what we can do or even about what we should do. The debate was about who we *are*. And it turned out that there was a revolution after all, and, as is the way with things that revolve, it came full circle to an understanding of the way things are, and are meant to be.

Imagine some years from now when people started being happy again, and being happy about being happy. Adults took great pleasure in watching children growing up and saying, "Oh, so that's how it's meant to be!" Of course there were also the very young and some slow learners who were always imagining how things could be otherwise and asking, "Why not?" But the adults were neither flustered nor intimidated now. The cloning debate had taught them to do some hard thinking about these things. They spoke confidently, persuasively, and winsomely about how things are and are meant to be. Some of them even talked about ontology. They still had problems of course—coping with temptations, keeping promises, forgiving betrayals of the way things are and are meant to be. But, all in all, they were very happy not to be lost in a world of their own making. Until they began to take things for granted again; until they began to think that that's just the way things are, and forgot the part about things being meant to be. And after they had been going on that way for a long time, somebody had what seemed like a really bright idea and asked, "Why not?" And the whole thing started all over again.

FT

FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES

A remarkable book that deserves a wider readership than it is likely to get is *When a Pope Asks Forgiveness: The Mea Culpa of John Paul II* by Luigi Accattoli (Alba House, 257 pp., $16.95 paper). Mary Ann Glendon has in these pages set out both the necessity and the dangers of what John Paul II calls the Church's "purification of memory" (see "Contrition in the Age of Spin Control," November 1997). Here an Italian journalist very usefully traces the development of that project, along with the obstacles the Pope encountered in his own curia among church leaders who are more impressed with the dangers than with the necessity. Accattoli understands why it is not theologically possible, in the Catholic view of things, to say that the Church sins, since the Church as the Body of Christ is constitutive of the "total Christ," and it is not possible to say that Christ has sinned.

Particularly valuable is the book's inclusion of original documents in which John Paul II has no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less than ninety-four times acknowledged that—regarding racism, anti-Semitism, the crusades, war, divisions between Christians, and the treatment of women, among other things—the faithful, including ecclesiastics at the highest level, have been unfaithful. The book includes also the vigorous challenge of Cardinal Biffi of Bologna and others to the entire idea of a purification of memory. Although, of course, he does not directly challenge the Pope, here is a sample of His Eminence expressing his concerns: "Galileo had been generally rejected in favor of the Ptolemaic theory in the universities of his day, and yet no rector or dean in our day has been called on to respond to the behavior of the academic authorities of those days. And who would dream of challenging the mayor of Milan or the president of the Lombard Region for the tragedies caused by the politics of Ludovico il Moro? And so it goes. It goes without saying that the heinous historical crimes committed against the human race are hidden today under a mantle of silence. It seems that all are in agreement in saying that we are no longer responsible. For example, to whom will humanity send the bill for the countless French people sent to the guillotine in 1793, for no other crime than their social standing? To whom will humanity send the bill for the millions of Russian citizens slaughtered by the Bolsheviks? Therefore, as regards the sins of history, would it not be better for all of us to wait for the Last Judgment?"

As he has made clear in *Tertio Millennio Adveniente* (As the Third Millennium Nears) and many other statements, John Paul II is convinced that, if Christians are to walk upright in the next millennium, they must cross the threshold of the year 2000 on their knees. One regularly meets people who say, "When is the Pope going to say he is sorry for (whatever grievance is on their mind)?" The answer is that he has probably already said it. Nor did the purification of memory start with John Paul II. Accattoli discusses the self-examination and asking for forgiveness that began with John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council, and was strongly continued by Paul VI. He includes some intriguing and admittedly uncertain reports about the plans John Paul I, the Pope of thirty-three days, had in this connection.

Some Catholics think the present Pope has "gone too far" in asking for forgiveness, while others will apparently not be satisfied until a Pope condemns the Church itself. What is certain is that no other church or religious community, never mind secular institution, has so candidly, repeatedly, and voluntarily accepted responsibility for its failings. It is the kind of thing made possible by an unshakable communal confidence in the gospel of forgiveness.

FT

BLAMING THE TRUTH

The experts may be right who say that Protestant clergy are more frequently engaged in varieties of sexual abuse than their Catholic counterparts. It is the latter instances, however, that seem to catch more public attention. Maybe it is because people expect more of the Catholic Church, maybe it is anti-Catholic bias in the media, maybe the perceived hypocrisy factor is increased by celibacy and the Church's countercultural sexual ethic, maybe attention is drawn by the lawsuits seeking megadamages from an institution thought to be rich and centralized. As discussed by Philip Jenkins in *Pedophiles and Priests* (1995), there are many factors contributing to an exaggerated and distorted impression of priestly wrongdoing. The rash of cases in the last decade has had a powerfully sobering effect, and church leaders have gained a measure of competence in responding to them, both legally and pastorally.

This spring a bishop in Florida resigned when it came to light that some twenty-five years earlier, when he was a young priest, he had, as the British put it, interfered with young boys in his charge. A bishop from a neighboring diocese who was called in to clean up the mess spoke to the press in words that reflect continuing difficulties in addressing such problems. Admittedly, he did not have an easy task. Perhaps it is inevitable in what Philip Rieff calls our "therapeutic society" that bishops, too, engage in a certain amount of psychobabble, but one wonders if both truth and credibility are not better served if bishops stick to what they presumably know most about—sin, grace, contrition, repentance, and atonement. When the bishop says, for example, that twenty-five years ago people did not know that pedophilia is a "disease" and therefore offenders were let off with a warning and change of assignment, it does sound as though the Church, after two millennia of dealing with the propensities of the human condition, is only now learning the facts of life under the tutelage of Dr. Ruth and contemporary sexology. The faithful might draw the conclusion that, rather than turning to the Church for guidance, they would do better to write Dear Abby.

Asked by the *Tampa Tribune* how such a scandal could happen in the Catholic Church, the bishop in charge of the clean-up is reported to have said: "We almost have a hang-up about sex. We expect people to live up to such a high ideal of sexual conduct and we don't allow any failure. And when some do fail, we don't always handle it right." It is a response deserving of a moment's reflection. Is the requirement that priests refrain from, inter alia, sexual recreation with boys really best described as a "high ideal"? It hardly seems like an excessively rigorous rule reflecting a "hang-up about sex." The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

overwhelming majority of people view such behavior as perverse and bizarre, something that is prohibited by even the lowest standard of conduct. Moreover, the Church condemns—not as an impossibly high ideal but as a matter of elementary justice—the exploitation of the defenseless by the powerful, which is just what the priest in question was doing. Yet the statement by the clean-up bishop might well give the impression that the problem is with the Church's teaching rather than with the wrong done.

In the passage where Jesus speaks about the millstone earned by those who cause one of these little ones to sin, he also enjoins us to forgive as generously as we are forgiven (Luke 17:1-4). The bishop who is now repentant and resigned must be forgiven, even as the wrong he did must be condemned. He might well be going through the tortures of deepest remorse, and we have no right to withhold from him whatever sympathy we can muster. Perhaps he was in many respects a very good bishop. What he did was a long time ago and might have remained mercifully forgotten. Whatever wounds he inflicted might have been healed or patiently borne. For better or worse, however, those long ago offenses of a young priest, which were also criminal, became public and had to be addressed publicly. In the face of evil, as John Paul II has said repeatedly, "We must call things by their right names." We must never call grave sin a consequence of the Church's witness to moral truth. The problem is not high ideals but low behavior. Which brings us back to sin and grace, the language in which the Church can speak with confidence, with credibility, and, most important, with truth. The Church is a communion of sinners forgiven and called to sainthood. We all have an ultimate, an eternal, stake in maintaining uncompromised each part of that truth.

FT

LESSER SIN OR LESSER DANGER

At least one reader is distressed when we touch on this subject. "Aren't you implying," she asks, "that it's better to sin safely, and are you not thereby encouraging people to sin?" I think the answer to both questions is in the negative, but I'll come back to that. The subject is that of "responsible," even "conservative," homosexuals who challenge the lethal promiscuity of the gay subculture. Notable examples are Andrew Sullivan, former editor of the *New Republic*, and Bruce Bawer, author of *A Place at the Table*. This item is prompted by a column sent in by a San Francisco reader. David Dalton writes in the *San Francisco Examiner* against a group that calls itself Sex Panic. The group advocates unlimited anal sex as the act that constitutes "what it means to be a gay man," without reference to medical consequences since life after forty is not worth living anyway.

Dalton, who is forty-nine, takes exception. He cites lesbians who are becoming less tolerant of "gay men's promiscuity and immaturity," and says the same is true of straight people. "There will be a backlash if Sex Panic prevails. And make no mistake about it: A backlash is exactly what Sex Panic wants, because a backlash would help to keep gay people on the fringes of society, which is where Sex Panic wants us." Dalton appeals to homosexual men: "A lot of stuff has happened in the world while you were reading nothing but the gay newspapers. We might mention 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down. After fifty years of disastrous experiments all over the globe, 1989 was when we knew for sure that leftist ideology is somehow fatally flawed and does not work. So why does the gay movement still have all its eggs in such a basket? And everyone except queer theorists seem to know that Foucault is dead, that he pretty much admitted before he died that he had been a young poseur. As long as we're deconstructing cultures, why don't we deconstruct the gay culture we've produced since Stonewall? Is it really all that fine? Is the right to public sex really so important to us that Sex Panic's agenda should become our agenda? Why does the gay elite that claims to speak for us want to keep us marginalized? The gay community in San Francisco is large, secure, mature, and diverse. Many of us—maybe most of us—are in the mainstream because that's where we want to be. It's all right to stand up to the brats in Sex Panic and say in a loud, firm voice: Stop claiming to speak for all of us. And above all we should say to young gay people that there are plenty of things that make life worth living after the age of forty, though we have to make our own lists and post them on our refrigerator doors." He then adds, "Take care of each other. Don't give your all to anyone unless you like him and trust him. Use a condom." And he urges his readers to oppose Sex Panic, "the people who are telling you that a sex act—any sex act—is worth more than your life."

Now back to the reader who says that, by reporting on the efforts of such as Dalton, Sullivan, and Bawer, we are encouraging people to sin safely, or at least less recklessly. Not at all. Objectively, whatever their intentions, *they* may be doing that, assuming as they do that people cannot or should not refuse to act upon their unruly desires. For the rest of us, it is important to understand the conflicted state of the homosexual subculture.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although it includes less than 2 percent of the male population, there is no doubt about its powerful influence in our continuing culture wars. Should we be more on the side of David Dalton and Andrew Sullivan than that of Sex Panic? Yes, and for at least two reasons. First, if their counsel prevails, some lives may be saved and those people may live long enough to come to repentance and amendment of life. Second, the position represented by Sex Panic is unqualified abandonment to evil, while the "responsible" homosexuals, by their poignantly futile effort to qualify evil with good, evidence an ambivalence that keeps them in conversation, however tenuous, with moral and spiritual sanity.

The reader mentioned at the start has a counterargument, of course. She might say it is precisely the "responsibles" who pose a threat to the larger society by their attempts to normalize homosexuality, thereby weakening marriage, family, and the rules by which human beings flourish. In that view, it is better that Sex Panic prevail and the deadly subculture be isolated as an object of general abhorrence. But that, I think, is simply not going to happen. As Dalton and others say, there are simply too many already in the "mainstream," and they are set upon demanding social legitimation. As the Ramsey Colloquium statement on the homosexual movement said (FT, March 1994), this insurgency is not going to disappear any time soon; it must be engaged and countered by every means available to us. Meanwhile, in the argument between the "responsibles" and the sexual nihilists, is it better that someone who is determined to play Russian roulette puts one bullet in the chamber rather than, say, four? I expect one must say yes, while more firmly saying that playing Russian roulette at all is morally wrong.

FT

CONSERVATIVE CHANGES

My colleague Jim Nuechterlein once said that his brand of conservatism is summed up in the simple motto, "Change is bad." When Bill Buckley launched *National Review*, he declared as its purpose to stand athwart history and shout "Stop!" Both, I take it, were intended tongue in cheek. Although their critics commonly say that conservatives are opposed to change, being against change makes as much sense as wanting tomorrow to be today all over again. I do recall a professor in college describing someone as being so conservative that, had he been present at creation, he would have argued in favor of chaos. But that is not any conservatism that I know about. Closer to truth is the maxim, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." The question is not change but change from what and to what—and why and how.

I got to thinking about this while I was being introduced at a university a while ago and the introducer alluded to my infamous days as a radical back in the 1960s. "Once noted as a champion of change," she said, "he is now more noted as its opponent. Maybe he will explain his change." It is a question frequently raised, and I've written about it from time to time, most extensively I suppose in "Remembering the Movement" in *America Against Itself* (University of Notre Dame Press). Now I've been pondering the question in connection with a book that I'm late in getting around to, Mitchell K. Hall's *Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War* (Columbia University Press). It is a fair and carefully researched work, being mainly an institutional history of most particular interest to those involved in that history.

The "CALCAV" in question was Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam, probably the largest sustained antiwar organization of that period. It started in 1965, and Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, Father Daniel Berrigan, and I, then age twenty-nine, were the first cochairmen. Later Martin Luther King, Jr. became a cochairman, which reflects the way in which the civil rights movement seemed to flow so naturally into the antiwar cause. As Hall writes, "The inequities of American society exposed by the civil rights movement prompted the religious community to reevaluate its acceptance of Cold War attitudes." At first I thought Hall was exaggerating the "moderate" and establishment character of CALCAV's beginnings, but he is probably right. It seemed pretty radical to me and others at the time, and I was certainly not part of the country's religious establishment. But compared with most other parts of what was then simply called "The Movement," CALCAV was in the first years very moderate indeed. I belonged then to the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, which was not, as he says, "fundamentalist," but just as surely was not part of the establishment. The error for which I can just manage to forgive Mr. Hall is that he puts the inner-city parish of which I was pastor in the Bronx rather than, as was the case, in my beloved Brooklyn.

There is a rush of half-forgotten events and people as I read the book. I am wearied by recalling the incessant pace of meetings, manifestos, demonstrations, and nonstop crises. I remember fondly Archbishop Paul J. Hallinan of Atlanta, one of the first Catholic bishops to lend his support. And Bishop James Shannon, auxiliary of St. Paul, Minnesota, who was the first. Father John Sheerin, then editor of *Catholic World*, said of Shannon that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he enjoyed "a unique prestige in the Catholic Church in America. It can be said of him, in a way that it cannot be said of any other American bishop, that he is the hope of the future." A few years later Shannon became the first American to resign from the episcopate, going off to study law, get married, and rear a family. So many things did not turn out as people hoped they would.

I have long since lost touch with most of the friends and associates from those days. William Sloane Coffin, Richard Fernandez, Joan Baez, Dan Berrigan, Balfour Brickner, Robert McAfee Brown, Harvey Cox, Robert Drinan, Gerhard Elston, Sandy Gottlieb, George Webber, Barbara Fuller, Cora Weiss, Charles West—all names that loomed large then. There were grand moments. Others have gone on to glory, or so I hope: Heschel, John Bennett, Ben Spock, Al Lowenstein, Norman Cousins, Phil Scharper. Yet others I still count as friends, such as Michael Novak, James Finn, and Peter Berger. They were not as intensely involved in CALCAV as I, but we walked the same path, and eventually walked away together. Hall writes that the organization lost the support of "Neuhaus, Novak, and Berger, who had come out of conservative traditions to oppose the war." Conservative traditions is part of it, but the larger reasons had to do with the organization taking a bitterly anti-American and countercultural turn as it sniffed around for sundry causes that could keep the excitements of "The Movement" alive.

By mid-1970 I had pretty well withdrawn from day-to-day involvement. The withdrawal was not entirely voluntary. In 1967 I had begun to speak and write in opposition to what was then called "liberalized" abortion law. That was not received well, for already the liberal flag had, with tragic consequences, been planted on the pro-abortion side of that great conflict. By 1975, when I helped lead an effort to protest the brutal violation of human rights by the Communist victors in Vietnam, I had long been a pariah to many in "The Movement," having clearly gone over to the side of that then new thing called neoconservatism. I am far from being as convinced as my neocon friend Norman Podhoretz that U.S. military involvement in Vietnam was ever just or wise. But he makes an argument very much worth engaging in his 1982 book *Why We Were In Vietnam*. There is considerable dispute among historians as to whether the antiwar movement shortened or prolonged the war. I am inclined to agree with Charles DeBenedetti who writes, "The dissidents did not stop the war. But they made it stoppable." It must only be added that it should not have been stopped the way it was.

Those are now hoary and interminable arguments. In the final assize we will learn for certain what we ought to have done and not done. Something was broken and we thought to fix it. Whether we made it worse or not I don't know for sure, but I think not. I know that we had to try. In any event, these were thoughts going through my mind when she said, "Maybe he will explain his change." And as I read *Because of Their Faith*. It's not a book for everyone, but you might want to take a look at it. Especially if you were there.

FT

GRASPING FOR GOLD

"No settlement can possibly be defended if it allows the Holocaust to stand as a profit-making enterprise for American Jewish lawyers." Change the last three words to "the Swiss banks" and you have the concluding sentence of an op-ed article by Burt Neuborne of New York University Law School. One of the more unseemly of current melodramas is the trafficking in the Holocaust aimed at getting big bucks out of the Swiss and others who remained neutral during World War II. History, it is said, is written by the victors, and at least some people among the victors have now decided that being neutral was a crime. That is the message of a recent State Department report indicting Switzerland, Sweden, and other neutrals. I don't know what options these countries had at the time, and it is hardly surprising that some banking and business interests made money out of trading with *our* enemy. One doesn't have to make heroes out of the neutrals to find repugnant the current mix of self-righteousness and greed with which they are being attacked.

If someone set out to create a scenario to reinforce anti-Semitic stereotypes, he could hardly do better than the World Jewish Congress and its passel of lawyers. The Swiss banks offered to put $600 to $700 million in a fund for Holocaust survivors and their descendants. "It is insulting," spits Neuborne in response. With the rise of Hitler, many Europeans, including Jews, put their savings into Swiss banks. Neuborne writes that 90 percent of these deposits "cannot be accounted for, the banks say, because the records were destroyed in the ordinary course of business." He then says, "A fair settlement must include the return of all Holocaust deposits, not merely those few for which records have survived." If there are no records, presumably Mr. Neuborne and his friends will decide how much is fair. During the war, Swiss banks loaned money to German companies that were building slave labor plants. "The banks say that at the time they were not aware they were financing slave labor," Neuborne notes. "But again, the victims argue, the Swiss knew or should have known." The *victims* argue? Not unless the lawyers who are engaged in what looks very

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much like extortion are victims.

Preserving the Holocaust as an icon of unspeakable evil is viewed by many, and rightly so, as a sacred cause. Its desecration by those involved in the shakedown of World War II neutrals is repugnant. It is also legally and morally incoherent to declare, a half century later, that neutrality was a crime for which reparations must be made. Swiss dealings with Germany, writes Neuborne, "enabled the Nazis to prolong the war for two years, according to estimates by American intelligence." Maybe so, maybe not. In view of the enthusiastic response of German-speaking peoples in other places (e.g., Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland) the determined resistance of predominantly German-speaking Switzerland is remarkable. We might agree that Winston Churchill is something of an authority on who contributed what to whom in World War II. He wrote: "Of all the neutrals Switzerland has the greatest right to distinction. She has been a democratic state, standing for freedom in self-defense among her mountains, and in thought, in spite of race, largely on our side." (Quoted in a book exceedingly pertinent to present disputes, Stephen P. Halbrook's *Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II*, published by Sarpedon.) In any event, if we want to talk about holding nations historically accountable, how about the U.S. and other allies who refused to accept the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees who might have fled Hitler's grasp? If we want to do a retrospective of bad things done by nations during World War II, the list is very long.

The anti-neutrals campaign recalls the "Black Reparations" movement of thirty years ago, in which it was demanded that whites pay blacks for the sufferings inflicted by slavery. Such efforts to settle historical scores are a throwback to primitive patterns of vengeance. Moreover, they are impossible to implement with anything approximating a reasonable calculus of justice. If specific crimes were committed, and no statute of limitations applies, penalties are in order. Otherwise, the Swiss gold caper is a mischievous formula for endless recriminations, a prospect made even less attractive by smarmy claims to be seeking recompense for the victims of the Holocaust. The World Jewish Congress and Mr. Neuborne, as they are given to saying about others, should know that.

Cheap Grace

Norway is a prosperous country for whom $60 million is neither here nor there. But it is being let off easy because it is only one of sixteen countries that are under investigation for not behaving during World War II in a way that the WJC has decided they ought to have behaved. So the WJC is using Norway as leverage to get at the really big money. Norway's Justice Minister Aud-Inger Aure says of the sixty million, "I see it as our duty to seek a broad moral reconciliation and to let this be expressed economically." Elan Steinberg, executive director of WJC, accommodatingly declared Norway's offer "a shining example of moral decency."

During the German occupation, about 750 Norwegian Jews were deported to Nazi camps, where all but a handful died. So Norway has expiated what Mr. Aure calls its "collective responsibility" at the rate of approximately $80 thousand per dead Jew. More precisely, the figure is considerably less than that, since the money is supposed to repay the two thousand Jews who fled the country (to neutral Sweden) for the property they lost. More precisely yet, since few of those people are still alive, most of the money, the *New York Times* reports, will go to Jewish organizations and to fund further agitations under the title of "Holocaust Studies." If the children of those who lost property during the war can prove their claims, they will be eligible to receive up to $27 thousand each.

Interestingly, the Prime Minister of Norway is a Lutheran minister and he probably knows something about expiation "economically expressed." He is undoubtedly familiar with the little jingle attributed to the sixteenth-century salesman of indulgences, John Tetzel: "As soon as the coin in the coffer rings / The soul from purgatory springs." Like Tetzel, Mr. Steinberg has a great appreciation of the pecuniary factor in penitential practice. Pronouncing absolution, he says, "Norway has confronted its past honestly, so that it can have an honorable future." For Norway, the pay-off is a bargain. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the Lutheran theologian martyred by the Nazis, didn't know the half of it when he complained about "cheap grace." The Holocaust racketeers have made it clear that they will not let other countries off so easily.

It should be added that the World Jewish Congress, which is the chief sponsor of this unseemly business, is in no way what its name suggests. It is the creature of Edgar Bronfman, the Seagrams whisky heir, and, contrary to frequent press reports, not representative of the Jewish community, either in this country or the world. But, with a name like that and millions of dollars available for self-promotion, misunderstandings on this score are almost inevitable.

FT

HOW TO SPEND HEAVEN

My discussion of an excommunicate theologian who has been reconciled with Rome provoked a strong

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

response from a reader who describes himself as an "uncompromising Baptist." "The fact is," he says, "that in the Catholic Church you can believe and teach whatever you want so long as you don't openly defy the authority of Rome." Well, not quite, but he has an important piece of a point. The Catholic Church is wondrously capacious, being hospitable to strikingly various traditions of theological reflection, spirituality, and patterns of discipleship. Differences that in Protestantism produce myriad denominational divisions are accommodated by Catholicism within an expansive understanding of the rule of faith (*regula fidei*) and ecclesial communion, with the latter anchored in the bishops who are in communion with the bishop of Rome. This is evident in the genius of religious orders wherein, for instance, Franciscans can break with Franciscans and Jesuits can condemn Dominicans without the question ever arising as to whether they are all members of the one Church. Of course they are.

The result sometimes looks like a bit of a hodgepodge, but one does not expect neatness in a Church that was aptly described by James Joyce as "Here comes everybody." It takes considerable effort to get booted out. In modern times, the late French Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre was one of the few to succeed, and then only after he condemned the Second Vatican Council as heretical, declared the Pope to be an impostor, and ordained bishops in defiance of Rome. After years of long-suffering pleas and negotiations, Rome finally acknowledged in 1988, with painful reluctance, that Lefebvre had indeed made himself excommunicate. Similarly, for years the famous German dissident theologian Hans Küng taunted Rome with innumerable books, declarations, and interviews, adamantly insisting that he is right and the Church is wrong on a wide range of doctrinal questions. Finally, in 1979, Rome came around to formally agreeing with Küng that he does not teach what the Catholic Church teaches and therefore is not, in that official sense, a Catholic theologian. Küng and his friends did their best to depict this as an instance of heavy-handed ecclesiastical oppression, when it was really a matter of their refusing to take yes for an answer.

"In my Father's house are many rooms," said the Lord, and so it is also with the Church that is the prolepsis of that happy destination. The Catholic Church is a very big house, extending to every corner of the earth and containing more than a billion people. Not only that, but she claims to be the gravitational center of the entire Christian reality, with all other baptized Christians being in "true but imperfect communion" with her (*Lumen Gentium*). That means there is an awful lot to put up with. It also means there is an astonishing diversity to explore. As the magnificent Chesterton observed, the Church is ever so much larger from the inside than from the outside. As someone who was not always in full communion, I confess that this discovery is one of the inexhaustible joys of being a Catholic. Not only are there the religious orders and sundry institutes and renewal movements with their distinctive "charisms" for living out the Christian life, but there is the splendid array of devotions surrounding saints who represent what are sometimes maddeningly diverse patterns of discipleship. Apart from the Mother of Our Lord, no one saint in Catholicism takes up so much spiritual space as, say, Luther does in Lutheranism, John Wesley in Methodism, or C. S. Lewis in much of evangelical Protestantism.

The Story of a Love

Such are thoughts occasioned upon reading an exquisite little book by Bishop Patrick Ahern, just out from Doubleday. *Maurice and Thérèse: The Story of a Love* (284 pp., $19.95) is an account of the twenty-one letters exchanged between St. Thérèse of Lisieux and a struggling young missionary priest, Maurice Belliere, in the months prior to her death in 1897 at age twenty-four. The author, who is auxiliary bishop of New York, has long had a most particular devotion to Thérèse, known also as the Little Flower, and my only reluctance in recommending his book was that some readers might not be familiar with her spiritual autobiography, *The Story of a Soul*, a book that has been translated into more than sixty languages and is established as an indubitable classic of the entire Christian tradition. But then it occurred to me that such familiarity is not necessary. There is no more effective enticement to reading that great work than Bishop Ahern's book. Were I a betting man, I would bet almost any amount that nobody will read *Maurice and Thérèse* without being inspired to read for the first time, or reread with deeper understanding, *The Story of a Soul*.

In 1997, John Paul II declared Thérèse to be a Doctor of the Church, in which august company there are only thirty-one others, beginning with such as Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Athanasius, and including two other women, Teresa of Ávila and Catherine of Sienna. The Little Flower is certainly no theologian in the academic sense of that term. At age fifteen she joined the Carmelites at Lisieux, and in her short nine years wrote only, in addition to the spiritual autobiography, a few little plays, many letters, and a bundle of poems. No Systematic Theology I, II, III, here. Yet minds as various as Dorothy Day, Georges Bernanos, Teilhard de Chardin, Henri Bergson, and Hans Urs von Balthasar have declared Thérèse to be one of the spiritual geniuses of Christian history. Mother Teresa of Calcutta regularly insisted that she took her name not from the Great Teresa of Ávila but from the Little Thérèse of Lisieux.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is said that Thérèse's field (to use a totally inappropriate term) is "mystical" theology, but that suggests something esoteric and the precise opposite of the "Little Way" that she lived and recommended to others. Ahern calls her "the democrat of mysticism, who uncovers and appeals to the mystic that lies within every human being." The utter simplicity of her formulations disguises for some readers the breathtaking depth of her insights. Her letters to Maurice were written as she was dying of consumption and going through a "dark night of the soul," about which she learned from the great Carmelite master St. John of the Cross. (If I have one small quarrel with Bishop Ahern, it is his repeated reference to her "blind faith." I understand what is meant by the phrase, but it is better described, I think, as indomitable faith with eyes wide open to all the reasons for unfaith.)

Thérèse's writing and conversation reflect her profound immersion in Scripture, all turning around an unlimited unfolding of St. John's assertion that "God is love." The entirety of her existence, she said, is "To love Him and to make Him loved," and thus "to give pleasure to others." Her devotion is radically centered in Christ, and especially in his suffering; her yearning is to "console" him. She puzzled over St. Paul's words to the Corinthians about the role of different members of the body until she came to the end of First Corinthians 12 with his reference to the "more excellent way," the way of love. "Love gave me the key to my vocation. I understood it was love alone that made the Church's members act. I HAVE FOUND MY PLACE IN THE CHURCH. In the heart of the Church, my Mother, I shall be love." Ahern comments, "She aspired to *be* love, even as God himself is Love. No other saint we know of ever entertained such an aspiration." Later he observes, "It was crystal clear to Thérèse that God not only wants our love but *needs* it. The reason He created us was that we should love Him. We are the only ones in the universe who can love Him, because we are the only ones who are free."

Suffering Happiness

Her physical and spiritual pain was unspeakable, but that is necessary to love. She writes Maurice: "Ah, if you could only look into my soul for a few moments, how surprised you would be! The thought of heavenly happiness not only doesn't cause me one bit of joy, I even wonder sometimes how it will be possible to be happy without suffering. No doubt Jesus will change my nature, otherwise I would regret leaving suffering and this valley of tears behind me. It is only the thought of doing God's will that fills me with joy." In a French spiritual climate influenced by Jansenism's emphasis upon sin and divine judgment, Thérèse asserted a reckless, some might say presumptuous, trust in God's mercy. To be weak is not only not an obstacle to the spiritual life, it is an asset. "To love Jesus, the more one is weak, without desires and without virtues, the more one is suitable for the operations of God's consuming and transforming love. It is confidence and nothing but confidence that must lead us to love."

To Maurice's obsessive worries about his sins and failings, Thérèse responds: "Ah, dear little brother, since it has been given to me too to understand the love in the Heart of Jesus, I assure you that it has banished all fear from my own heart. The memory of my faults humiliates me and prompts me never to rely on my own strength, which is nothing but weakness, but this memory speaks to me even more of mercy and love. When we cast our faults into the devouring fire of Love with total childlike trust, how would they not be consumed, so that nothing is left of them?" She did not dispute the ascetic rigors and penances of other Carmelites who struggled to make reparation for their sins, but it was not her way. She writes Maurice, "'There are many mansions in the House of my Heavenly Father.' Jesus said that, and that's why I follow the way He is tracing out for me. Anymore I try not to worry about myself at all. I leave it to Him to do in my soul whatever He wants. I did not choose a hard life to make up for my own faults. I chose it to make up for the faults of others."

She promised Maurice that, when she left the "exile" of this life, which she soon would, she would accompany him on his priestly mission to Africa. They had never met in this life except by correspondence, but then, she wrote, theirs "will be the conversation of a brother and sister which will charm the angels." The luminous simplicity of Thérèse's awareness of the worlds of which this world is part is simply astonishing. In her understanding, heaven is a very busy, even bustling, affair. "Let me assure you," she wrote Maurice, "the only thing I desire is God's will, and I want you to know that if in heaven I would no longer be able to work for His glory, then I would far prefer the exile to the homeland." In this light one understands one of Thérèse's best known affirmations, "I will spend my heaven doing good on earth."

Father Maurice Belliere ended up with a very checkered vocation. His work in Africa was marred by disappointment and he died a broken man at age thirty-three. He was an exceedingly ordinary specimen of the ordinariness for which Thérèse proposed her "Little Way" to be a Christian. His greatness was in his neediness that elicited these letters of amazing grace. As for Thérèse of Lisieux, she continues to spend her heaven doing good on earth, not least through Patrick Ahern's *Maurice and Thérèse.*

FT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHILE WE'RE AT IT

■ My friend Joseph Epstein, the distinguished former editor of *American Scholar*, is pleased to note that under his editorship the journal could go for years without one mention of the current President, or any other politician for that matter. I respect his indifference to the chattering commentariat of what passes for current affairs, while also noting that this journal, and especially this section of the journal, does not cultivate quite that degree of aloofness. Nonetheless, the reader will note that there is nothing in this issue (until now) about the unspeakable but endlessly talked about shame that Bill Clinton has brought upon himself, his family, the presidency, and the nation. It is not that we do not have definite views on the subject. It is simply that this is chiefly a journal of ideas, not of politics, and we expect readers are already inundated with commentary on the subject. In addition, we have a long lead time between written word and final publication; anything on the particulars of this sad and fast-moving story would likely be dated by the time readers received the journal. Having said that, and speaking only for myself, I believe President Clinton has violated his oath of office to faithfully execute the laws of this Republic and has grievously betrayed the trust of the American people. It is vitally important to the moral and political health of the country that he resign or be constitutionally removed from office. When this sordid episode is past, we will undoubtedly have articles and other commentary examining what it means for our moral culture and what it portends for the future. Meanwhile we have confidence in the resilience of the American political order, and believe that the emetic of Mr. Clinton's departure will be a salutary relief from the severe disorders inflicted by him and his presidency.

■ A friend passes this on from a friend of his who doesn't let what she calls her "Protestant atheism" get in the way of having opinions on matters religious, including women priests: "Paganism could afford to have priestesses because the religions were so inherently masculine that women could do them no harm, but Christianity is so feminine to begin with that female celebrants can but deliver the coup de grâce. No woman could make a dent in Mars or Thor or sadistic Druids, but when it's a case of turning the other cheek, the meek inheriting the earth, and doing unto others, you don't dare let women get hold of it." It doesn't count as a sophisticated theological argument, but neither is it nothing.

■ Our reviewer of Eamon Duffy's *Saints and Sinners: A History of the Popes* (Thomas F. X. Noble, "Popes for All Seasons," October) liked the book exceedingly, and it is indeed a marvelous story in many respects. The treatment of the early development of the primacy of the bishop of Rome, the role of the papacy in establishing a division of powers in the Middle Ages, and Rome's check upon the aspirations of absolute monarchs—all this is very deftly handled. It is surely no little thing to find just the right vignettes to sketch the ups and downs of the 263 successors of Peter, all within less than three hundred pages and all accompanied by a very judicious selection of works of art. Moreover, the appended bibliographical essay will be a big help to those who want to know more. All the more the disappointment, then, that the book ends with a confused and self-contradictory treatment of the most recent Popes, Paul VI and John Paul II. The conclusion collapses into a conventional left-right, liberal-conservative telling of the tale that is reminiscent of the late and stridently "progressive" Peter Hebblethwaite's Vatican journalism. "He is a hard man to measure," Duffy writes of John Paul II. Little wonder that he finds it hard, since, as he comes close to recognizing, this Pope can hardly be contained within the conventional partisan boxes. Like some other recent writers who view John Paul as an authoritarian but want to claim at least part of his authoritarianism for their pet causes, Duffy depicts the Pope as a champion of democratic socialism. This leads to the incredible suggestion that the 1988 encyclical *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* is the Pope's last word on political economy and to the complete absence of any mention of the 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus*, with its careful argument for "the free economy." This is but one of many indications that Duffy loses his sure historical grasp when he gets caught up in the fevered debates that have marked the Church since the Second Vatican Council, and it does invite a certain caution in accepting at face value his account of earlier periods that are treated with greater authorial confidence.

■ The book has a huge subtitle, but then it is a huge subject that Alan Wolfe takes on in *One Nation, After All: What Middle-Class Americans Really Think About God, Country, Family, Racism, Welfare, Immigration, Homosexuality, Work, the Right, the Left, and Each Other* (Random House, 359 pp., $24.95). After studying eight suburban communities from New England to California, Professor Wolfe provides convincing evidence and argument that most Americans are decent, tolerant, and trying to be good as they understand good. Further, they understand good in ways that are more similar than dissimilar. Wolfe is critical of the polling business which, by phrasing questions as sharp alternatives, ends up claiming that opinions are much more polarized than is the case. There is a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

significant shift toward conservatism, but Wolfe, a centrist tilting to the left, says this is no cause for alarm. Contrary to media depictions, he finds even the most convinced religious conservatives of a fundamentalist disposition are as eager as everyone else not to impose their views upon others. That finding of course will be unwelcome but hardly a surprise to leaders who would mobilize believers to act on the public implications of their faith. The one thing on which the book finds middle-class Americans really polarized is homosexuality, as was previously discussed here in connection with another essay by Wolfe. As other critics have also pointed out, it is strange that in the book Wolfe gives so little attention to abortion. That question, as is also demonstrated by studies beyond number, is the bloody crossroads in our public life, and serves as the single most reliable litmus test of cultural, moral, and political alignments. To the extent that it counters fears that Americans are enlisted in ideological factions that are out to do one another in, Wolfe's book makes a valuable contribution. But one may wonder how many people really share that fear. Wolfe acknowledges that there is a culture war going on, and then he emphasizes, "*but it is one that is being fought primarily by intellectuals, not by most Americans themselves.*" Well, yes. Of course. A war over ideas is fought chiefly by people who are in the ideas business. Most Americans can't get themselves out to vote, never mind reading a serious book on morality and culture. In short, most Americans are not intellectuals, which is just as well. Just as most Americans are not political activists, which is also just as well. Nonetheless, the culture wars go on, and the ideas in conflict shape both the politics and public mores that do affect all Americans, whether they know it or not. Alan Wolfe's new book reminds us that most Americans are basically decent people who are busy with many things, eager to be liked, and therefore not easily recruited as combatants in the cultural wars. The average American, it turns out, is pretty average.

■ Bench-pressing Marx at the 23rd Street Y is no trivial pursuit. To understand its serious ramifications is the kind of benefit for which innumerable parents flirt with bankruptcy in sending their children to places such as Harvard and Princeton. How else could they gain the wisdom to be derived from Michel Foucault's life and death devoted to exploring the darker side of homosexual sadomasochism? The "depth and complexity of Foucault's work" is displayed in the following passage from H. J. Larmoux's new book, published by the very distinguished Princeton University Press, *Rethinking Sexuality: Foucault and Classical Antiquity*. It is offered here as a public service to encourage parents to ask themselves whether their children are really so rotten that they deserve a college education. Herewith a sampling: "David Halperin . . . contends that gay male gym culture is a form of Foucauldian political ascesis. To those who label this position a trivialization of Foucault's concept of resistance, he responds that they are mere elitists, 'suspicious of any technology of the self that is widely dispersed in a culture, and is genuinely popular.' From the Marxist perspective, this is disingenuous at best. In the same text he makes a clear distinction between gay muscles and 'the kind of muscles that are produced by hard physical labor.' This distinction, in turn, is part of a larger argument that 'gay male body-builders,' in their inscription of their disciplinary practices on their flesh, should be seen as having 'performed a valuable political service on behalf of everyone.' While Halperin's position makes the valuable distinction between the complex and largely independent matrices of gay and straight gym culture, it is difficult not to draw the inference that gay muscles are somehow superior to those 'produced by hard physical labor.' The implication of such a position is twofold. The first is that the service provided to the community by gay male body-builders is more important than that of those who get their muscles through back-breaking labor; hence, gay gym culture is more worthy of the attention of radical theorists than, say, the labors of farm workers picking strawberries in the Rio Grande valley. The second is that none of the young workers sweating in the fields are gay. This is a position difficult to square with a stance that aspires to be antielitist and 'truly popular.' It defines gay males as essentially upper-middle-class, urban professionals, a definition consistent with Halperin's stated desire not to deny 'the possibility that resistance could *ever* take the form of shopping for the right outfit.' Yet Halperin's view represents only one rather narrow interpretation of Foucauldian politics, and to conclude from it that Marxists and Foucauldians share no common ground would be to undervalue the depth and complexity of Foucault's work." Being an inveterate ecumenist, I'm prepared to allow that they share the same ground, and are welcome to it.

■ George Steiner seems like an unlikely reviewer for D. M. Thomas' *Alexandr Solzhenitsyn: A Century in His Life* (St. Martin's). But then, novelist D. M. Thomas is an unlikely biographer of Solzhenitsyn, and in fact he is not that. He simply reprises Michael Scammel's fine biography of 1984, updating it with information subsequently available and subjecting it all to his own novelistic and Freudian spins. But back to Steiner. His essay in the *New York Times Book Review* is not about the Thomas book but about Solzhenitsyn, who, he says, in the '70s "bestrode the world like a colossus" and was "not only the world's most famous writer but a spiritual

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guide, a prophet, an exemplar unrivaled since Voltaire or Tolstoy." How the mighty have fallen, Steiner laments. "Although the comparison is, at any substantive level, absurd, there is about the aged and bitter titan more than a touch of the later years of Ayn Rand." Solzhenitsyn and Ayn Rand? The comparison is absurd but Steiner will make it nonetheless, although ever so gingerly. He is prepared to say only that there is "more than a touch." A few lines later we read, "There is more than a hint of courage in D. M. Thomas' attempt at a chronicle in depth." There is more than a scoop of obfuscation in Steiner's saying what he wants to say, but give him time; he will get to it. With more than a hint of sadness, he asks how Solzhenitsyn's "decline in stature and reputation came about." "These questions make the present moment one both appropriate and premature for revaluation." The moment is appropriate because it is premature, or whatever. "It may be too late to get certain problems into the requisite perspective. It may be too early to judge a vast textual output still in progress and a life yet unquenched." Go figure. Solzhenitsyn's great work, according to Steiner, was *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, which was published in 1962 and exposed the horror of the gulag. Whatever the tragedy of the later Solzhenitsyn, says Steiner, "What matters is the extent of our continued indebtedness to *Ivan Denisovich*, to the mapping of the gulag. At so many moments, what our soiled age has had of conscience lay in this one man's angry keeping." How much better for him and for all of us if Solzhenitsyn had died in 1962. Regrettably, his "life yet unquenched" enabled him to give "the notorious commencement address at Harvard" in 1978. That was the address in which Solzhenitsyn took the secular intellectuals of the West to task for their abandonment of moral truth and supine accommodation to permanent coexistence with the evil of totalitarianism. From that address one can date what Steiner calls his "decline in stature and reputation." But the real offense of Solzhenitsyn in the unblinking eye of a vengeful George Steiner is his adherence to the biblical God and insistence upon the Christian character of civilization. Steiner writes: "If anything, D. M. Thomas deals only circumspectly with Alexandr Solzhenitsyn's theocratic-agrarian ideology and his thirst for a communal, in some ways medieval, Rus under the unblinking eye of a vengeful God. Implicit in this worldview is the vexed issue of Solzhentisyn's anti-Semitism." As the vexed George Steiner has tirelessly alleged over the decades, anti-Semitism is inherent and ineradicable in Christianity. How much better for Solzhenitsyn's stature and reputation—at least as George Steiner rates stature and reputation—had the "vast textual output" come to a halt before he convicted himself of being a Christian. That is the gist of Steiner's attack. As for the rest of the essay, all his gestures of deference to a once great writer have about them more than a hint of disingenuousness.

■ Hoist one to the people of Tangier Island, a little place in Chesapeake Bay just off Virginia. The town council voted unanimously not to invite Warner Bros. to use their town for the filming of *Message in a Bottle*, a movie starring Kevin Costner, Paul Newman, and Robin Wright Penn. "We rejected it because of our religious stand," said Mayor Dewey Crockett. The account continues: "He said a sex scene, cursing, and selling of alcohol in the movie were not the kind of things the council wanted associated with Tangier. 'Our values go way back, and we don't condone these things,' he said." A hotel keeper and an operator of ferry boats to the mainland, who stood to make big money from the filming, were very unhappy with the decision. But Grace Brown, who runs a bed and breakfast, put it simply: "We don't want any loud, alcoholic parties, or bad language from the filmers. We just don't want our island to be that way." Grumbled Paul Newman: "The religious zealots turned the economic benefits into an evil thing. They were looking at me like I was the devil. I've never been in the presence of such small-mindedness, fear, and ignorance in my life. I couldn't get away fast enough." The movie will be filmed on Martha's Vineyard. Despite our mayor's new campaign for civility, New Yorkers have no choice but to put up with loud alcoholic parties, bad language, and much worse. But it is reassuring to know that there are people somewhere who have not been talked out of thinking that it is a very good argument to say, "We just don't want our place to be that way."

■ Pragmatism, it is said, is the characteristic American disposition, and when that disposition is dressed up as a philosophy the conversation inevitably turns to William James. In a new biography of James (*Genuine Reality*, Harcourt Brace, 467 pp., $35), Linda Simon quotes a disciple of James, Giovanni Papini, on what the master meant by pragmatism. The philosophy of pragmatism, he said, is "a collection of attitudes and methods" that take a position of "armed neutrality in the midst of doctrines." "It is like a corridor in a hotel, from which a hundred doors open into a hundred chambers. In one you may see a man on his knees praying to regain his faith; in another a desk at which sits someone eager to destroy all metaphysics; in a third a laboratory with an investigator looking for new footholds by which to advance upon the future. But the corridor belongs to all, and all must pass there. Pragmatism, in short is a great *corridor-theory*." That is nicely put and captures an important element of what James meant by pragmatism, but only, I think, an element. Standing in the corridor in a position of neutral

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

superiority is the posture of rationalist upper-case Liberalism, and does not adequately describe the James of, for instance, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. That work is grievously flawed in several respects, and most especially in its radically individualistic approach to religious experience, but it also reveals a William James who recognized the inescapability of occupying a chamber off the corridor. His chamber looked out on the corridor, and he paid attention as best he could to what was happening in other chambers, but he knew that he himself was not unchambered. In a time when the champions of Enlightenment rationalism are being casually consigned to the dustbin of history, I suggest some thought be given to sparing so great a mind and so great a soul as William James.

■ Is there such a being as a Christian philosopher, or are there just philosophers who happen to be Christian? That is the question addressed by the eminent Louis Dupré of Yale upon receiving an award from the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Herewith his conclusion: "At which point does the encounter with transcendence fully deserve the name of *Christian philosophy*? It occurs, I would think, when a philosopher not only seriously considers the Christian hypothesis, but singles it out among others as worthy of a full investigation. He or she then attempts to establish its logical possibility, showing that its concepts are not intrinsically contradictory, that its positions appear coherent and do not conflict with well-established scientific theories or historical facts. But Christian philosophers must do more. They must show the logic that is proper to faith: the *specific* truth of religion which by no means coincides with equation and requires more than coherence, the unique intentionality of the act of faith, the symbolic character of religion in language and rituals, and also the nature of the mental attitude appropriate for receiving the *particularity* of the Christian revelation. Yet they must never move beyond the restrictions imposed by the philosophical method, remembering that what to the believer is the supreme reality remains beyond the full grasp of philosophy. To succeed in its task this investigation requires a variety of methods, each of which has been developed by one or another segment of contemporary philosophy: it needs an analysis of the language of faith, an examination of the logic of its doctrine, a phenomenological description of attitudes, narratives, rituals. At no point should this philosophical encounter turn into a *substitute* for faith, as it has done all too often. Theology, and indeed the Christian faith itself, denies philosophical reflection all claims of autonomy with respect to its content, which would allow it, once its reflection on religion was completed, to dispense with religion itself. To be sure, Christian philosophers need not devote their entire thinking to the justification and exploration of Christian faith or doctrine, in the manner here described, though it is essential that in some way and to some extent they subject the concepts of their private faith to a philosophical critique. What Christianity does require is that philosophers committed to the Christian faith creatively use some of the fundamental ideas that revelation and the Christian tradition present us with, *and*, negatively, that their philosophy not clearly contradict any of them. I say *clearly*, because wherever there is reflection there will be controversy. To ostracize others from the Christian fold is not the task of the philosopher. Our far more beautiful vocation is to be guided and to guide upward to those spheres of consciousness where the divine light breaks though into a reflective illumination of human existence. That, at least, is what the most memorable among us, from Dionysius and Augustine to Newman and Blondel, have done for centuries. It is an ascent onto that mountain which ends at *l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle*."

■ The annual *Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches* has appeared and it seems the oldliners—Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), United Church of Christ, United Methodist—are, after decades of precipitous membership loss, bottoming out. The fast growing and largest of Protestant groups, the Southern Baptist Convention, reports that its membership is not quite what it seems. "Of the 15,691,964 SBC members (which include an increase of 0.18 percent growth last year), 20.7 percent do not attend church and are called 'resident actives.' An additional 31.8 percent are 'nonresident,' which means those who have moved and did not drop their membership. Active SBC members, therefore, do not make up even half of the membership."

■ George Tinker, a Methodist, is professor of American Indian cultures and religion at the Iliff School of Theology in Denver. He recently spoke in Seattle as part of the Earth Ministry Lecture Series and explained, according to the *Catholic Northwest Progress*, that "three 'isms' fuel the fires of democratic capitalism: classism, sexism, and racism." Of course. Everybody knows that. The paper reports, "Tinker said he is 'of mixed blood'; his father was an Osage Indian and his mother a Lutheran." I'll let the Lutherans handle that one.

■ There are these humbling moments in which one is left with absolutely nothing to say. (From the peanut gallery: "He should have more of them.") The following is not, repeat not, a parody. It is from the *Publishers Weekly* review of a new book from the University of Pennsylvania Press, *The Fantasy Factory: An Insider's View of the Phone Sex Industry* by Amy Flowers. "Having spent four months

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

working as a phone-sex operator and having interviewed more experienced operators as well, Flowers lays out the contours of this world with a clarity that resists easy conclusions. In some ways it's like any other job; in others, utterly different. The exploitative working conditions or the necessity to cater to even terrifyingly pathological callers, for instance, support critics' charges that sex work is oppressive and damaging; yet workers sometimes find room to educate the sexually inexperienced or act out their own desires more confidently. More important, they learn to protect their inner selves in the paradigmatic modern encounter, one structured by 'professional pretense,' technological mediation, and manufactured emotion—a description fitting everyone from fast-food employees to flight attendants. In that sense, phone sex sells something both typical and necessary today: 'the most important fantasy of all, that of presence and intimacy.' Although the author might have pursued the implications of her study further, this short book's sensible vision complicates popular stereotypes and challenges all of us to find better, more direct ways of relating to one another in a world of strangers."

■ Alert readers are familiar with the finding of a *New York Times* poll that about half of adult Americans agree that abortion is "the same thing as murdering a child," while a third of those who agree with that also agree that "abortion is sometimes the best course in a bad situation." Richard Stith of Valparaiso University, writing in the *Indianapolis News*, suggests this reflects a circumstance that is simply not socially sustainable: "Isn't our ability to defend life *after* birth seriously undermined by people who see no important difference between born and unborn children, and yet think those still unborn shouldn't be protected by law? Why worry much about stopping child abuse, for example, if child murder is thought permissible? And if it's okay to kill a healthy child, what can be so wrong with involuntary euthanasia of the seriously disabled? On a more abstract level, the belief that violence against children may be none of the government's business strikes at the heart of our notions of community responsibility. If we do not share a common concern for the next generation, what do we share? Worse still: for those who consider abortion to be murder, it is not just any kind of murder. It is, as the *New York Times* poll puts it, the same thing as 'murdering a child.' And where there is a child, there is a mother. Abortion, in the view of half of the American people, is the killing of a child by its own mother. Can we live with the belief that mothers have a fundamental right to take the lives of their children? I doubt it. The mother-child relationship has been too long held up in this civilization (though no doubt sometimes with wrongful sexist intent) as the archetype of self-sacrificing nurture, as the centerpiece of all idealism. If we think we are permitting mothers to dismember their children, what violence may we still forbid?"

■ Call it evenhanded. *Origins*, the Catholic documentation service, publishes two episcopal letters on the liturgy, one by the bishop of Youngstown, Ohio, and the other by the bishop of Erie, Pennsylvania, who is former chairman of the bishops conference committee on liturgy. The first is a compelling statement on the centrality of the Eucharist, and the centrality of the Real Presence in the Eucharist, around which is gathered the community of adoration and praise. The second letter commends an "ideal" liturgy of people gathered in admiration of themselves. Admittedly, that puts it a little too strongly. A little. The difference between the letters in tone and direction might lead the reader to infer that the bishops are talking about quite different events and quite different beliefs about what is happening in the Mass. At the communion in Erie's ideal liturgy, the eucharistic ministers "look each communicant in the eye and call them by what they are, 'the body of Christ.'" (The "them" presumably refers to "each communicant.") The bishop adds, "We do not toy with that greeting, but let it mean what St. Augustine said it means: 'You are the body of Christ, this is the body of Christ, and by doing this, become what you are: the body of Christ.'" But of course the bishop is toying with what St. Augustine and the Church means. The words, "The body of Christ," are not a greeting but an announcement of what *this* is. The individual communicant is not the body of Christ. We are members of the body of Christ, the Church, by virtue of receiving the body of Christ. The moment of communion is not an encounter, however meaningful (looking one another in the eye), between the minister and the communicant; it is being encountered by "the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ and, therefore, the whole Christ is truly, really, and substantially contained" (*Catechism* #1374). Of course the Church and every member of the Church is part of the whole Christ, but at the communion attention is riveted on *this* that is the crucified and risen Lord. In the face of that astonishment, one might commune with eyes cast down or even closed. After communion there is time enough to look around in wonder at all the others who have received the same gift and are thereby also caught up in the mystery of Christ and his Church. In devotional sensibility, in spiritual understanding, and implicitly in doctrine as well, there is a world of difference between the greeting, "You are the body of Christ," and the declaration, "This is the body of Christ." (When the communion is in both species, does the bishop propose that ministers look people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the eye and say, "You are the blood of Christ"?) The faithful of Erie and elsewhere might be forgiven for saying, "If you want a meaningful encounter, I'll see you after Mass. Right now I have Someone more important on my mind. Anyway, you are not capable of meaningful encounter with each of the hundreds of people coming forward. He is."

■ "Despite growing up in New York City, Jim maintained a deep respect for human beings." Well, I never! Despite that slur in its tribute to James Arthur Miller, a valiant exposer of population explosion bunk, I'll put in a plug for the *Population Research Institute Bulletin*, an excellent source of information on population data and coercive programs too often supported by the U.S. government, edited by Steven Mosher (5119A Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041).

■ "Volume 1, Number 1." How that warms the cockles of the editorial heart. To be young again, and launching a publication that the world desperately needs. Whether it knows it or not, but it will soon find out. Premier issues of promising publications get a free plug, and this plug is for *Markets & Morality*, a handsome semiannual (the editors mistakenly say biannual, but some slack should be cut for a first issue) that advances serious moral and theological reflection on matters economic. The subtitle is "Scholarship for a Humane Economy," and the favored school of thought is "economic personalism," which is economic freedom with a conscience. Published by the Acton Institute and available for $25 per year by writing 161 Ottawa NW, Suite 301, Grand Rapids, MI 49503.

■ What kind of oath of public office might be taken if the Supreme Court is saying, as it sometimes seems to be saying, that we owe allegiance to it rather than to the Constitution? J. M. Kelly's *A Short History of Western Legal Theory* provides a possible answer. There we learn that the seventeenth-century Cortes (parliament) of Aragon took this oath to the crown: "We, who are as good as you are, take an oath to you, who are no better than we, as prince and heir of our kingdom on condition that you preserve our traditional constitutional rights and liberties, and, if you do not, we do not." Of course, the Supreme Court of the *Casey* decision would likely declare such a conditional oath to be an intolerable threat to the rule of (its) law.

■ I've been told that I exaggerate when I say that, in the eyes of the prestige media and academy, the only good Catholic is a bad Catholic, and perhaps I do. Several notches above the usual books about contemporary Catholics who are angry with the Church is *Catholic Lives, Contemporary America*, edited by Thomas J. Ferraro (Duke University Press, 274 pp). There is an essay by Patrick Allitt reprising his argument that Catholic conservatives (and "the neoconservative trio") seem to be in the ascendancy but are really making little difference, and Andrew Sullivan explains why the Church should come to terms with his "virtually normal" homosexuality. There is also a moving interview with the writer Richard Rodriguez, who refuses to let his homosexuality define who he is as a person and a Catholic. But the best essay is by Stanley Hauerwas, "A Homage to Mary and to the University Called Notre Dame." As a Protestant, he taught theology for fourteen years at Notre Dame and felt himself becoming more and more Catholic, even praying to Mary in the unself-conscious way that Catholics do. That was until a new chairman, a Catholic, took over the department and declared Hauerwas to be a Protestant who stood in the way of the department becoming more Catholic, which meant more Protestant. Well, you'll have to read the essay to figure all that out, but it rings true. Along the way of the essay, Hauerwas talks about how he and his young son regularly participated in Catholic worship. While he persists in not explaining why he is not a Catholic, at the student Masses Hauerwas did learn some things of interest. For instance, this: "As an anthropologist utilizing the participant-observer method, I noticed that Catholics worship quite differently from Protestants—Catholics are noisy and not particularly 'worshipful.' Although I was at first bothered by this, I began to realize that Catholics do not have to be 'holy' at worship because they think God is going to show up anyway. If the priest gets it right, there is not a thing they can do to prevent God from being present in the Eucharist. In contrast, most Protestants believe in the 'real absence' rather than in any presence. Accordingly we have to be especially 'holy' because otherwise we are afraid 'God' will go away. I suspect that one of the reasons why Protestants are so serious in worship is our unacknowledged presumption that there is no difference between what is happening in our subjectivities and God. Although I would have difficulty spelling it out, I think this has to do with Protestant inability to really party the way that Catholics can." As for Notre Dame, Hauerwas has not lost hope. He thinks they're training kids to be just like everybody else, which means to be good Americans who fit neatly into the career and culture slots created by the Protestant establishment. But he suspects they'll not get away with it. "So I left Notre Dame. It was a sad leaving, but I am glad that the years there left their mark on me. For even though I am not a Catholic, I feel what it means to be one in the contemporary university. I suspect that the last legitimate prejudice on the American campus is against the Catholics. After all, they continue to remain members of a hierarchical institution that maintains some extraordinarily conservative moral practices. As hard as they try to be good Americans,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mary just keeps following them around."

■ The magazine advertisement said, "Become an egg donor or surrogate mother. Help an infertile couple become a family!" In small print: "There is a special need for Jewish and Asian women." That got Margaret Talbot to thinking, and writing in the *New Republic*. She concludes: "Maybe once you decide to buy an egg—at a considerable cost once you add in medical bills—you figure you might as well shop for what you really, really want. But all this, I think, is a little nuts. The catalog-style browsing for top-drawer genes and specific attributes (I want a child who can understand Ashbery, damn it!) subtly corrupts the single most significant attribute of parental love, which is that it is love for what one has been *given*. Its unconditionality is owed not least to the fact that the children have not been designed by the parents. But here are these egg dealers, proposing to cancel the surprises and the contingencies that test and toughen the bonds between parents and children. I'm not sure quality is worth it." Unconditionality. That gets pretty close to the heart of the matter.

■ The ultimate victory of story over theory—and specifically the biblical story over Communist theory—is the theme of a lecture by James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress, reflecting on China and Russia: "If Americans cannot penetrate into the interior spiritual dialogue of other peoples, they will never be able to understand, let alone anticipate or affect, the discontinuous major changes which are the driving forces in history and which will probably continue to spring unexpected traps in the years ahead. To put it another way, if we cannot learn to listen to others as they whisper their prayers, we may well confront them later on when they howl their war cries. Even if cultural gaps cannot be bridged, one becomes a better person and more appreciative of one's *own* culture by the very attempt to understand someone else's. I recently returned from China, about whose past I am largely ignorant and about whose future I am not so optimistic as many Americans. I was particularly moved in ancient Xian by one lonely stone slab which is all that remains of the Nestorian Christianity that penetrated China at the end of the first Christian millennium before disappearing without a trace. Halfway through the second millennium, the Christians came again in the most nearly successful attempt to bridge the gap between the West and China: the great Jesuit mission to China. When the Jesuits ultimately left China in failure at the beginning of the eighteenth century (as America's own missionaries were forced to do when the Communists took over in the twentieth), they left behind a moving epitaph. 'Go now, voyager. Congratulate the dead. Console the living. Pray for everyone. Wonder and be silent.' It is in prayer, wonder, and silence that one sometimes best finds understanding of others. I felt some of that as I wandered silently and alone through the streets of Moscow after experiencing the forty-eight exhilarating hours that shook the world in August 1991, listening to people constantly repeat the word *chudo* or miracle and marvel in whispers that Russia had been transformed on the Feast of the Transfiguration—the miraculous first appearance of Christ in a transformed state before His disciples on Mt. Tabor. It was the persecuted literature and religion of Russia, not the vaunted megacomputers of the West, that saw it all coming. Even during the depths of the Cold War, Pasternak had written at the end of *Dr. Zhivago* that 'Although victory had not brought the relief and freedom that were expected at the end of the war, nevertheless portents of freedom filled the air throughout the postwar period, and they alone defined its historical significance.'"

■ Yet another catalogue from a Christian publisher of "very inspirational" books, or so it says here. We receive mountains of these. The sorry fact is that some Christian communities are book happy the way boxers are punch-drunk. A person gets a spiritual buzz and it sets off an automatic reflex to write another How-Jesus-Makes-Me-Happy book. Apparently there is an almost unlimited market for such pap. Meanwhile, the great classics of Christian literature are neglected, including eminently accessible classics. Even worse, the hack writers of the inspiration trade typically treat the Bible as though nobody had read it before, dishing up their fatuities with the excitement of fresh discoveries. Admittedly, some of the "discoveries" are amusingly inventive. Here is a little book announcing that Jesus is risen, rah, rah, rah, and wants Christians to be happy and healthy. We know he wants us to be healthy because John 20 says that Peter and John ran to the empty tomb and running is good for you. Moreover, John, who is the disciple of love, ran faster, which shows that the more we love the better we run. This is heavy-duty exegesis. It was with some relief, therefore, that I read the good news in this morning's paper. For some years now we've been getting these quite different reports on the connection between exercise and health. My doctor bought the one that prescribed at least forty minutes of discomfort per day, so for a long time I was jogging, sort of. Then I read this report that said the key thing is simply to move around enough to break sweat, which was really easy to do on hot days. But this morning there is this story on a nineteen-year study of sixteen thousand twins in Finland which controls for heredity and concludes that "taking brisk half-hour walks just six times a month cuts the risk of death by 44 percent." I'm not a twin and I suspect I'm among those who are at risk of dying some day, but the news is getting better and better.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pretty soon there will be a study showing that all the exercise you need is getting out of bed in the morning. Our ever-alert Christian publishers will undoubtedly come out with books on the discipleship of the sedentary life. Nor will they lack a biblical foundation. Look at all those people in the Bible to whom God spoke in dreams, while nobody ever got a revelation while jogging. Then there's Psalm 46: "Be still and know that I am God." Is any further proof needed?

■ The 1998 Winter Olympic games brought it into focus again, the pathetic ups and downs of Japan on the world stage. Pathetic, I mean, in the sense of pathos. In his 1952 book, *The Lost Japan*, Hasegawa Nyozekan wrote: "We must direct our efforts towards turning in the reverse direction the cultural nature of the Japanese, which hitherto has had a propensity for the intuitive, until it shows instead a propensity for the intellectual." He had a rather rationalistic notion of "the intellectual," and one might wonder whether in fact the Japanese have not, by virtue of the mystic intuition that Nyozekan scorned, achieved a stunning mastery of at least the products of the intellectual. Until very recently, we were deluged with books telling us that Japan Inc. had beaten the rest of the world at their economic games, and the rising sun was the universal future. Then Japan went into an economic tailspin, and we are told that their success was superficial, that they had never grasped the inner workings (whatever that may be) of the market economy. Similarly, Japan has been the object of Christian missionary endeavors for half a millennium, although there is very little gain in terms of the number of converts. Yet here, too, the Japanese have seized upon the trappings of Christianity, as witness the popularity of "Christian" weddings, weddings that are Christian in all but faith commitment. In Samuel Huntington's grand scheme of clashing world civilizations, Japan, unlike the other civilizational constellations, stands alone. Its very mirroring of cultural artifacts not its own seems to be its own cultural identity. There are, for instance, these CDs of Bach cantatas given me by my friend Russell Hittinger (BIS CD-781). Imagine "Aus der Tiefe rufe ich" by the Bach Collegium Japan, conducted by Masaaki Suzuki. The cantatas are exquisitely articulated in both pronunciation and pace, and I can imagine someone dismissing this as a curiosity, the ultimate superficial trickery in Japanese mimicry. But I suspect that is a mistake. I do not go so far as to claim that the music of Johann Sebastian Bach is a sacrament, but it is sacramental in its potency. Play around with the aesthetics of it long enough, and grace is likely to take hold. All these centuries of missionary effort, it is said, and so little *to show for it*. But then there is the Bach Collegium Japan, playing the most fulfilled musical expression of the Christian faith, which expression plants the seeds of faith in an intuitive and intellectual culture that might grow those seeds according to its own genius. Or so we may think, and so we may hope.

■ Last year a committee of the U.S. bishops conference put out a statement on homosexuality, "Always Our Children," that received massive criticism. After consultation with concerned bishops and with Rome, the statement has now been issued in revised form. The old statement advised parents whose teenage children "may be experimenting with some homosexual behaviors" that "sometimes, the best approach may be a 'wait and see' attitude." That drew a lot of fire and the new statement replaces it with more sensible counsel, concluding with, "Parents must always be vigilant about their children's behavior and exercise responsible interventions when necessary." Of course, the old statement is still out there in thousands of copies that are adroitly used by activists in spreading the word that the Church has changed its teaching on homosexual behavior. And the question remains whether parents really needed instruction from the bishops that they should not disown children who are wrestling with problems of "sexual identity." Nonetheless, some people might be pleased to know that there is a revised statement, even if it is an effort to clean up a mess that should not have been made in the first place.

■ Who can you trust anymore? Here's a release announcing that the *National Catholic Reporter* has sold its book division, Sheed & Ward. It used to be that you could count on *NCR* to excoriate wicked corporations that in their greed for profits closed down plants and threw workers out of their jobs. Now we are told that the editor and book division staff have been "terminated" by *NCR* because of "the small profit margin" in recent years. Not to worry. For some reason, I am confident there will be no let-up in the excoriation of other capitalist culprits.

■ The BBC show *Ballykissangel* is possessed of a "subversive nature," says the *New York Times* television guide, but gets away with poking fun at Catholicism because the Brits have a deft touch that we Americans presumably lack. By comparison the ABC show, *Nothing Sacred*, which "dealt bluntly with such topics as loss of faith, illicit sex, and clerical corruption, lost chunks of advertising after being attacked by conservative Catholic groups and was canceled by ABC in midseason." I seem to recall that the cancellation of *Nothing Sacred* had something to do with the fact that almost nobody was watching it.

■ This from a profile of Poland in the April issue of the newsletter of National Religious Broadcasters: "The percentage of practicing Christians is tiny (perhaps half of one percent, or seventy to eighty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thousand), as more than 90 percent of the population is Roman Catholic." ECT anyone?

■ To say that people should be interested in something they're not interested in can be a turn-off, but I'll do it anyway. We should all be a good deal more interested than most of us are in the state of religion, culture, and politics in Russia. Those who are or might be interested will be interested in the big (738 pages) Winter 1998 issue of *Emory International Law Review*, which is chock full of interesting articles and is available for $20 from Emory University School of Law, Gambrell Hall, Atlanta, Georgia 30322. (I would be interested in knowing whether the seven uses of "interesting" or "interested" in this item will produce as many sales.)

■ In the event you're ever in Malta. The search for anti-Semitism goes on relentlessly, and then it sometimes hits you in the face. On one side of the door of the Shrine to Our Lady Tapinu on the island of Gozo is a sign in English calling for "silence and decency in dress" and forbidding shorts, mini-skirts, and animals. On the other side of the door the sign in Maltese reads, "GHAJJAT JEW DISKORS BLABZONN . . . MINI-SKIRTS JEW HOT PANTS." A deeply shocked tourist of the Protestant persuasion took pictures of the signs and wanted to know what the Church was going to do about this outrage. I dutifully passed on the inquiry to Rome and the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews dutifully looked into the matter, and sent back a letter, along with an extended dictionary entry, explaining that the word "jew" in Maltese is a conjunction meaning "or" and has nothing whatever to do with Jewish people. Would that all misunderstandings were so easily resolved.

■ How touching is the simple faith of the true believer. Steven Marcus, distinguished professor of the humanities at Columbia University, writing in the *New York Times* celebrates the 150th anniversary of the *Communist Manifesto*. He is captivated by the soaring rage of its rhetoric: "What the bourgeoisie produces, above all, are its own gravediggers. . . . The working men have no country. . . . The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win." Mr. Marcus allows that "there is much of importance the Manifesto did not get right: the revolution it hailed was not successful; the proletariat did not become the gravediggers of the bourgeoisie; the ever-deeper pauperization of the working class was not part of the system's 'inevitable tendencies.'" Then comes the true believer's great "Nevertheless." "Nevertheless, it got certain things right as no other work of its time, or any other time, did. A century and a half afterward, it remains a classic expression of the society it anatomized and whose doom it prematurely announced." The fact is that, as much as any attempt at comprehensive analysis can, the Manifesto and the movement it engendered got everything wrong. From its economic anthropology, to class struggle as the key to world history, to the role of the state in liberating the worker, Marxism has been devastatingly falsified by the very history it appealed to for vindication. Along the way to its falsification, about a hundred million people were murdered in its name, and a billion more are still struggling to free themselves from its oppressive legacy. Nothing daunted, Mr. Marcus says that Marx's announcement of the kingdom was simply premature. One is reminded of Chesterton: "'The Christian ideal,' it is said, 'has not been tried and found wanting: it has been found difficult and left untried.'" At least Christian eschatological faith has the historical fact of the resurrection going for it—and that it never promised its fulfillment on earth.

■ You come across his name regularly, and almost always attached to the adjective "controversial" or, amounting to the same thing, "conservative." A recent column by a critic observed that "despite his relentlessly polemical style" he sometimes has an important point. Anyone who knows Michael Novak knows that this is utter rot. He's one of the sweetest human beings you're ever likely to meet. We have been hanging out together for years beyond counting, and more times than I want to remember he has driven me up the wall with his inexhaustible patience with interlocutors who, in my judgment, had long since worn out their welcome. He should have been a priest. He almost was. But God had other plans and his virtues were turned to marriage, and to being the kind of father who, with his daughter Jana, can write the kind of book that is *Tell Me Why: A Father Answers His Daughter's Questions About God* (Pocket Books, 319 pp., $24). Mary Ann Glendon says, "Its subtitle should be: 'Everything you want your son or daughter to know about God, faith, and morals, but were afraid you couldn't put into words.'" Book blurbs should be taken with a grain of salt, but I know these are heartfelt: From William F. Buckley, Michael Medved, Archbishop Rembert Weakland, John Cardinal O'Connor, Rabbi Marc Gellman, Father Avery Dulles, Steve Allen, and Charles Colson. I put in my oar with this: "Parents and children all over America should turn off the television, read this book, and then embark together on a similar conversation into the things that matter most." I meant that, and I mean it. So let's hear no more about that polemical Michael Novak. "Sympathetic, wise, and lucid" are the adjectives suggested by Fr. Dulles, and he is right.

■ Of the people who have had the greatest influence on my life, Arthur Carl Piepkorn is right up there. He was professor at Concordia Theological Seminary, St. Louis, for many years and was a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pioneer of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic theological dialogue. Dr. Piepkorn ("the Pieps") died twenty-five years ago on December 13, 1973. There will be a memorial lecture honoring him on Sunday, December 13, at five o'clock at Immanuel Lutheran Church, 88th Street and Lexington Avenue in Manhattan. The lecture is by Professor Robert Louis Wilken of the University of Virginia, another close student of Piepkorn's, with responses by Professors George Lindbeck and William Wiecher of Yale, and your scribe. For further information call Immanuel Church at (212) 289-8128. The church will also provide a light supper afterwards, but you must make your reservation at least two weeks in advance.

■ Last month we noted ("Setback in Rome") the widespread disappointment among both Lutherans and Catholics over Rome's criticisms of the "Joint Declaration" on justification by faith. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), has responded strongly to reports that the document was "torpedoed at the last minute" because of his disagreement with the Council for Christian Unity. He notes that CDF and the Council emphatically affirm that the declaration does represent a consensus in "basic truths of the doctrine of justification." Rome did indicate questions that need further exploration, he says, but in doing so was only agreeing with many Lutheran theologians and churches who had reservations about the Lutheran World Federation's approval of the Joint Declaration. Ratzinger's concern is "to find a language which can make the doctrine on justification again so intelligible as to be experienced as the core of Christian existence and as a response to the basic experience of being human. If we tackle this task together, we are most likely to overcome the historical oppositions." He observes that he was the one largely responsible for taking up the question of the condemnations of the sixteenth century and how to overcome them. "I would be in contradiction with myself if all of a sudden I were to claim the contrary," he adds. In sum, whatever the reservations and criticisms expressed by Rome, these "must not be seen as withdrawing the explicitly stated consensus in basic truths."

■ Responses to the spoof on how various figures, past and present, might answer the question, Why did the chicken cross the road?, have amused. George R. Weber of Portland, Oregon, for example, has Dr. Laura Schlessinger saying, "Chickens have got to learn to stay where they are supposed to," while Edmund Burke opines, "The motives of chickens are in a sort of *middle*, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned." Others suggested how the question might be answered by such as Bill and Hillary Clinton and Sidney Blumenthal. The responses seemed quite clever at the time, but you will understand that, in view of the presidency's sad descent and soon disappearance into the slough of mendacity, we will take a pass on them.

■ *We will be pleased to send a sample issue of this journal to people you think are likely subscribers. Please send names and addresses to* FIRST THINGS, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010 (or e-mail to Ravaughan@aol.com). On the other hand, if they're ready to subscribe, call toll-free 1-800-783-4903.

Sources: On Florida bishop guilty of molestation twenty-five years ago, *Tampa Tribune*, June 4, 1998. Burt Neuborne on Swiss banks and the Holocaust, *New York Times*, June 24, 1998; on Norway and the Holocaust, *New York Times*, June 27, 1998.

WHILE WE'RE AT IT: D. M. Thomas' *Alexandr Solzhenitsyn: A Century in His Life* reviewed by George Steiner, *New York Review of Books*, March 1, 1998. On the filming of *Message in a Bottle* being rejected by town council of Tangier Island, *Virginian-Pilot*, March 12, 1998. Louis Dupré on the idea of a Christian philosopher, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, Volume LXXI 1997. On membership of Southern Baptist Convention, *Religion Watch*, April 1998. George Tinker on classism, sexism, and racism, *Catholic Northwest Progress*, May 7, 1998. *The Fantasy Factory* by Amy Flowers reviewed in *Publishers Weekly*, March 2, 1998. Episcopal letters on liturgy by RC bishops of Youngstown, Ohio, and Erie, Pennsylvania, reprinted in *Origins*, April 23, 1998. Margaret Talbot on advertisements for egg donors, *New Republic*, March 16, 1998. On Finnish health study, Associated Press, February 10, 1998. On revised version of "Always Our Children," *Origins*, July 2, 1998. On *National Catholic Reporter* selling its book division (Sheed & Ward), press release, June 29, 1998. *Ballykissangel* and *Nothing Sacred* discussed, *TV Guide*, June 19, 1998. Profile of Poland, newsletter of National Religious Broadcasters, April 1998. Steven Marcus on the *Communist Manifesto* in *New York Times Book Review*, April 25, 1998. On Joint Declaration, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 14, 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED ADVERTISEMENTS

EDUCATION

ARTES LATINAE, self-teaching, programmed Latin course for use in classroom or by individuals at home. For more information: 502-897-5578 or email tim_fout@ntr.net

THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION that is biblical, classical, Reformed, and scholarly. M.Div., M.Rel., M.A., D.Min., Knox Theological Seminary, Fort Lauderdale. Call 1-800-344-5669 for more information.

EMPLOYMENT

PRIEST ASSOCIATE WANTED: Lively, loving Episcopal church seeks full-time priest associate to equip congregation for ministry—especially youth, eventually adults also. Oversight responsibility for youth and education, assist rector in worship. Must be ordained or soon to be. Life experience desirable. Send application letter and resume to David McKnight, Messiah Episcopal Church, 1631 Ford Parkway, St. Paul, Minnesota 55116.

SOFTWARE

BIBLE AND THEOLOGY DISCOUNT SOFTWARE. Huge discounts on Anchor Bible Dictionary, Hermeneutika's BibleWorks, and products of most electronic publishers of Bibles and books (Logos, Parsons, NavPress, OSV, etc.). Also Catholic software. **www.BibleTheology.com, 800-548-6678.**

Introduce a Student to a Whole New World of Challenging Ideas!

GIVE A GIFT SUBSCRIPTION AT OUR LOW STUDENT RATE

College or seminary is a good start. Now it's time to let FIRST THINGS open the doors to a "higher education" in religion, ethics, and other great issues of our common life. Our reduced student rate makes it easier than ever to send 10 thought-provoking issues of FIRST THINGS to your favorite student(s). One year is only $14.97 -- more than $14 off the basic rate.

Don't wait! Give a gift that will engage a young mind. Send in the special savings coupon attached.

ONLY $14.97 FOR 10 MIND-OPENING ISSUES

FIRST THINGS STUDENT GIFT SAVINGS COUPON

YES! Send one year (10 issues) of FIRST THINGS to the student below for only $14.97 which is more than $14 off the regular subscription price.

☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Bill me ○ Charge my ☐ VISA ☐ MasterCard

Card #_____ Expiration Date_____

Please add $6 to foreign orders. Students will receive a handsome gift card announcing your gift.

YOUR NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY/STATE/ZIP _____

61198

STUDENT'S NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY/STATE/ZIP _____

Please mail this coupon to FIRST THINGS, P.O. Box 3000, Denville, NJ 07834-9847

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mark Your Calendar Today!

JUSTICE FELLOWSHIP®

Please plan now to join us for Justice Fellowship's

National Forum on Restorative Justice

"Beyond Crime and Punishment"

February 18-19, 1999 • Washington, D.C.

Who Should Attend:
Policy makers, religious leaders, attorneys, judges, opinion leaders, academics, criminal justice professionals.

- **Dynamic Plenary Sessions** with nationally-recognized leaders in the restorative justice movement
- **Exciting Breakouts** with plenty of time for questions, comments, engaging dialogue and interaction with panels
- **Tremendous Location** at the luxurious, recently-remodeled Hyatt Regency Washington on Capitol Hill
- **Superb Meals** include breakfast buffet, two seated luncheons, a seated dinner, and our Grand Dinner Banquet with keynote speaker **Chuck Colson**

Confirmed Keynote Speaker:
Chuck Colson

Are you dissatisfied with the current criminal justice system?

Do you think victims and communities should have a voice in repairing the damage done by crime?

Does the Church have a Biblical responsibility to actively engage all areas of the culture, including the criminal justice system?

If you answered yes, then come to our national forum and learn:

- ✔ What the Biblical principles of restorative justice are and how they can be applied in your life.
- ✔ How successful programs across the nation have applied the principles of restorative justice and what impact they are having.
- ✔ How your church can effectively assist all those affected by crime.

Invited Speakers Include

Jacqueline L. Schneider, Ph.D.
Crime Control Policy Center
Hudson Institute

Gordon Bazemore
Community Justice Institute
Florida Atlantic University

Ron Claussen
Center for Peacemaking and Conflict Studies
Fresno Pacific University

Pat Nolan
President
Justice Fellowship

Dr. Karen Strong
Co-author,
Restoring Justice
Prison Fellowship Ministries

Dr. Dan Van Ness
Co-author,
Restoring Justice
Prison Fellowship International

Mark Umbreit
Center for Restorative Justice & Mediation
University of Minnesota

Lisa Barnes Lampman
President
Neighbors Who Care

Dr. Howard Zehr
Professor of Sociology and Restorative Justice
Eastern Mennonite University

For more information:

call Ron Rosenberger at 1-800-217-2743 ext. 698
or visit Justice Fellowship's website at www.justicefellowship.org

Justice Fellowship is the nonprofit, public policy arm of Prison Fellowship Ministries

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOIN THE CATHOLIC REVOLUTION!

There's a revolution going on that's changing the face of the Church in America. Ordinary Catholics are learning and living the Faith like never before; they're renewing Catholic culture and making converts. Their secret? They fill their minds and hearts with Catholic truth.

This revolution is so sweeping that Evangelical and Fundamentalist Christians are converting to the Catholic Faith in droves, with a fervor unparalleled in the history of the Church in America!

Now there's a magazine promoting this Catholic revolution: ***Catholic Dossier***. Edited by philosopher and bestselling novelist Ralph McInerny, each issue of ***Catholic Dossier*** tackles a single subject and thoroughly examines it, from every angle — theology, philosophy, apologetics, history, fiction, law, science, art, and much more. ***Catholic Dossier's*** outstanding writers include: Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, O.P., James Hitchcock, William E. May, Janet Smith, Msgr. George Kelly, John Kippley, Helen Hull Hitchcock, Fr. Benedict Groeschel, C.F.R., Jude P. Dougherty, Fr. Giles Dimock, O.P., Douglas Bushman, Mary Kay Clark, Gerry Bradley, Charles Rice, Russell Hittinger, Michael Novak, Fr. James Schall, S.J., Mary Rousseau, Fr. Benedict Ashley, O.P., Father Stanley Jaki, O.S.B., Fr. Kenneth Baker, S.J., and many more. . .

Catholic Dossier is a compendium of Catholic faith and culture, a handbook for 21st century Catholicism. There's no other publication like it! Recent and upcoming issues include: Sacred Scripture, Homosexuality, Suicide and Euthanasia, Feminism, the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Eucharist, Modernism, Church Architecture and Christian Marriage.

Catholic Dossier's penetrating approach to Catholic beliefs and today's pressing theological, philosophical and social issues is why so many top Catholic leaders and thinkers read it.

"***Catholic Dossier*** is one of the brightest lights in current Catholic publishing. The writing is done with exceptional flair and wit, and I look forward eagerly to each issue."

— Bishop Fabian Bruskewitz
Bishop of Lincoln, Nebraska

"Just when one thinks that such magazines have nearly disappeared from the American scene, there comes ***Catholic Dossier***, a lively journal where one can encounter the best of Catholic thought and writing."

— Mary Ann Glendon
Professor, Harvard Law School

"I love ***Catholic Dossier***. It's the best new magazine to come out in years — hard hitting yet balanced and witty. McInerny's style is a delight."

— Dr. Scott Hahn,
Franciscan University

GET YOUR FREE BOOK, TOO!

Subscribe to ***Catholic Dossier*** now! And get Father Peter Stravinskas's outstanding book, ***The Catholic Church and the Bible***, FREE! This book defends the Catholic view of the Bible against anti-Catholic attack and gives readers the biblical basis for Catholic Tradition. It's yours FREE for trying ***Catholic Dossier***. If you're not satisfied, you can cancel and receive a refund on the unused portion of your subscription. You keep ***The Catholic Church and the Bible*** as our "thank you" for giving ***Catholic Dossier*** a try.

CATHOLIC
DOSSIER
ISSUES IN THE ROUND

P.O. Box 591120, San Francisco, CA 94159-1120

Name _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

Yes! I want to be part of the revolution that's transforming the Church and our world. Sign me up for ***Catholic Dossier*** today and send me my ***FREE*** book! My payment is enclosed.

	USA	Canadian* *(airmail)*	Foreign *(surface)*	Foreign *(airmail)*
☐ 1 year *(6 issues)*	$29.95	$39.05	$40.95	$46.95
☐ 2 years *(12 issues)*	$57.95	$76.01	$79.95	$91.95
☐ 3 years *(18 issues)*	$85.85	$112.86	$118.85	$136.85

All prices are in U.S. dollars. *Canadian prices include GST.

www.ignatius.com

Or call 1-800-651-1531 (credit cards only)

DS1FIP

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED